Aviation Law Monitor : Aviation Lawyer & Attorney : Michael Danko Law Firm : California Airplane & Helicopter Crashes : Aviation Law Monitor

A jury in Washington state handed down a $26 million verdict against Avco Lycoming as a result of a fatal Cessna 172 crash that killed three people in 2008.  The  jury's award included $6 million in punitive damages, designed to punish Lycoming for consciously disregarding the safety of the flying public.

It's the second time a jury has slammed Lycoming with punitive damages for its carb floats. In 2010, a jury awarded $89 million, including $64 million in punitive damages, as a result of 1999 Cherokee 6 crash that killed four and injured one.

This case, however, was a bit different. It was the judge who ruled that Lycoming was responsible for the crash before the case ever reached the jury.  All that was left for the jury to decide was how much to include in its verdict.  The judge ruled against Lycoming because it refused to turn over relevant documents in the case.  Apparently, the documents were so incriminating that Lycoming felt it was better to suffer a certain jury verdict than to allow the documents to see the light of day. 

[I]n December 2005, Lycoming participated in a series of emails discussing the leaking Delrin Float issue, none of which Lycoming produced during discovery. The series of emails informs Lycoming of the significance of the Delrin float leaking problem. In the emails, Lycoming employees state that it is clear that hollow plastic carb floats can leak, allowing fuel to enter the interior of the floats. The emails reflect that there was also a recent inflight [engine] stoppage. The email also recognized the danger of discussing the defects in writing: “It is too bad that we have to answer in writing on such a touchy issue.”

Plaintiffs asked Lycoming to turn over the rest of the emails on the subject, including those that went to upper managment.  The emails would have been important evidence that Lycoming knew the floats leaked and could cause engine failure. But Lycoming refused. So the court ordered Lycoming to turn them over. Lycoming still refused. 

Lycoming's  willful and deliberate refusal to follow the court’s order prevented plaintiffs from proving their case. So the court did the only thing that was fair and ruled that the floats were defective and caused the accident.

The Judge's order is an interesting read. 

Judge's Sanctions Order Against Lycoming

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

An Fixed-Base Operator will sometimes tell the pilot to whom it rents an aircraft that, in the event of an accident, the pilot may be held responsible for the FBO's deductible.  From that, pilots sometimes conclude that their liability will be limited to the amount of the deductible, and that everything else is "covered."

Not so.  Not only can the FBO pursue the pilot for the deductible, but the FBO's insurance company can (and often does) pursue the pilot for the full amount it pays to the FBO for the damage to the aircraft.  In other words, the renter pilot can be held responsible for the entire loss.

But more importantly, the FBO's policy doesn't necessarily cover the renter pilot for any injury or death he may cause to others. That was the recent holding in Knezovich v. Hallmark Insurance, an Illinois case arising from a fatal midair collision between a Cirrus and a Cessna in Wyoming. The families of those killed in the Cirrus sued the estate of Cessna pilot, claiming the Cessna pilot caused the crash. The court ruled that the FBO's insurance policy didn't protect the pilot at all (or, more accurately, his estate) and that the insurance company didn't even have to hire the renter pilot's estate a lawyer to defend against the wrongful death lawsuit brought against it.  In short, the estate was on its own.

Aviation lawyer Greg Reigel sums it up:

Although this is an unfortunate situation for the deceased pilot's estate, this case serves as a reminder to anyone who rents aircraft to confirm that insurance coverage is in place that will protect the renter. It isn't enough to simply ask the FBO or aircraft owner whether they have insurance. You need to be sure that coverage is in place to protect you, the person renting the aircraft. If the aircraft owner's or FBO's insurance doesn't provide coverage, you need to know that so you can understand your risk and either obtain coverage elsewhere or go without.

Of course, not only was the situation unfortunate for the estate of the Cessna pilot, but it was unfortunate for the families of the others killed in the accident.  Even assuming that they prove the crash was caused entirely by the Cessna pilot, unlike the FBO, its unlikely they will ever be fully compensated.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The NTSB has determined that the probable cause of the Galloping Ghost’s crash at last year’s Reno Air Races was flutter. No surprise there -- I wrote about flutter within hours of the accident. At its presentation, the NTSB even showed the same NASA video demonstrating flutter that I had posted last year.

Flutter can occur whenever an aircraft is flown faster than it is designed to fly. As it turned out, Jimmy Leeward, the pilot of Galloping Ghost, exceeded by nearly 40 mph the aircraft’s previous top speed without any previous testing to determine if the aircraft would be able to resist flutter at the new speeds. As it turned out, it couldn’t. Board member (and pilot) Robert Sumwalt was highly critical of Leeward’s decision to fly the aircraft in competition without first testing it at race speeds:

If you want to go out and fly fast and try to win, that's one thing. If you're modifying an aircraft without fully understanding how the modifications can affect the aerodynamics, you're playing Russian roulette.”

A loose trim tab assembly contributed to the flutter’s onset. The assembly came apart because the lock nuts that held it in place had been reused multiple times. That’s a no-no. Each time locknuts are removed and then re-tightened, they lose a bit of their ability to grip. That’s why once removed, locknuts should always be replaced with new.

What was surprising was the NTSB’s sentiments concerning “assumption of risk”.  According to the NTSB board chair Deborah Hersman:

At the heart of the tragedy was the fatal intersection in transference of risks from participant to observers. One moment, spectators were thrilled at the spectacle of speed only to have it followed by inescapable tragedy. The pilots understood the risks they assumed. The spectators assumed that their safety had been assessed.”

Those sentiments echoed what I wrote here.  Judging from readers’ comments to that post, many disagree.

Transcript of the NTSB presentation here.

All this blog's Reno Air Crash posts here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Why doesn’t the FAA do a better job of promoting aviation safety?

1. The FAA’s Inherent Conflict of Interest.  When the FAA was created, it was charged with both regulating aviation and promoting it. But most aviation regulations don't promote aviation -- they constrain it. The FAA’s inherent conflict of interest explains why the FAA so often ignores the NTSB’s aviation safety recommendations.

2. The Problem of the Captive Regulator.  Putting aside the inherent conflict of interest, the FAA is simply too close to the industry it regulates to do an effective job. This problem is not unique to aviation.   For example, the drug industry has tremendous influence over its regulating agency, the FDA.  We saw that play out most recently last year, when we learned that a number of the FDA committee members who voted against requiring stronger warnings on a drug's label had economic ties with the drug's manufacturer. In California, we learned that the Public Utilities Commission was too cozy with the gas utility it was supposed to regulate. It let the utility slide again and again until September 2010 when a gas explosion in San Bruno killed 8 and damaged or destroyed more than 40 homes.

3. Bureaucratic Incompetence.  Sometimes, it seems that bureaucratic incompetence is the simplest reason for the FAA’s failure to act in the face of a known ongoing hazard. What else explains the night vision goggle debacle?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

At first glance, one might expect that high density altitude was the cause of last week’s fatal Comanche crash at Truckee-Tahoe airport.  The pilot first attempted to depart with three aboard, but aborted the takeoff.  He then offloaded his two passengers and tried again.  It was on the second attempt that the pilot crashed into hangars.

No doubt about it:  Because of its altitude, Truckee is a difficult airport, especially in the summer when the air is thinnest.  In fact, last week’s crash was the ninth at the airport in the past four years.  High density altitude played a role in a number of those crashes, including the Karen Trolan crash.

But the facts don’t quite add up on last week’s accident.  The pilot flying the accident aircraft (Piper N8218P) was very experienced – he reportedly had in excess of 6000 flight hours.  And though a departure with three aboard may have taxed the abilities of the plane and its pilot, with only the pilot aboard, there shouldn’t have been much of a problem.

Whenever an aircraft crashes on takeoff, the NTSB tests the fuel supply at the departure airport.  It’s always possible that an engine failure contributed to the crash, and one possible cause of an engine failure is contaminated fuel.

Today word is out that the fuel supply at Truckee did not meet the standards.

From an email I received from San Mateo County Airport: 

After a fatal accident at Truckee (KTRK) on the 2nd of August, the industry-standard practice of halting fuel service and testing the fuel in all tanks and trucks revealed that the 100LL fuel stored at KTRK did not meet the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards for 100LL.  As a result of these tests, 100LL fuel service at the airport continues to be suspended pending new fuel and testing of its quality.

Truckee Airport has been trying to get in touch with all pilots who purchased fuel between July 20th (the last fuel delivery) and August 2nd (the day of the accident) and have asked us to pass along this information to pilots at San Carlos/Half Moon Bay.  Questions about the above-mentioned issue should be directed to World Fuel Service's area representative Mike Montalvo at: 510-604-6511.

The test results don't prove that bad fuel caused the Comanche crash but, at this point, bad fuel can't be ruled out.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Pilots have come to accept that aircraft fuel gauges just don’t work well. In fact, many pilots simply assume the fuel gauge is wrong, believing it’s safer to rely on their own calculations concerning the amount of fuel remaining rather than on the gauge. As the old saw goes,  “never trust your life to a gauge.” 

Good idea. Usually.  But sometimes skepticism about fuel gauges can lead to an accident.

The pilot and one of his passengers were killed when the Cessna 172 crashed in Tennessee. The second passenger survived. The NTSB determined that the plane ran out of gas. How can this happen? According to the NTSB report, it seems the pilot may have miscalculated the amount of fuel necessary for the trip because he didn’t know the engine horsepower had been increased by an STC, and thus burned more fuel than an unmodified aircraft..

But still, the aircraft did have a working fuel gauge. What the NTSB’s report does not discuss is why the pilot ignored it.

The pilot and passengers were apparently from the U.K.  Last week, the Welch coroner held an inquest, at which the surviving passenger testified. The passenger explained that he had been sleeping in the back seat. He woke up and:

I glanced over to look at the instruments and just noticed the fuel gauge had a low indication. I brought it to the knowledge of [the pilot]. He said ‘I’ve done a maths calculation about the distance and I trust my maths more than a 1969 fuel gauge’.

Was the pilot arrogant?  Or was he just sucked in by the common belief that aircraft fuel gauges are seldom accurate?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

More than 30 Cessna 208 and 208B Caravans have crashed when their wings iced up in flight. Victims’ families have filed many product defect lawsuits against Cessna, claiming that Cessna concealed from the pilots defects in the aircraft’s deicing system. Silvey v. Cessna is the first case to reach trial. At least the first that I know of.

Silvey, which is pending in federal court in Fort Worth, Texas, involves a Caravan that crashed near Parks, Arizona in November 2002.  The pilot reported encountering light icing. According to the NTSB report, a short time later, a witness saw the aircraft come spinning out of the clouds with its nose pointed down. All four on board were killed on impact.

After that crash, the FAA issued at least three airworthiness directives against the Cessna Caravan, all concerning the aircraft’s deicing system.  Cessna asked the Silvey trial judge, the Honorable Terry Means, to keep the airworthiness directives from the jury.  Cessna argued that since the FAA didn't issue the airworthiness directives until after the accident, they are not relevant. The judge declined to rule whether the evidence will come in or stay out. Instead, he ruled that he’d have to see how the trials goes before deciding.

Three of the airworthiness directives at issue are:

• AD 2005-07-01, prohibiting takeoff when there is any ice on the aircraft, and requiring pilots to feel the wings for ice rather than simply inspect visually;
• AD 2006-01-11 requiring owners to modify the aircraft’s deicing system to legally fly in icing conditions; and
• AD 2006-06-06 prohibiting flight in anything other than “light” icing conditions, requiring pilots to maintain higher air speeds when climbing through ice, and advising pilots that the aircraft’s stall warning system cannot be relied on in icing conditions.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (8)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

No conclusion yet as to exactly what caused the Galloping Ghost to crash last September at the Reno Air Races. But the interim report the NTSB issued today disclosed that the Galloping Ghost experienced an “upset” 6 seconds before it lost its left elevator trim tab. That, in turn, caused the aircraft to go out of control.  None of that  information is really new, and was discussed shortly after the accident in this post and in the post's many thoughtful comments.

The NTSB also issued safety recommendations that specifically questioned whether the Galloping Ghost had been properly tested at race speeds or otherwise evaluated for resistance to “flutter;” an aerodynamic phenomenon that can destroy an aircraft in seconds. But that’s not news either -- flutter and its possible role in this crash was discussed the day after the crash here.

There is one fact, however, that we didn’t know before. Race officials inspected the aircraft just before the race and determined that the aircraft’s trim tab’s screws were too short. But the NTSB could find no documentation that the screws had been replaced and the discrepancy resolved before the race started. Though the race inspector stated that he verified that all the aircraft’s discrepancies had been resolved, the NTSB recommended that, in the future, race organizers develop a system that tracks discrepancies found during pre-race technical inspections and ensures that they have been resolved before an aircraft is allowed to race As the NSTB put it:

without a method to track discrepancies to resolution, conducting pre-race inspections is of limited value.

The NTSB’s interim report doesn’t say whether the screws were, in fact, replaced. For that, we’ll have to wait for the NTSB to issue its factual report. But even without a system for race officials to track discrepancies, whenever a mechanic performs any work on an aircraft, he is supposed to record that work in the aircraft’s maintenance logs.  If there’s no entry in the Galloping Ghost’s logbooks showing that the screws were changed, that’s evidence that the work wasn’t done, or at least wasn’t done properly.

Besides recommending that race officials establish a better system of ensuring that aircraft discrepancies are repaired before race time, it issued recommendations that would, among other things:  

• Require race pilots to be trained to tolerate or avoid high g-loadings;
• Revise the mathematical formulas used to lay out the race courses;
• Require aircraft to be tested at race speeds before they be allowed to compete; and
• Require pilots to practice on the actual race course before being allowed to compete.

Related Content:

• NTSB to Quiz Airshow Industry
• Airport Seeks to Influence NTSB
• Reno Air Race Lawsuits and the Assumption of Risk Defense
• Victims' Lawsuits Against FAA Will Face Hurdles
• Reno Air Race Disaster No Freak Accident
• Leeward a Hero?
• Leeward's P-51 Lost Trim Tab

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Can any question remain about the R44's tendency to roll over and catch fire?  It happened again yesterday, in Glendale Arizona.  This time, the helicopter had barely gotten off the ground. 

Fortunately, no one was hurt.  But the story is becoming all too familiar. According to the Arizona Republic:

A mechanic was testing the engine of the Robinson R-44 helicopter when he lost control and it came down on its side and caught fire.

Helicopters aren't supposed to catch fire in survivable accidents.  But Robinsons do just that because their fuel tanks are defectively designed.  This latest fire happened little more than a few weeks after an R44 accident killed filmmakers Mike deGruy and Andrew Wight.  That crash led well-known aviation attorney Ladd Sanger to call the Robinson R44 the "Ford Pinto" of helicopters.

Seems as though there may be something to that.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (5)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Foreign countries routinely bring criminal charges against pilots after an accident. But in the US, criminal charges are very rare. And that's a good thing because "criminalizing negligence" usually does little to promote safety.  

But perhaps there are exceptions.

Pilot Steven Fay bought his 1960 Cessna in June 2010.  He crashed it after dark on New Year's Day 2011. He survived with minor injuries but, sadly, his 35 year-old daughter -- the passenger on the plane -- did not.

A Massachusetts grand jury has now indicted him for involuntary manslaughter, which carries a possible 20 year prison term.

Fay's Cessna, a Cessna 310, was a "multi-engine, complex, high-performance airplane." Trouble is that:

• Fay was not licensed to fly a twin-engine aircraft;
• Fay did not hold a high performance aircraft endorsement;
• Fay did not hold a complex aircraft endorsement;
• Fay's last night landing was ten years earlier, and thus he was not legally entitled to carry a passenger in any aircraft at all.

According to the NTSB report, neither weather nor mechanical problems played a factor. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The pilot says he warned Lauren Scruggs away from his propeller.   According to the NTSB's preliminary report:

After [the pilot] opened the door, [Scruggs] started to get out of the airplane. Upon noticing that she was exiting in front of the strut, the pilot leaned out of his seat and placed his right hand and arm in front of her to divert her away from the front of the airplane and the propeller. He continued to keep his arm extended and told [Scruggs] that she should walk behind the airplane. Once he saw that [Scruggs] was at least beyond where the strut was attached to the wing, and walking away, he dropped his right arm and returned to his normal seat position. The pilot then looked to the left side of the airplane and opened his window to ask who was next to go for a ride.

The pilot then heard someone yell, "STOP STOP," and he immediately shut down the engine and saw [Scruggs] lying in front of the airplane.

While the pilot apparently tried to keep Scruggs from the propeller, it wasn't enough.  Sadly, the accident likely would have been avoided had the pilot followed the the general safety guidelines set forth here.

• The aircraft engine should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers. This is the simplest method of avoiding accidents. Unfortunately, the pilot elected to keep his engine running.

• The pilot should instruct passengers, before they exit an aircraft with an engine(s) running, the path to follow to avoid the propeller or rotor blades. The pilot apparently failed to instruct Scruggs of the path to follow before she exited the plane.  Once she had exited the airplane, given the noise, he was left to rely on crude hand signals to get his message across.

• When it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger's route from the aircraft. Apparently, in this case, the propeller was in the path of the deplaning passenger's travel.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The NTSB says that during tomorrow’s hearing, it will be looking to industry leaders to give it a “deeper understanding of regulations” bearing on the operation of the nation’s air shows. Of course, the only regulatory body that has the authority to control air shows is the FAA. But what the Board will find -- if it asks the right questions -- is that for the most part, the industry regulates itself. According to one veteran air racer, Howie Keefe, the FAA is more or less “hands off” when it comes to air show safety. From Martha Bellisle’s article in the Reno Gazette-Journal:

Keefe said the industry is largely self-regulated because the pilots and engineers are the most qualified to determine whether another pilot can handle a certain race or course or whether a certain design can handle the stress of a trick or race. ‘The classes themselves can say yes or no to a person who wants to race — if they can’t do a roll, they can’t race,’ Keefe said. ‘The FAA can’t do that. We rely on the expertise of the people in the industry to make the decisions.’

Perhaps a “hands off” policy is fine for the participants. But not so much for the spectators, who expect that if the FAA approves an event, it is overseeing the event’s safety in some meaningful fashion, and not merely turning the reins over to the event sponsors.

This Board says that the purpose of tomorrow’s public hearing is to help it investigate future air show accidents. But this Board is more assertive than past boards. There’s little doubt that it will find the FAA’s oversight lacking. The question is whether it will do anything about it.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Some say that Cirrus aircraft are improperly designed because they tend to catch fire on impact more frequently than other aircraft, such as those manufactured by Cirrus competitors, like Diamond or Cessna. And there are plenty of examples of post-crash Cirrus fires to talk about. Critics argue that those fires prove that the aircraft is unduly dangerous and defective.

An aircraft should be designed such that no one is burned to death in an otherwise survivable accident. At least, that’s the design standard in the auto industry. It became the standard when, during the 1970's, Bell Helicopters showed that some simple engineering enhancements could virtually eliminate post-crash fires in survivable Huey helicopter accidents.  That technology has been around now for 40 years. The technology works in helicopters and cars, so there’s no reason for a properly designed, modern airplanes to catch fire either.

But the key is that the crash must be otherwise survivable. If the crash is not otherwise survivable, the post-crash fire is irrelevant to the fate of the occupants. To date, the Cirrus fires that critics point to (like this one, and this one) were accidents that likely would have been fatal regardless of whether there was a post crash fire. So from those accidents, no conclusions about the fuel system's safety can be drawn.

But this morning, everything changed. A Cirrus crashed in Phoenix while on approach to land at Scottsdale Airport.  Both the pilot and the passenger survived the impact. But then a fire broke out.  The fire killed one occupant and badly burned the other.   

Unlike other Cirrus crashes, the Scottsdale crash was undeniably survivable. The post - crash fire raises legitimate questions about whether the Cirrus fuel system is as crashworthy as it should be.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (5)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

“Investigators aren’t sure why Scruggs didn’t see the propeller” she walked into last night. 

Um, maybe because a spinning propeller is pretty much invisible? Especially at night?

News reports are that incidents such as Lauren Scruggs', who is a model and fashion blogger, are rare. Maybe, but it would depend on what one means by “rare.”  Seems that someone is killed or seriously injured by a spinning prop every year. Some reports of incidents from my local area alone are here and here.

During the day, spinning propellers have a mesmerizing effect. People have been known to see them, yet walk right into them. 

Of course, at night, propellers can be virtually invisible.

In almost all prop-strike cases, pilot error plays a role. A pilot needs to think carefully before allowing a passenger to deplane with the engine running. Here, apparently, the pilot allowed Scruggs to exit the aircraft with the engine running so that another passenger could take her seat. Certainly it would have been safer to shut down the engine of the Aviat Husky he was flying before allowing passengers to leave or approach the aircraft. “Hot loading” – allowing passengers to get into the aircraft with the engine running -- is safe only when the passengers have been carefully briefed on procedures.  Even then, it's best permitted only with the help of a trained spotter who walks one passenger away from the aircraft and then walks the next passenger in.

Here are some common guidelines for propeller safety:

• The aircraft engine should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers. This is the simplest method of avoiding accidents.

• Boarding or deplaning of passengers, with an engine running, should only be allowed under close supervision. The pilot in command should have knowledge that either the company or the airport operator has ground attendants fully trained in their specific duties to board or deplane passengers from an aircraft with an engine(s) running. The pilot should instruct passengers, before they exit an aircraft with an engine(s) running, the path to follow to avoid the propeller or rotor blades.

• When it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger's route from the aircraft.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (7)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

It looks as though it was the twin-engine Seminole that caused the mid-air collision between it and a Beech Bonanza near Newberg, Oregon.  The crash killed the the 58-year old Bonanza pilot. The Oregonian quotes sources saying that:

the larger Piper PA-44 Seminole was executing training maneuvers in the area, making a series of rapid ascents and descents shortly after 4 p.m., when it came down upon a Beech Bonanza V35. . . [cutting it in two].

The Seminole (N3062H) was owned by Hillsboro Aviation, a flight school in Hillsboro, Oregon.  As it turns out, the crash was not the flight school's first.  In fact, in recent years the school has been plagued with training accidents. The most serious of those was in September, 2009, when both a Hillsboro Aviation flight instructor and his student were killed while training in a Robinson R22 helicopter. 

In addition to this week's fatal accident, and the one in 2009, Hillsboro Aviation aircraft have crashed in June 2008, June 2010, September 2010, and October 2010.

In August 2010, the FAA indicated its intent to fine Hillsboro Aviation $580,000 for numerous safety violations, including improper maintenance of its aircraft. Though the FAA investigation looked into the September 2009 fatal helicopter crash, the FAA ultimately decided to levy the fine for violations unrelated to that crash -- specifically for what it found to be Hillsboro's intentional falsification of various aircraft maintenance records.

Of course, Tuesday's crash may be entirely unrelated to the previous Hillsboro Aviation training crashes and the conduct for which the FAA cited the flight school.  Nonetheless, the school's safety record is abysmal.

Yet, Hillsboro Aviation remains in operation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (20)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The NTSB excludes family members from its accident investigations.  But it allows those who may have caused or contributed to a crash to participate.  That's an obvious conflict of interest.  As a result, NTSB probable cause findings are not always impartial.  Instead, they tend to favor the industry players.  

The industry players have long argued that, while they may be allowed behind closed doors to assist the NTSB in their investigations, they would never seek to influence the investigation's outcome. 

Yeah, right.

The Reno-Tahoe Airport Authority, which owns Reno-Stead Airport, has dropped the pretense of "just wanting to help the NTSB find out what happened."  Rather, it has gone whole-hog in seeking to actually influence the investigation of the Reno Air Race Disaster.  In fact, it has hired professional help from a Washington lobbying firm. 

You won't find that information on the Airport Authority's website.  But you will find it in papers filed in Washington, DC. According to  The Hill:

The Reno-Tahoe Airport Authority has hired Gephardt Government Affairs to lobby on the “government investigation of crash at Reno Air Races,” according to new lobbying forms released this week.

An NTSB investigation is not supposed to be a political process.  It's hard to imagine anything more inappropriate than hiring lobbyists to influence its outcome.

But that is what it has come to. 

Thankfully, we still have the jury system.  No lobbying allowed there.  Everything has to be done in open court, for all to see.

Related Content:

• Reno Air Race Lawsuits and the Assumption of Risk Defense
• Victims' Lawsuits Against FAA Will Face Hurdles
• Reno Air Race Disaster No Freak Accident
• Leeward a Hero?
• Leeward's P-51 Lost Trim Tab

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

There are obvious dangers inherent in events such as the Reno Air Races. The victims of the disaster were undoubtedly aware of those dangers and attended the event anyway. Does that mean they should not be able to file lawsuits to obtain compensation for their loss? 

Not at all.

Granted, Life is Full of Risks

There are risks involved in most everything. We take a chance every time we cross the street. But it’s nonetheless reasonable for us to believe we will be safe when we are in the crosswalk. When we use the crosswalk, we are where we are supposed to be.

If an SUV hits someone in the crosswalk, we may all agree it was “just an accident.” Yet, we require the driver to compensate the pedestrian for his injuries. If the driver couldn’t see the pedestrian because the crosswalk was poorly designed, we might require the city to compensate the pedestrian. In either case, we don’t tell the pedestrian that he is out of luck because he assumed the risks of getting hit by a car.

It doesn’t matter that the driver had a very good driving record up to that point in time. While we don’t punish those responsible for an accident, we do hold them accountable and require them to compensate the person who, through no fault of their own, is seriously hurt.

The victims at Reno undoubtedly understood that there were risks associated with the Air Races. But they were exactly where they were supposed to be. Sure, the crash was an accident. But that doesn’t mean whoever is responsible for the injuries – whether that is a mechanic or a course designer -- shouldn’t compensate the victims for their losses.

The Race Sponsors Were Supposed to Provide Patrons with a Safe Viewing Area

Some say that Nevada law lets sponsors off the hook for injuries to spectators.  And it's true that, in Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment, the Nevada Supreme Court said that a baseball stadium was not responsible for serious injuries a fan sustained when she was struck by a foul ball. But in that case, the fan was not in the viewing area. Had the fan been injured in a viewing area, the result might have been different. That’s because the court recognized that a ballpark has a duty to provide the patrons with at least some designated safe seating.

Once a stadium owner or operator complies with the rule's requirements by providing sufficient protected seating, the owner or operator has satisfied the legal duty of protection owed to its patrons.

The Reno Air Race victims were in the designated viewing area. They were exactly where they were supposed to be. But it appears that the sponsors failed to ensure that the area was safe. Turner v. Mandalay would thus seem to support the victims’ claims for compensation, not undercut it.  

The Language on the Ticket Is Not a Contract

A reader of this post noted that, according to the tickets sold for the event, the spectators voluntarily assumed all the risks and released the event sponsors from liability for any injuries.  Isn’t that the end of the matter?

No.

Sure, a spectator can, by contract, agree ahead of time not to sue if he is injured, even if the person who caused the injury was negligent. But for there to be a contract, there has to be an agreement. If the spectator actually signed something, then that would be one thing. Without the victim’s signature, the fine print on the ticket won’t be binding on anyone. 

Related Content:

• Reno-Stead Airport Seeks to Influence NTSB Investigation
• Victims' Lawsuits Against FAA Will Face Hurdles
• Reno Air Race Disaster No Freak Accident
• Leeward a Hero?
• Leeward's Aircraft Lost Trim Tab

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (16)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Hall of Fame aerobatic champion Patty Wagstaff says that it was just bad luck that Jimmy Leeward's accident involved spectators.

At the speeds Leeward was moving, had the malfunction occurred four seconds earlier or later, or almost anywhere else on the course, it would have terminated in the desert.  This was not an accident waiting to happen – this was a freak accident.

Patty, this was not the first time that flutter sent a highly modified warbird out of control during the Reno Air Races.  It happened in 1998, when flutter ripped a trim tab from a P-51 called "Voodoo."  Bob Hannah, the pilot, immediately found himself heading straight up, just as Jimmy Leeward did.  Hannah lost consciousness from the high g-loading, but regained his senses as the aircraft rolled over the top.  Unlike Leeward, Hannah landed safely.

So, though it's too early to say for certain, it looks like Leeward's precise airframe failure -- or something pretty darn close -- actually happened before.  And sure, Leeward's failure could have just as easily occurred somewhere else along the nine mile course, and not at show center. But that doesn't make it a "freak accident," any more than losing at Russian Roulette can be considered a freak accident. 

Nope. This was an accident waiting to happen.

The warbird pilots push their aircraft to their limits and beyond.  That's why it's called "Unlimited" racing.  No one would deny pilots, fully aware of the risks they are taking, the right to fly their aircraft to the point of destruction.  It is, after all, their own lives that they are risking over the Nevada desert.  But they should not be permitted to place spectators at risk.  Pilots might be willing to flirt with death.  But that's not what spectators bargain for.

Sorry, Patty.  Leeward's crash was no "freak accident."  And suggesting it was is not fair to the victims.

Related content on this blog:  

• Reno-Stead Airport Seeks to Influence NTSB Investigation
• Reno Air Race Lawsuits and the Assumption of Risk Defense
• Lawsuits Against the FAA Will Face Hurdles
• Leeward a Hero?
• Leeward's Aircraft Lost Trim Tab

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (17)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Three Mooneys have crashed in two weeks.  Each aircraft crashed on takeoff.  Sadly, seven people were killed.  Two of the accidents may have involved the "impossible turn."

First Crash: On July 5, a 1974 Mooney M20F (N7759M) crashed shortly after taking off from Watsonville, California.  All four aboard were killed. 

Second Crash: On July 17, a nearly identical Mooney M20F (N3524X) crashed taking off from Winslow-Lindbergh Airport in Arizona, killing two aboard.  

At first glance, the Watsonville crash and the Winslow crash seem eerily similar.  The same model aircraft was involved in each.  Each crashed just moments after takeoff. 

But the two accidents are entirely different. The Watsonville crash is consistent with the pilot climbing too steeply to avoid a fog bank. There doesn't appear to be any evidence of an engine problem, at least at this point. Rather, as the pilot pitched the nose up, his airspeed bled off, and the wings (not the engine) stalled.  According to one witness:

He was heading toward the coast and tried to climb . . .From the time he took off, he was going too steep, too slow. ... He spun to the left and you can see where the impact was.

In contrast, the pilot in the Winslow crash appears to have attempted to turn around and glide back to the runway after his Lycoming engine quit.  

A Mooney departed then called with engine problems [saying he was] returning to the airport [from the] opposite direction. My friend circled giving the Mooney the right of way. .  Later he asked the Mooney for a position, no response to a couple of calls. He circled for a while longer then landed. Rolling out he saw the Mooney off the departure end of the runway on its back. He said it looked like the typical return to the airport stall spin accident.

The attempt to return to the airport after an engine failure is often called "the impossible turn," because it so frequently ends in the aircraft stalling during the turn and spinning in, with fatal results.

Plots are trained never to turn back to the runway after an engine failure unless they have adequate altitude.  Instead, land straight ahead, or slightly to the right or to the left.  Better to land in the trees, but under control, then lose control of the aircraft and spin in.  While a crash landing in rough terrain may result in serious injury or even death, spinning into the ground is almost always fatal.  Losing control of the aircraft after engine failure must be avoided at all costs. Unfortunately, the temptation to try the "impossible turn" and make it to the runway can be irresistible.

This video shows a Mooney pilot attempting the impossible turn after engine failure near Sacramento, California in 2009.  Both he and his passenger were killed when the aircraft spun in.

Third Mooney Crash: Finally, on July 18, a 1979 Mooney 20K (N777CV) crashed at Augusta Regional Airport while taking off, killing the pilot and sole occupant, a Mooreville doctor. That aircraft also came to rest within the airport boundaries.  It appears this pilot also experienced engine failure, and also may have attempted to turn back to the airport, stalled, and spun in.  Too early to tell.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (6)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Running out of gas is a leading cause of piston aircraft engine failures. So you'd think that pilots would have zero tolerance for the shoddy fuel gauges installed in many aircraft, such as the ones installed in the Cirrus SR22.  But instead, they tend to make excuses for the manufacturers. "It would be too expensive to make gauges that work." Or, "you shouldn't trust a fuel gauge anyway." Or, my favorite:

Well, you know, the regulations require that the gauge be accurate only when reading empty."

That last one makes the least sense of all. A pilot doesn't need a gauge to tell him his tanks have just reached "empty." The aircraft has another way of informing the pilot the very moment that happens.

I don't know how this stuff about the regulations started.  But I've heard it from dozens of pilots over the years.  Even from those who work for manufacturers, and so should know better. 

The Regulations Do Not Say that the Fuel Gauge Must be Accurate "Only When Reading Zero"

Most aircraft carry "unusable fuel."  For example, perhaps there are three gallons that sit in a fuel line that can't be pumped to the engine. So while the aircraft carries 53 gallons of fuel on board, only 50 are "usable." The federal aviation regulations, not surprisingly, require that the gauge read "zero" when there are three gallons left on the aircraft, since that's when the engine will stop. 

Each fuel quantity indicator must be calibrated to read "zero" during level flight when the quantity of fuel remaining in the tank is equal to the unusable fuel supply . . ."

Put another way, the gauge must read "zero" when there is no usable fuel on board. But it doesn't follow that when there is usable fuel on board, the gauge need not be accurate. 

The Gauge Must Be Accurate At All Fuel Levels.

The regulations require the gauge to show the quantity of usable fuel in each tank "during flight."  It doesn't matter whether there is a quarter tank, a half tank, or a full tank of usable fuel.  The gauge must indicate the quantity accurately. The only time the gauge need not be accurate is when the aircraft is sitting on the ground.

If a fuel indicating system does not comply with the regulations, it is defective. Plain and simple.

The relevant part of the aviation regulations is as follows:

§ 23.1337 Powerplant instruments installation.

     Fuel quantity indication. There must be a means to indicate to the flightcrew members the quantity of usable fuel in each tank during flight. An indicator calibrated in appropriate units and clearly marked to indicate those units must be used. In addition: [] Each fuel quantity indicator must be calibrated to read "zero" during level flight when the quantity of fuel remaining in the tank is equal to the unusable fuel supply. . . 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Senator Leahy of Vermont is pushing for a law that would insulate volunteer pilot organizations (such as Angel Flight West) from liability for injury the organization's pilots cause to its passengers. If the bill passes, it means that those injured by the negligence of an organization's pilot would have no recourse against the organization. Rather, the passenger would be limited to seeking compensation against the pilot -- regardless of how minimal the pilot's insurance.

The trouble is that those who decide to fly with a charitable organization usually do so because they are impressed by the organization, not by the pilot. The passengers don't select the pilot who, in some cases, they may not even meet the pilot until arriving at the airport for the flight. They have no way of checking out the pilot's qualifications or competence level. Instead, they trust the organization to do that.

It doesn't seem right for an organization to turn its back on an injured passenger or his family after an accident. Yet, that's what the bill would allow.  

The text of the proposed law is as follows: 

Liability Protection for Volunteer Pilot Nonprofit Organizations

A volunteer pilot nonprofit organization that flies for public benefit, the staff, mission coordinators, officers, and directors (whether volunteer or otherwise) of such nonprofit organization shall not be liable for harm caused to any person by a volunteer of such nonprofit organization while such volunteer--

(A) is operating an aircraft in furtherance of the purpose of such nonprofit organization;
(B) is properly licensed for the operation of such aircraft; and
(C) has certified to such nonprofit organization that such volunteer has insurance covering the volunteer's operation of such aircraft."

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (7)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The EMS helicopter was returning to Shenandoah Valley Regional Airport in Virginia, having dropped off a patient in nearby Charlottesville.  Reports differ on whether the Cessna was departing the airport or returning to the airport for landing.  The Cessna and the helicopter collided.  Though the helicopter landed safely, both occupants in the Cessna were killed.

No Control Tower

There’s no control tower at Shenandoah Airport. The primary means of preventing collisions at airports like Shenandoah is called “see and avoid.” That means that pilots are supposed to look out their windows, see other aircraft, and avoid them. 

Helicopters and Airplanes Don’t Mix Well

Though the "see and avoid" method may sound primitive, over the years it has worked well, and mid air collisions are relatively rare.  But helicopters don’t mix well with airplanes in a "see and avoid" environment.  Helicopters tend to fly slower than airplanes and, because they have a small cross section, they are hard for airplanes to spot -- especially when viewed from directly behind. 

Because of that, when near an uncontrolled airport, helicopter pilots are supposed to "avoid the flow" of airplane traffic.  In other words, as best they can, helicopters are supposed to stay out of the way of airplanes.  Sometimes that’s easy enough. For example, if the airplane traffic flies on one side of the airport (see below), the helicopters generally should fly on the other side. Or, the helicopter can fly at an altitude that is lower than the altitude at which the airplanes are flying.

The above diagram depicts a left-hand traffic pattern for fixed-wing (airplane) traffic similar to the pattern used at Shenandoah Airport.  Airplanes typically fly the traffic pattern at 1000 feet.  To avoid the flow of that traffic, helicopters might fly a right-hand traffic pattern on the other side of the runway, and fly no higher than 500 feet.

One question will be whether the Cessna was operating within the "flow" of fixed wing traffic when the collision occurred and, if so, why the EMS helicopter did not avoid that flow. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Steve Wilson argues that there are safety issues with Cirrus airplanes. First, Wilson feels that the Cirrus is more prone than your typical Beechcraft to crashes in which the pilot loses control of the aircraft while maneuvering. Second, Wilson feels that the Cirrus is more susceptible to crashes involving inadvertent encounters with icing conditions.

Of course, the NTSB chalks up both of these types of accidents to pilot error, not to a fault in the

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (15)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The NTSB hasn't yet released its probable cause finding concerning the Pilatus crash at Butte, Montana that killed the pilot and his 13 passengers.  But it has just made public its “docket.”  The docket sheds some light on what may have been happening in the cockpit in the minutes leading to the crash.

The flight was bound for Bozeman. Suddenly, the pilot diverted to Butte, which was only marginally closer.  Though the pilot never explained the reason for the diversion, the docket suggests that the

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

We've filed suit against Los Gatos real estate broker Karen Trolan (pictured), her husband Steve Trolan, and their company, Trolan Enterprises, as a result of the September 2009 plane crash that left the Trolans' passenger, 14 year-old Marilyn Mitchell, seriously injured. 

The Trolans were headed from Truckee Tahoe airport to San Jose. They needed very little fuel for the short flight. But fuel was a few pennies per gallon cheaper in Truckee than in San Jose.  The Trolans decided to fill the tanks of their single-engine Cessna 206 to the tops.

When departing a high altitude airport such as Truckee, that's a very dangerous thing to so. As discussed here, the combination of thin air and a heavy aircraft can dramatically compromise the aircraft's ability to climb. After takeoff, the aircraft will ride briefly on the cushion of air that exists between the plane's wings and the runway, and then crash.  And that's exactly what happened.

The NTSB's preliminary report confirmed that the Trolans' tanks were indeed full when they attempted to take off.

The crash was caused by pilot error, plain and simple.  Yet, the Trolans have turned their back on Marilyn and her family, leaving them to fend for themselves. The Trolans have yet to pay any of Marilyn's medical bills, which continue to mount.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (12)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

It’s not uncommon for three or four pilots to share ownership of an aircraft. For years, owning an aircraft as “partners” was the norm. That form of ownership, however, carries with it some liability considerations.

• “Partners” can generally be held individually liable for one another’s debts, including debts arising from one another’s negligence. In other words, if one partner ’s piloting mistake kills or injures a passenger, the other partners may in some cases be held accountable to the victim or the victim’s family.
• Aircraft owners are responsible for maintaining their aircraft properly. If one of the partnership’s maintenance decisions – such as an ill-considered decision to run past TBO – leads to an accident, each partner could be held responsible for that as well.
• Even assuming the partnership made all the right maintenance decisions, the partnership may still be held responsible for the negligence of the mechanic. More on that here. If the partnership is liable, each of the individual partners may be liable as well.

Many pilots seeking to share an airplane now form a limited liability corporation. They arrange it so that the corporation, and not the individual pilots, own the aircraft. The pilots own shares in the corporation only. Because the pilots do not themselves own the aircraft, they avoid some of the liability that comes with aircraft ownership generally and with the partnership relationship in particular.

But here’s where people often get confused: no form of ownership allows the pilot who is flying the aircraft to avoid responsibility for his own negligence. If a pilot error kills or injures someone, that pilot may be held accountable to the victim or his family regardless of whether the aircraft is owned by his partnership or by his limited liability corporation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

An aircraft owner loans his plane to a friend. The plane crashes and a passenger is injured. It turns out the crash was caused by the negligence of the aircraft's mechanic. Can the crash victim hold the aircraft owner liable for the mechanic’s faulty work?

This question comes up a lot. In fact, it comes up in almost every case where the mechanic doesn't have adequate insurance to cover the passenger's medical expenses. 

Ask the owner’s insurance company whether the owner can be held liable, and they will always say “no.” Their argument is that the owner didn’t perform the work and, in fact, without a mechanic's license was legally prohibited from doing so. The owner trusted the mechanic, as the regulations required him to, and so did nothing wrong. According to the owner’s insurance company, the passenger must look to the mechanic for compensation, and not to the owner. 

There are a couple of court opinions that seem to go along with the insurance company's reasoning.  But none of those opinions applies in California.  

In California, unlike in some other states, an owner of a machine that can seriously injure someone if not properly maintained is responsible to those injured as a result of faulty maintenance. It doesn’t matter that the owner didn't actually perform the faulty maintenance. 

Why does this make sense? Because, according to the Supreme Court's opinion in Maloney v. Rath, it is the owner who decides who the mechanic will be.

the owner selects the [mechanic] and is free to insist upon one who is financially responsible and to demand indemnity of him.

In other words, the injured party had no say in what mechanic did the work, or whether the mechanic carried insurance. But the owner who selected him did. So the accident victim can hold the owner financially responsible, and leave it to the owner to try to obtain reimbursement from his mechanic.

The Maloney case didn’t involve airplanes. It involved a car crash caused by improperly maintained brakes. But the reasoning applies to airplanes too. After all, improper aircraft maintenance is just as dangerous as improper car maintenance. Maybe even more so.

The federal aviation regulations make the owner responsible for maintaining the aircraft in airworthy condition. The owner can’t necessarily avoid that responsibility by hiring a good mechanic. Despite what the insurance company says, the owner may still be on the hook.  At least in California.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

An instrument rating entitles a pilot to legally navigate an aircraft when the weather is bad enough that he can't see outside.  A pilot who is not instrument-rated must always stay out of the clouds. If the weather is such that he can't do that, he must stay on the ground.  

The training required to obtain an instrument rating is extensive.  In most cases, it takes a pilot longer and costs him more to obtain the rating than it did for him to get his pilot's license in the first

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (7)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

According to the NTSB, most aviation accidents are caused by pilot error. But aviation lawyers know that as many as half the cases that the NSTB says were the result of "pilot error" simply weren't.

The NTSB does its best to get an accident's probable cause right. The trouble is that, in almost every one of its cases, the NTSB turns to the manufacturer of the aircraft for help in figuring out what happened. In other words, the NSTB asks one of the entities who may have caused the crash for help investigating it. The NTSB calls this method of investigation the "party system."  It presents an unavoidable conflict of interest.  It's like asking the fox for help in figuring out what happened to the chickens.  

More often than not, the "party system" results in the pilot taking the blame, even when the accident may really have been the manufacturer's fault. I've seen this happen dozens of times. I've written about it here and here and here. 

NTSB investigators don't disagree.  Well, at least one doesn't. From an anonymous email:

[W]e rarely, if ever, can exclude the manufacturers' representatives from access to every part and detail of an investigation. We (NTSB investigators) are open and forthright with these people. Unfortunately, such a candid exchange is rarely a two-way communication...And the process gets pretty cloudy when we send the wreckage, or part, to that manufacturer for teardown and examination. Sure, we're there 'in-charge' of the process...but that's just a formality.

But isn't the NTSB watching everything that the manufacturer is doing?

NTSB investigators 'observing' may be more like a dog watching television when it comes to the latest technology that is known only by those experts who made it in the first place. And it's even worse if an FAA Inspector stands in for the NTSB investigator.  Then our 'eyes' may be almost an in-house friend of the manufacturer...

Predictable Probable Cause Findings

So, what do you expect as a result? 'Nothing wrong with our engine! (or accessory) (or special part)'...and that's what goes down in the report...That's the simple reason that 'statistics' cite 80% pilot error...This high rate is simply not accurate, it's far more often a system failure... but the NTSB cannot buck industry when we have to use the 'party system.'

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Cirrus aircraft is loaded with advanced safety features lacking in older "legacy" aircraft.  Yet, the Cirrus safety record appears to be no better -- and perhaps even worse -- than that of the legacy fleet.  How can this be? 

I've written before that "risk homeostasis" may be one factor at work.  I suggested here and here that pilots might tend to use the advanced features of the aircraft to fly into more challenging conditions than they otherwise would.  While using the features in that fashion might increase the utility of the aircraft, it necessarily undercuts many of the features' safety benefits.  

It turns out that that three human factors experts have published a short article (see below) on risk

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I was sitting in my aircraft at the approach end of the runway at San Carlos, waiting to be issued an instrument clearance. A Beech BE65 Queen Air taxied down to the runway and took off ahead of me. Sadly, it crashed 30 seconds later into a lagoon north of the airport, killing the three aboard. 

Some questions raised in the various news accounts:

Why was the aircraft headed north on the “Bay Meadows” departure, when its ultimate destination was to the south?

I heard the pilot – or whomever was handling the radios -- tell the ground controller that he was going to fly along the ridge line west of the airport and then to South County airport. The

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Bill King
Vice President of Business Administration
Cirrus Aircraft
Duluth, Minnesota 55811
 

Dear Bill: 

I own one of your aircraft. There are some nice things about the Cirrus. But a few things, from a safety standpoint, really suck. First, the doors don’t stay closed. Second, too many pilots and passengers are getting killed when pilots try to land the thing. Third, the fuel gauges don’t work.

I read your comments on each of these issues in today’s Duluth News Tribune. Considering that they come from a company that prides itself on “celebrating safety,” I found some of the comments disturbing.

The doors.

Bill, they pop open. A lot. It’s always a distraction when it happens. If they pop open at a bad time, it can spell real trouble. More on that here. 

I read how you flew from one airport to another a few weeks ago with a door that wasn’t shut, and

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (31)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The pilot of the Otter that crashed in Alaska on Monday, killing Senator Stevens and three other passengers, encountered some very bad weather.  Low ceilings.  Fog and rain.  Gusty winds.

Rugged terrain only complicated things.  Fortunately, the pilot had tons of experience  -- tens of thousands of hours.  According to the Alaska Dispatch, had any less talented pilot been at the controls, the death toll surely would have been higher.

The fact there were four survivors is testament to [the pilot's] skills. [He] maneuvered that plane like no other mere pilot to save lives.

So is the pilot a hero?  No.  Not quite.

There's an old saying in aviation: "a superior pilot is one who exercises superior judgment so as to avoid having to exercise his superior skills."  In this case, a pilot exercising superior judgment might have turned around before tangling with the worst of the weather.  Or, better yet, never left the comfort and safety of the lake lodge in the first place.

The Weather was Bad 

When the pilot took off from the lake where the lodge was located, the weather was bad.  It was bad at nearby Dillingham airport.  It was bad at the river camp that was to be their destination.  And it was bad everywhere between.

A pilot who flew the same valley where the crash occurred confirmed to the LA Times that it was bad there too.  "It was just awful weather. . .I came through that valley at about 100 feet off the ground with about a mile of visibility."

Now, bad weather doesn't mean a good pilot must stay on the ground.  For example, the airport at Dillingham has various instrument approach procedures that will allow planes to land safely in some pretty crappy weather. No undue risk. No sweat.

But this pilot wasn't headed to Dillingham.  He was headed to a fishing camp on a nearby river.  No instrument approach procedure would guide him through the clouds.  If this pilot was going to get there, he’d have to do it without instruments. He’d have to do it by looking out the window.  Seat of the pants stuff.  All perfectly safe, as long as the weather is good enough for you to see where you are going.

Controlled Flight into Terrain

So what exactly happened?  What we know about the accident is consistent with "controlled flight into terrain."  Opting out of the instrument flight system, the pilot had to stay under the clouds.  He couldn't go through them because once inside, he wouldn't be able to see and might bump into something hard and pointy.  So he had to stay in the clear and visually pick his way around the terrain in his path.  But as he maneuvered under the low clouds and around the fog, he suddenly came upon a mountain's steep up-slope.  He shoved the throttle forward, pulled the nose up and began a climb.  But the terrain rose faster than could his aircraft.  He bellied onto the rising slope while in full control of a perfectly functioning aircraft.

At least that how it looks.

According to John Bouker, the pilot who found the wreck: 

The Otter had plowed into the hill. He bounced up the mountain. He looked like he was in a full-power climb. . the plane appeared mostly intact.

That’s a classic "controlled flight into terrain” scenario.

Poor Decision Making   

This morning a pilot who used to fly search and rescue out of Dillingham called me to talk about the crash.  He pointed out that the state of Alaska accounts for more than a third of all commuter and air taxi crashes in the entire country.  That's right: one state accounts for a third of all the nation's crashes.  And more than 80 percent of those crashes are due to poor decision-making.

Alaskans seem to accept aviation tragedies as part of life in the wilderness.  My caller suggested that poor decision making seems to be not just tolerated, but sewn into the very fabric of Alaskan aviation community. 

The question is not the whether the pilot had the skills to “maneuver” the aircraft around difficult terrain. Or whether he had the experience necessary to pick his way around the obstacles along the route. Or whether he brought the aircraft down with the least impact possible.  The question is whether, given the weather, he should have attempted the flight at all.

I can easily imagine that a nice fire was burning in the lodge fireplace when the pilot loaded up his passengers. If ever there was ever a flight that didn't need to be made, it was this one. 

Yet it was.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (5)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Cirrus N146CK crashed on August 4 at Deer Valley, Airzona.  The pilot was killed.  Just before the accident, the aircraft's door popped open.  We know that because the pilot reported to air traffic control that his door was open and that he needed to return to the airport to close it.  Plus, surveillance cameras confirmed that the pilot's door was indeed ajar. 

The plane's door popped open? What's with that? 

The Cirrus doors are poorly designed.  It's that simple. They just don't stay shut in flight.  

The plane flies okay after a door pops open.  But the distraction can be dangerous, and can lead to a loss of control, as demonstrated by this 2009 Cirrus crash.  Following the 2009 accident, John

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (7)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

An FBO is not supposed to rent an aircraft to a pilot who the FBO knows isn't competent to complete the planned flight safely. If it does, and a passenger is hurt or killed by the pilot's mistake, the victim or his family can hold the FBO responsible. That's the law of "negligent entrustment."

A pilot who doesn't hold the proper license or rating to operate the aircraft he is seeking to rent is probably not competent to complete the planned flight safely.  But what if the pilot is properly licensed and meets all the FAA's other requirements? If the FBO rents the aircraft to the pilot, can the FBO still be held responsible for what turns out to be the pilot's mistakes?

Sometimes, the answer is yes.

The landmark case is White v. Inbound Aviation. A young pilot had just recently received his private pilot's license. He was comfortable flying the FBO's Piper Archer in which he had been "checked out" by one of the FBO's instructors. The FBO felt the renter was a good pilot.  It felt, however, that the pilot should obtain some additional instruction in "mountain flying" before flying to an airport in the mountains nearby.  The FBO felt that without the instruction, the pilot might not be able to handle the special challenges presented by "high density altitude" airports. 

One day the pilot showed up to rent the Archer. He told the FBO that he wanted to fly two friends to Lake Tahoe airport, an airport in the mountains.  The pilot hadn't obtained the mountain-flying instruction, but the FBO rented the aircraft to him anyway.

The pilot landed at Lake Tahoe airport without incident. But he wasn't prepared for the effects of the altitude, heat, and weight of the aircraft on takeoff.  When he attempted to depart, he crashed, killing himself as well as his two passengers.

The family of one of the passengers sued the FBO, arguing it should never have rented the plane to the pilot for this particular trip. The jury agreed and held the FBO liable.

The FBO appealed.  It argued that the pilot held a license that legally entitled him to fly anywhere he wanted, including mountain airports like Lake Tahoe. That, the FBO argued, should have been the end of the matter. If the pilot was competent in the eyes of the FAA, he should have been deemed competent in the eyes of the court.

The court of appeal disagreed, and affirmed the jury's verdict against the FBO.  Though the young pilot may have been a competent pilot generally, that wasn't the issue.  The FBO knew that, notwithstanding his license, the pilot wasn't competent for the particular flight he had planned.  As the court of appeal noted:

[The issue as plaintiffs framed it] was not whether [the pilot] was competent in general to pilot an aircraft but whether [he] was competent to 'operate the aircraft that he operated on the day he operated it and in the manner in which he operated it under the conditions he experienced ... on July 3rd with three people on board going to Lake Tahoe.'

The FBO knew that, even though he was properly licensed, the pilot was not competent to conduct the particular flight he had planned under the conditions that existed on the day of the accident.  The court of appeal ruled that, therefore, the jury properly held the FBO liable for the accident under the law of negligent entrustment.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

When Cory Lidle's widow sued Cirrus Design, it caused a bit of an uproar in the aviation community.  Her suit alleges that it was a defect in the aircraft's flight controls that caused the Cirrus SR-20 to slam into a Manhattan hi-rise.  That claim led many to call the suit frivolous.  After all, the NTSB determined the accident was caused by pilot error, plain and simple. Right?

Cirrus asked the federal judge who is hearing the case to toss it out as being based on "junk science." Cirrus argued that under legal precedent known as Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the judge must act as a "gatekeeper."  That means she must review the expert

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Many airports in the western United States are located at altitude.  In the thin air, a departing aircraft's propeller and wings are less aerodynamically efficient.  And without a turbocharger, the aircraft's engine won't be able to produce full power.  All of that hurts the aircraft's ability to climb. Unless the aircraft is handled properly, after lifting off the runway it may travel for a distance

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A passenger injured in an aircraft accident can't sue the aircraft manufacturer if the part that caused the crash is older than 18 years. Any such suit would be barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act, or GARA.

What if the accident was caused by a mistake in one of the aircraft's manuals rather than a defect in the aircraft itself?  If the manual is older than 18 years, does GARA protect the manufacturer from liability for its error? 

It depends.  The manufacturer is off the hook if the manual is properly considered a "part" of the aircraft.  Some manuals are. Some aren't.

A flight manual (sometimes called a "pilot's operating handbook" or "flight handbook") is properly considered "part" of the aircraft, and so GARA protects the manufacturer. For example, in Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopters, the pilot's family blamed a helicopter crash on the flight manual's failure to say that the last two gallons of fuel in the helicopter were unusable.  As a result, the pilot believed he had sufficient fuel but in fact did not.  He crashed just minutes from his destination.

The Caldwell court said that manufacturers are required by regulation to provide a flight manual when it delivers the aircraft to the customer.  The manual must be carried in the aircraft at all times thereafter. Therefore, the manual was properly considered to be an aircraft "part."  Because the manual at issue was more than 18 years old, GARA applied to protect the manufacturer from liability for any errors. 

But the situation is different when the manual is a maintenance manual. A manufacturer can sell an aircraft without providing to the buyer a maintenance manual.  Thus maintenance manuals, unlike flight manuals, are not a "part " of the aircraft, and GARA doesn't apply. At least according to Rogers v. Bell Helicopters Textron, a case decided earlier this month by a California appellate court. 

In Rogers, the pilot claimed the accident resulted from faulty instructions in a maintenance manual for balancing the helicopter's tail rotor. The court ruled that, despite the fact that the manual was more than 18 years, GARA didn't apply and so the pilot was entitled to sue.  

Unlike a flight manual that is unique to the aircraft, used by the pilot, and necessary to operate the aircraft, a maintenance manual applies to different aircraft models, is used by the mechanic, and only for troubleshooting and repairing the aircraft.

According to Rogers,, GARA won't protect a manufacturer from liability for mistakes in its maintenance manuals, regardless of how old the manuals are. 

The plaintiff in Rogers was represented by Louis Franecke of San Rafael. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The General Aviation Revitalization Act immunizes aircraft manufacturers from liability for defects in their products once those products turn 18 years old.  GARA was enacted in 1994.  Back then, more than half the general aviation fleet was older than 18 years. 

In other words, in 1994, the manufacturers were allowed to "walk away" from the majority of the fleet they had produced, as well as any defects that they had built into them. But once relieved of that financial responsibility, the manufacturers were supposed to spring into action and start cranking out new aircraft at more affordable prices. 

True, anyone injured by a defect in an older aircraft would be left without a legal remedy against the manufacturer that caused the injury.  But GARA proponents argued that the flood of new piston aircraft would lead to the older aircraft being removed from service.  In short order, GARA proponents argued, the average age of the aircraft in the fleet would drop and manufacturers would 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A Philadelphia jury has determined that a defective carburetor caused the 1999 crash of single-engine aircraft that killed four and injured one. The aircraft, a Piper Cherokee Six, was manufactured in 1968. The jury’s verdict included $25 million for compensatory damages and $64 million as punitive damages against the engine manufacturer Avco Lycoming, a division of Textron.

Since the Aircraft was Older than 18 Years, Why Didn’t the General Aviation Revitalization Act Protect Lycoming from Liability?

There are a number of exceptions to the General Aviation Revitalization Act (known as GARA). In particular, GARA doesn’t apply when the manufacturer, in obtaining FAA certification of its part, conceals from the FAA information about defects in the part's design. The jury in this case determined that Lycoming did just that. Thus, GARA was no defense.

The NTSB Determined the Cause of the Crash was Pilot Error. Its Report Didn’t Say Anything About a Defective Carburetor. Why Wasn’t the Jury Bound by the NTSB’s Findings?

The NTSB’s accident reports almost always favor the manufacturers. That’s because the NTSB relies on the manufacturer for help in determining the cause of the crash it is investigating. The NTSB calls this method of investigation the “party system.” 

Of course, asking the manufacturer for help in figuring out if there was a defect in its engine is much like asking the fox for help in determining what happened to the chickens. There’s a built-in conflict of interest. The NTSB is aware of the conflict, but continues using the party system anyway.

Here, after consulting with Lycoming’s experts, the NTSB decided not even to examine the carburetor. Since the NTSB never tore down this critical component, it’s no surprise that the NTSB did not discover any problems with it.

Fortunately for the victims’ families, the NTSB’s conclusions are by regulation inadmissible in court.

Why Did the Jury Award Punitive Damages?

A jury cannot award punitive damages simply because the defendant was negligent, or just

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The NTSB has released its preliminary report of the off-airport landing of Lancair IV-P N9JE at Hilton Head.  The accident killed a jogger but left the plane’s two occupants uninjured. According to the preliminary report, 

Further examination of the airplane revealed that the propeller assembly separated from the crankshaft flange and was missing.

In other words, the crankshaft failed.

One wouldn’t expect a crankshaft to break absent some sort of defect. If that proves to be the case, could the manufacturer of the crankshaft be held liable to the jogger’s family?

The aircraft was built from a kit and was thus "experimental." The engine, however, was not. Rather, according to FAA records, it appears that the engine was an FAA-certified, turbocharged piston engine manufactured by Teledyne Continental Motors, a company that has had its share of lawsuits related to its engines coming apart in flight. 

The General Aviation Revitalization Act, or GARA, protects aircraft engine manufacturers from liability for defective engine parts older than 18 years.

We don’t know how old the engine was in this case.  However, the Lancair builder had reportedly taken the engine from a Piper Malibu.  Piper stopped using the Teledyne Continental TSIO-520 engine in its Malibus due to reliability problems. In 1988, it switched and began installing Avco Lycoming engines instead. Thus, if it turns out that the engine was an original equipment Malibu engine, then it had to be at least 20 years old -- 2 years beyond GARA's age limit.

So is Teledyne Continental Motors off the hook, regardless of whether the jogger's family can prove that the engine was defective? 

No.

There is one important but little-known exception to GARA.  Regardless of the defective part's age, GARA doesn’t protect its manufacturer from lawsuits brought by the families of those killed on the ground.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

That's the number one question I've been asked about this accident.  Not "why did the accident happen," but "why didn't the pilot use the parachute?"

As I note here, most Cirrus pilots would say that the parachute should be deployed in the event of engine failure, unless there is a long, paved runway beneath the aircraft such that a safe on-airport landing is assured.  But that doesn't mean that, if there is no airport within range, a pilot who opts to glide to a field rather than pull the chute is negligent.

Pulling the parachute has serious risks.  The aircraft's rate of descent under the parachute is high.  Ground impact forces are severe. Cirrus warns that the decision to deploy the parachute should

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (7)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A Cirrus SR-22, N224GS, crashed yesterday in Washington state.  The pilot was killed.  The passenger was critically injured.  The aircraft departed Concord, California (CCR) in good weather, bound for home.  It crashed in Morton, 60 miles from its destination, which was presumably Renton (RNT).

The accident appears to have been the result of engine failure:

• Witnesses said it was flying "low and silent" just before impact.
• A pilot on frequency says he heard the Cirrus pilot report to Air Traffic Control "saying he was dead stick "no engine" and he didn't think they were going to make the airport."

Facts suggesting that the engine failed because it ran out of gas:

• Fuel exhaustion is the leading cause of engine failure.
• The pilot reported to his wife that he was battling a "stiff headwind." Unexpected headwinds are common to many fuel exhaustion accidents.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Only modifications that carry a Supplemental Type Certificate may be legally installed on an aircraft. The Supplemental Type Certificate guarantees that the FAA has thoroughly tested and reviewed the modification. And it's the Supplemental Type Certificate that insures that the modification is safe and compatible with the particular model aircraft on which it’s being installed. Right?

Maybe not. Owners really shouldn't place too much stock in an STC. Or so says one former NTSB accident investigator. The investigator, now retired, explained to me that most owners might be surprised by how little work the FAA does before issuing an STC. Sure, the STC process is a huge paperwork shuffle for the modification's manufacturer. But it's little more than that. The process seldom entails any real independent engineering cross-check on the FAA's part.

"Give me an example", I asked. "OK,' he said. "Let's talk tip tanks."

A popular modification for many models of Cessna single-engine aircraft are wingtip extensions that

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Most general aviation aircraft manufactured today come with "glass cockpits."  Instead of being equipped with mechanical gauges and indicators, they are equipped with computer screens.  The screens integrate and display all sorts of useful flight information.  The information displayed may include satellite weather, synthetic vision, infrared vision, terrain awareness information, traffic

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The NTSB released its preliminary report on the Pine Mountain Lake crash.  As usual, the preliminary report contains no conclusions concerning the cause of the crash. For that, we'll have to wait up to 4 years.  The preliminary report does, however, hint that the NTSB's investigation will focus on whether the pilot pressed on into weather beyond what the regulations allowed.

The full text of the report is here.  Some excerpts:

Instrument night meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site, and no flight plan had been filed.

Instrument weather conditions are those that require a pilot to fly by reference to his instruments rather than by looking out the window. To fly in instrument conditions, a pilot must be instrument-rated, his plane must be properly equipped, and he must have a clearance from air traffic control.  He is not necessarily required to file a flight plan.  For example, instead of filing a flight plan, the

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Lisa Krieger of the San Jose Mercury News writes on a variety of issues related to this crash: 

• Pilot's Insurer Meets with East Palo Alto Residents.  Residents who suffered property damage can make a claim against the pilot's estate or his insurance policy.  The families of his passengers, however, probably cannot.  Workers compensation laws prohibit a passenger's family from suing the passenger's co-employee (in this case, the pilot) or, for that matter, the passenger's employer (Tesla).  The families are, however, permitted to sue anyone else who may be responsible for the crash, such as a negligent mechanic or a manufacturer of a defective aircraft part.
• Palo Alto Airport Proposes New Routes to Avoid East Palo Alto. The airport can suggest that pilots avoid over-flying homes near the airport, but it cannot require them to.  Only the FAA can do that. 
• Palo Alto Plane Crash Likely Caused by a Lethal Combination of Factors.  A pilot flying a heavily loaded twin-engine piston aircraft from a short runway in the fog is unlikely to be able to avoid disaster when one engine fails.

Related posts:  Tesla Crash: NTSB Probable Cause Investigation

                       Tesla Crash: The Paradox of the Twin

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The runway at Pine Mountain Lake is oriented east-west, and is surrounded by rugged terrain.  In poor weather, pilots are permitted to execute instrument approaches to the airport.  The approach procedures guide pilots as they descend through the clouds to the runway.  The procedures, flown properly, will place the pilot in a position to land straight ahead without having to maneuver.  When the pilot pops out of the clouds after flying the instrument approach to Pine Mountain Lake, his view out of the windshield should be something like this:  

The procedure the pilot must follow when approaching from the east is set forth below.  A pilot may descend in the clouds no lower than 770 feet above the runway.  To descend further, the pilot must

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (6)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The initial investigation was conducted by local law enforcement in conjunction with the FAA. Now the National Transportation Safety Board will take over.

The NTSB’s job will be to examine the wreckage and attempt to determine if the crash was caused by a defective aircraft part, negligent maintenance, or pilot error. The NTSB concedes, however, that it lacks the manpower, the technical expertise, and the funding to do that job properly on its own. Therefore, as a matter of long-standing policy, it will seek engineering assistance from the companies that manufactured the aircraft components in question. In this case, the NTSB will recruit the help of Cessna Aircraft, which manufactured the aircraft involved in the accident, Cessna N5225J, and Teledyne Continental Motors, which manufactured each of the aircraft’s two 260 horsepower engines. The NTSB will exclude members of the victims’ families and their technical representatives from the investigation, feeling that they have nothing to offer. (Sad but true.)

Of course, the NTSB’s practice of asking the manufacturers for help – a practice it calls “the party system” -- presents a conflict of interest.  After all, the manufacturers themselves might be the ones responsible for the accident. Some say that the NTSB’s party system is akin to asking the suspects for help in solving a crime. Nonetheless, the conflict – discussed further here – is ingrained in all NTSB investigations.

It’s no surprise that most NTSB final reports often favor the manufacturers who have “assisted” the NTSB investigators in their work. But perhaps it doesn't make any difference because, by federal regulation, the NTSB’s probable cause findings are not binding on anyone. The families are free to conduct their own investigation, and in the event of a lawsuit, the NTSB’s conclusions are given no deference whatever. In fact, in the event of litigation, the NTSB conclusions are not even admissible. Aviation attorneys who conduct their own independent investigations find that the NTSB’s conclusions are wrong about 50% of the time.

In one recent example, a Teledyne Continental engine similar to those installed on N5225J quit

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (4)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

One might think that a twin-engine aircraft is safer than a single-engine aircraft.  After all, if one engine fails, you still have the other to bring you home safely.  That's the whole point of the second engine, right?

If one of the twin engines fails in cruise flight, maybe that's true.  But if it quits right after takeoff, the twin can be extremely difficult to handle.  When the aircraft's landing gear is down, its flaps set, and its airspeed just above the minimum flying speed, the asymetric thrust generated by the operating engine can flip the aircraft onto its back and out of control.  A "Vmc roll", as it is called, is

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (11)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Cirrus aircraft are now available with "flight into known icing" (FIKI) capability.  That's a great feature. I've written before, however, that Cirrus is asking for trouble with its marketing.  Cirrus sells the feature as one that both enhances safety and increases the aircraft's utility.  But Cirrus can't have it both ways.  If a pilot uses the FIKI capability by, for example, flying in conditions that would otherwise keep him on the ground, he necessarily undermines that feature's safety benefits.  I discuss why Cirrus' marketing is a problem here.

Steve Wilson, who is an air safety investigator (among other things), now slams Cirrus' marketing even harder.  According to Wilson, some aspects of Cirrus' marketing encourage pilots to use the FIKI capability to take risks that are simply foolish.

Some say that Wilson's criticisms should be discounted because he sells Cessna aircraft and Cessna competes with Cirrus.  But Wilson isn't criticizing Cirrus' product, just its marketing.  It seems hard to argue with him. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Updated February 12:

A Cirrus SR-20 single engine aircraft collided with a Pawnee tow plane that was pulling a glider. The Cirrus reportedly ran into the Pawnee's tow line. The Pawnee crashed and the pilot was killed.  The occupants of the Cirrus were also killed.  The glider pilot, however, recognized the impending collision, released his aircraft from the tow line, and landed without injury to himself or his two

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (7)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The FAA has instituted new rules designed to keep sightseeing helicopters from colliding with airplanes that are transitioning the Hudson River Corridor near the Statue of Liberty.  The San Francisco Daily Journal, California's largest legal newspaper, published this column on how the new rules came to pass, and why they aren't enough.

FAA and NTSB Battle Over Aviation Safety

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The NTSB's preliminary report on the crash contains little more than what was in the news accounts. The report does, however, offer one bit of new information.  The helicopter impacted on a magnetic heading of 230 degrees.  That heading is not in line with the route from Reno to Susanville.  While that might ultimately prove to be important, little can be made of that information without a careful examination of the layout of the terrain near the accident site and the roadway that the pilot might have been using to aid in his navigation.     

Though the information in the NTSB's official report is sparse, an NTSB spokesman did offer his expanded comments to Mary Pat Flaherty, a reporter for the Washington Post who has been following the poor EMS safety record during the past months. The NTSB's Ted Lopatkiewicz told Flaherty that the Mountain Lifeflight helicopter didn't have certain important safety equipment.  Lopatkiewicz was referring to the helicopter's lack of an autopilot, a ground proximity warning system, night vision goggles (discussed in this post), and other equipment necessary to navigate in poor weather.

But in this case the pilot was flying in good weather.  He did not collide with the ground because he could not see it.  Rather, as discussed here, it appears that the pilot crashed because of some type of mechanical problem with the helicopter.  It's unlikely the helicopter's lack of advanced equipment played any role in the accident at all. 

Related Posts:

Compensating the Families of the Mountain Lifeflight EMS Crash

Mountain Lifeflight EMS Helicopter Crash at Doyle, California

EMS Helicopter Safety: NTSB Pushes the Envelope

OSC: FAA Ignoring EMS Helicopter Dangers For Fear of Negative Publicity 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Aircraft engine manufacturers recommend that owners overhaul their engines when they accumulate a certain amount of operating time, usually between 1200 and 2400 hours depending on the engine's make and model. For example, Teledyne Continental Motors suggests that owners overhaul its IO-550 model engine at 2000 hours. Textron Lycoming suggests that owners overhaul its O-235 engine, like the one pictured, at 2400 hours.

Overhauls are expensive.  Some can cost $40,000 or more.  An increasing number of owners opt to run their engines 200, 400 or more hours past the manufacturer's recommended "time between overhauls," or TBO.  Once past TBO, they may take extra precautions by, for example, regularly sending out engine oil samples for spectrographic analysis, checking the engine’s compression, and looking inside certain parts of the engine with a boroscope to insure that  things look good. They feel the manufacturer's TBO recommendations are somewhat arbitrary. By running their engines past TBO they are squeezing more life out of them, and that just makes good economic sense.

The FAA does not require private owners to comply with the manufacturer’s stated TBO interval. The manufacturer's TBO is therefore advisory only.  As long as a properly certified mechanic has

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Burdett v. Teledyne Continental Motors involved the forced landing of a Beech Bonanza after the Teledyne Continental IO-550 engine installed in the aircraft came apart in cruise flight. The passenger was severely injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board blamed the engine failure on the mechanic who last worked on the engine, and cleared the engine manufacturer, Teledyne Continental, from any liability. 

We suspected that the NTSB's determination had been influenced by Teledyne's engineers, who the NTSB had allowed to assist in the investigation, despite the obvious conflict of interest that presented.  We thus conducted our own, independant investigation.  We concluded that, contrary to the NTSB's findings, Teledyne Continental was to blame.  After a six-week trial, the jury agreed.

At its annual convention in San Francisco, the California Trial Lawyers Association, known as the Consumer Attorneys of California, honored aviation accident attorney Mike Danko as a Trial Lawyer of the Year finalist for 2009 in recognition of our work in the Burdett case. The Trial Lawyers Association showed this video presentation during the ceremony.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

An A-Star AS350B air ambulance helicopter crashed November 14 at Doyle, California, killing the three crew members on board.  According to an article in the Reno Gazette Journal, the pilot made a distress call before the crash. That indicates that the pilot was likely experiencing a mechanical emergency. The photographs accompanying the article show that the wreckage was spread over a fairly large area.  That indicates that the pilot lost control of the helicopter well before he was able to attempt an emergency landing.

Under the circumstances, the NTSB will be looking at the helicopter's

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

This past April, the NTSB called upon the FAA to ground the entire fleet of Zodiac aircraft because their wings tend to fall off in mid-flight.  As it turns out, a defect in the Zodiac's design induces an aerodynamic phenomenon known as flutter.  Flutter can destroy a wing or other control surface in a matter of seconds.  This well-known, dangerous, but rare condition is shown occurring in the tail surfaces of other aircraft types here and here. 

When the NTSB's issued its "urgent recommendation," a total of ten people had already been killed in Zodiacs due to flutter-induced failures.  Back then, the NTSB was under heavy fire for sitting on a long list of NTSB recommendations pertaining to a number of different aviation industry sectors while lives were being lost. Because of that, I figured that this was one recommendation the FAA would act on, and fast.

The FAA will see Zodiac's manufacturer as an easy target and move against it -- if for no other reason than to quiet its critics.

I was wrong.  The FAA refused to ground the aircraft.  Even I was surprised.

Of course, it was just a matter of time.  On November 6, another Zodiac crashed in Arkansas.   It looks like another flutter-induced failure.  That brings the death toll to 11.  On November 13, the NTSB issued an official "I told you so."

The Safety Board's urgent recommendation to the FAA was to "prohibit further flight of the Zodiac CH-601XL, both special light sport aircraft and experimental, until such time that the FAA determines that the CH-601XL has adequate protection from flutter." The FAA replied in July that they lacked "adequate justification to take immediate certificate action to ground the entire fleet." 

The NTSB's unstated question:  Just how many deaths are required before the FAA finds "adequate justification" to act?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The families of the victims of the Zodiac crash near Oakdale, California, have filed suit against the aircraft's maker, Zenith Aircraft, alleging that the Zodiac's design is defective. The Zodiac is the two-seat aircraft whose wings tend to break off in flight due to a design-induced aerodynamic phenomenon known as flutter.  That appears to be exactly what happened in the Oakdale crash. The design has caused at least 10 deaths so far. 

According to the Modesto Bee, Zenith Aircraft is blaming the pilot and passenger for getting into the airplane it designed.

 Zenith Aircraft said the crash was caused by the "negligence" of [the pilot and his passenger]. The company said both had "full appreciation" of the risks involved.

As discussed here, months ago the NTSB called upon the FAA to ground all Zodiacs. The FAA, however, has yet to do so.  Unfortunately, the NTSB has no power to ground an aircraft on its own.  It doesn't matter how bad the design of the aircraft is; only the FAA can ground a fleet. 

The FAA refuses to act, and Zenith Aircraft won't accept responsibility for the fatal flaws in its aircraft's design.  Lawsuits brought by aviation accident lawyers like the families' lawyers in this case seem to be the only way to prevent others from being killed in the Zodiac. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

1. The National Transportation Safety Board Secures the Wreckage on Site. The wreckage usually remains at the site of the aircraft accident until the National Transportation Safety Board arrives. The Board investigator immediately secures the wreckage and makes sure no one tampers with it.  The Board investigator inspects, documents, and photographs the wreck.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Maintenance manuals tell the mechanic when to perform an inspection or service, and how to perform it.  Many mechanics believe that the regulations require them to follow the book exactly. But in an excellent column on this murky subject, mechanic and aviation author Mike Busch sums up the regulatory requirements nicely:

The manufacturer's “how-to” instructions are compulsory, but the manufacturer’s “when-to” instructions are not.

Let's say, for example, that the manual requires the aircraft’s spark plugs to be removed and regapped every 100 hours. If a mechanic decides to service the aircraft’s spark plugs, he must do it exactly as instructed in the aircraft manual. The regulations, however, do not require the mechanic to follow the manufacturer's instructions at all concerning when or how often to service the plugs, regardless of how much time the engine has accumulated. As Busch explains:

No manufacturer can mandate any maintenance requirement on a part 91 aircraft owner; only the FAA can do so.

There is another part of the story, however, that Busch's column doesn't address. The FAA regulations are bare minimum requirements only.  If an accident occurs because the mechanic failed to comply with the manufacturer’s recommendations, questions can arise as to whether the mechanic was negligent – that is, not reasonably careful -- and thus liable to those injured as a result.  A jury may conclude that, though the regulations didn't require him to, a reasonably careful mechanic would have followed the manufacturer's recommendations anyway.  After all, does a reasonably careful mechanic believe he knows better than the manufacturer? 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

We count on the NTSB to get the facts right. That confidence is, unfortunately, sometimes misplaced. The truth is that the NTSB gets it wrong. A lot. I’ve written about that here, here, and here.

The NTSB has now given us further reason to question whether it deserves the confidence we place in it. On Friday, the NTSB came out with a block-buster press release condemning the Teterboro air traffic controller who had cleared the Piper airplane for takeoff. According to the NTSB's report, the Teterboro controller could see on his radar screen that the Piper pilot was on a possible collision course with the Liberty Tours helicopter. In fact, according to the NTSB, the controller could see the conflict before the Piper pilot switched off from the Teterboro controller’s frequency. Yet, according to the NTSB, the controller failed to warn the Piper pilot.

At 1152:20 the Teterboro controller instructed the pilot to contact Newark on a frequency of 127.85. . . At that time there were several aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of which were potential traffic conflicts for the airplane. The Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential traffic conflicts.

That was wrong. True, the controller was on the phone when he should not have been.  But the helicopter did not appear on the controller’s radar screen until after the Piper pilot was supposed to have switched to a new frequency. Of course, by then it was too late for the controller to advise the pilot of anything. In other words, it appears that there was nothing the controller could have done -- whether he was on the phone or not.

Over the weekend, the air traffic controllers’ union privately asked the NTSB to correct its error. The NTSB refused. So today the union issued its own press release setting the record straight.  The press release claims that the NTSB's account, which implies that the controller should have prevented the accident, is "outright false" and "misleading."  Worse, it charges that the NTSB knows it, but refuses to correct its error.

This afternoon, after the controllers' union went to the press, the NTSB finally conceded that it was, in fact, wrong. It thus issued a new press release, explaining that the controller could not have seen the helicopter after all.

The accident helicopter was not visible on the Teterboro controller's radar scope at 1152:20 [when the controller instructed the Piper to change frequencies]; it did appear on radar 7 seconds later - at approximately 400 feet.

The NTSB offered no apology for its error. Nor did it offer an explanation. Rather, despite that the union was right, and the NTSB was wrong, the NTSB’s only reaction was to kick the union off the investigation.

The NTSB’s blunder was a whopper. It laid blame for the accident where it does not appear to belong.  The NTSB's only interest is supposed to be in getting the facts right. If that’s so, why did it not correct its error when the union asked it to?  Why did it require the union to force the issue? 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Compared to pilots in other countries, pilots in the US have extraordinary freedom. Of course, to keep commercial airliners safe from collisions, pilots of small aircraft are excluded from certain airspace near major airports unless they have first obtained a clearance from air traffic controllers.  If a pilot obtains the necessary clearance, controllers will dictate the pilot's path and use radar to monitor the pilot's every move. 

But that still leaves many places where pilots are permitted to fly without being supervised or controlled in any way.  One such area, appropriately enough, is near the Statue of Liberty.  As long as the pilot stays below 1100 feet -- outside the airspace used by airliners -- the pilot doesn't need a clearance, doesn't need to have filed a flight plan, and doesn't need to communicate with any tower or other air traffic control facility. The pilot is totally on his own.

Many non-pilots are surprised to learn that the method used to prevent collisions in such uncontrolled areas is called "see and avoid."  The pilot is supposed to look out his window, "see" the other aircraft, and "avoid" them.  Pilots talk about having to "keep their head on a swivel" when flying in uncontrolled airspace. Though this method of collision avoidance may sound primitive, over the years it has worked well.

There is one problem.  Helicopters and airplanes don't mix well in a "see and avoid" environment.  Helicopters fly slower than airplanes.  And because they have a small cross section, they are hard to spot -- especially when viewed from directly behind. That puts them at risk of being rear-ended.  It doesn't help matters that helicopters tend to manuever in a fashion that most airplane pilots find to be unpredictable. 

Because of all that, helicopter pilots are supposed to "avoid the flow" of airplane traffic.  In other words, as best they can, they are supposed to stay out of the way. Unfortunately, when both a helicopter and airplane are headed to the same spot, or are both looking at the same feature on the ground, that can be difficult to do.

We don't know what factors combined to result in the midair over the Hudson.  But the NTSB has long recognized that when it comes to uncontrolled airspace, helicopters -- especially tour helicopters -- don't mix well with airplanes.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The G36 Bonanza's closest competitor is probably the Cirrus SR22. Would the outcome of this accident have been different had the Beechcraft been equipped with a ballistic parachute system, like the system installed in the Cirrus, depicted here?  Probably not.  For the Cirrus' ballistic parachute to work, the plane needs at least 400 feet of altitude.  Although we don't know how high N618MW climbed before its engine quit, it's unlikely it reached 400 feet.  That's an altitude the aircraft probably wouldn't have achieved until well after crossing the end of the runway. As this illustration shows, the Bonanza never made it that far.

The NTSB has now released its Preliminary Report.  The report can be found here.  There's no new information in the report, and certainly nothing that causes us to rethink the analysis we wrote about here.  

As usual, the NTSB report contains no conclusion concerning the cause of the crash.  For that, we have to wait until the NTSB issues its Probable Cause report.  Some news sources, such as the one here, are reporting that the probable cause report will be issued in the next 6 to 9 months.  That's doubtful. Except in the simplest of cases, it takes the NTSB at least 18 months to issue its probable cause report.  Sometimes, it can take as long as four years.    

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Bonanza N618MW, a Beechcraft like the one pictured below, was doing "touch & goes" at Jack Northrop field in Hawthorne.  "Touch and goes" are practice landings where the pilot does not stop on the runway.  Instead, after the wheels touch down, the pilot advances the throttle, takes off again, and then circles around for another landing.  Everything appeared to be fine until, on one of

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (4)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Special rules protect careless health care providers in California.  The rules, collectively known as MICRA, were designed to make it harder for medical malpractice victims to sue the doctors who injure them. For example,

• The medical malpractice victim must provide the defendant doctor a special notice before filing suit.
• At any trial, special rules of evidence apply that favor the doctor.
• There is a $250,000 limit on what the negligent doctor or his insurance company ever has to pay to compensate parents when the doctor causes their child's death.
• An injured party cannot recover against a negligent doctor more than the $250,000 limit for causing any sort of pain or disfigurement. 

But what do the MICRA rules have to do with helicopter crash cases?

In March 2008, a California court of appeal ruled that the medical malpractice rules apply to the claims of a someone injured in an ambulance.  In that case, called Cannister v Emergency Ambulance Service, the court ruled that a negligent ambulance company that injures a patient en route to the hospital was entitled to all the protections of MICRA, because the ambulance company was properly considered a “health care provider.” The ruling extended the umbrella of MICRA's protection from doctors to ambulance drivers, at least when those drivers are licensed as EMT’s.

An EMS air ambulance company will undoubtedly argue that Cannister -- regardless of how unfair -- applies not just to road-bound ambulances, but to air ambulances as well. The aviation lawyer must keep the MICRA rules in mind in handling EMS helicopter accidents in California, and he should be familiar with the strategies that medical malpractice lawyers use to minimize MICRA's unfair impact on his clients.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The pilot's original destination was Bozeman, Montana.  But the pilot amended his flight plan and diverted to Butte.  The pilot did not tell air traffic control why he was diverting.  About 25 minutes later, as the aircraft approached for landing at Butte, it went out of control and crashed. 

The NTSB is now investigating two things: (1) why the pilot diverted to Butte, especially when he was so close to Bozeman, and (2) why the pilot lost control and crashed so near the runway at Butte.

Some possible explanations for diverting include:

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (5)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The General Rule

Mechanics are required by regulation to follow the instructions set forth in the manufacturer's maintenance manuals when working on an aircraft.  The mechanic is not allowed to deviate from the instructions covering the work he undertakes.  If he does deviate, and someone is injured as a result, the mechanic is liable.

Service Bulletins

Sometimes, a manufacturer learns of a problem with the way its product is performing in the field.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Cory Lidle's wife and Tyler Stanger's family are suing Cirrus Design, alleging that a problem with the plane's flight controls caused Lidle and Stanger's plane to crash into a Manhattan hi-rise.

Miles O'Brien, a former CNN correspondent, calls the lawsuit frivolous, because the NTSB concluded the cause was pilot error.  According to O'Brien, "in our litigious society, the facts don't matter for much."

O'Brien is missing the fact that the NTSB's conclusion is marred by a built-in conflict of interest.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Cirrus is a “new generation” aircraft loaded with safety features. For example, if a pilot flying after dark gets too close to a ridge line, the Cirrus' on-board Terrain Awareness Warning System generates a voice urging him to “Pull Up! Pull Up!”  The plane’s wings secrete fluid that helps prevent them from icing up in poor weather. The cockpit has airbags, and its seats protect the passengers in a crash by absorbing 26 times the force of gravity.  The Cirrus is the only aircraft of its kind that comes with a rocket propelled parachute that can shoot out of the back of the plane in an emergency. Partly as a result of all its safety features, the Cirrus has become the most popular general aviation aircraft, with sales surpassing long-time industry leaders Cessna, Beechcraft, and Piper.

Critics, however, say that the aircraft has a lousy safety record, with a fatal accident rate significantly higher than the “old style” Cessnas and Beechcrafts. They say that the Cirrus, made mostly of fiberglass rather than the traditional aluminum, is not crashworthy. Not only does the

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The General Aviation Revitalization Act, known as “GARA,” immunizes general aviation manufacturers from lawsuits for defectively designed or manufactured aircraft that are more than 18 years old. Regardless of how serious the defect, if the aircraft is more than 18 years old, an injured victim cannot sue its manufacturer.

There are exceptions.  An injured party can sue the manufacturer regardless of the defective aircraft's age if:

• The aircraft, when first certified, seated 20 or more passengers;
• The aircraft is engaged in “scheduled” passenger operations;
• The victim was a passenger (not a crew member) in an air ambulance;
• The manufacturer misrepresented important information about the aircraft’s safety to the FAA during the aircraft certification process;
• The accident occurred as a result of a part that was replaced on the aircraft less than 18 years before the accident; or
• The victim was not an occupant of the aircraft.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Today the NTSB issued an "urgent" safety recommendation, asking the FAA to immediately ground all Zodiac CH-601XL aircraft.  The reason:  their wings tend to fall off.  So far, six have broken up in flight, causing 10 fatalities.  The NTSB suspects that the design of the aircraft induces "flutter"-- an aerodynamic phenomenon that can destroy an aircraft in seconds.  This short NASA video depicts flutter nearly destroying the tail on a Piper Twin Comanche.

Will the FAA act on this recommendation or, like it has with regard to so many other NTSB recommendations, simply ignore it?  I'm betting that this is one the FAA will act on.  As I've noted before, the FAA has been under increasing fire for sitting on NTSB recommendations while lives are lost. The FAA will see Zodiac's manufacturer as an easy target and move against it -- if for no other reason than to quiet its critics.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link