A pilot needs to reach the end of the runway at the right height and speed. Too slow and the aircraft could stall and crash. Too fast and the aircraft will run off the far end.
As an approach to landing progresses, the pilot watches the runway and constantly reassesses whether the aircraft is going
A poster on another forum notes that air traffic control kept Asiana 214 higher than the same flight from Seoul that landed the day before, requiring the aircraft to make a steeper descent to the runway. This is sometimes called a "slam dunk" approach.
The top illustration is the descent profile for the accident flight.
In January 2008, a Boeing 777 crash landed just short of the runway at London Heathrow Airport. Ice crystals had formed in the fuel. The ice crystals restricted the fuel to the aircraft’s two Rolls-Royce engines, causing a power failure just before landing.
Could the same thing have happened to Asiana Airlines Flight 214?
The picture to the right makes it clear that Asiana Flight 214 hit the berm just short of the runway 28L threshold. But why?
Sometimes, an aircraft lands short because of a mechanical problem. For example, British Airways Boeing 777 landed short at Heathrow in 2008 when ice crystals in the fuel caused the engine
A flight attendant placed a cup of hot coffee on passenger Lourdes Cervantes’ tray table. Then the passenger in the row ahead of her reclined. That caused the coffee to spill on Cervantes lap. Cervantes suffered second degree burns. She sued Continental.
Does she have a case?
Domestic travelers can hold the airline liable
The FAA allows Boeing to certify its own design work. That means that, at least to some extent, Boeing now regulates itself. That never seemed like such a great idea to me. Afte
r all, isn’t it the FAA’s job to make an independent determination that an aircraft design is safe? Does it make sense for the FAA
The Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation Center (“JACDEC”) is an airline safety think-tank in Germany. Last week, it rated the safety records of 60 air carriers worldwide. It considered the number of crashes and fatalities each airline has experienced – regardless of cause – since 1983. Its “time-weighted”
methodology placed the greatest emphasis on recent crashes.
The
American Airlines Flight 587 encountered wake turbulence. The pilot countered with rudder inputs. The rudder inputs were excessive, the tail assembly failed, and the aircraft crashed, killing 265 people.
The NTSB determined that the Airbus’ rudder controls are unduly sensitive and make it easy for a pilot to overstress the aircraft’s structure, causing a catastrophic failure. Now
Today a French court of appeals reversed the conviction for criminal manslaughter against the Continental Airlines mechanic involved in the Air France Concorde crash.
That brings the criminal proceedings to a close 12 years after the airliner went down. I wrote here that the proceedings would do nothing for the families. To the extent that the
The Montreal Convention requires airlines to compensate international travelers who are injured as a result of an “accident.” If the passenger is killed, the Montreal Convention requires the airline to compensate the family members. But the Convention considers neither an airliner’s pilots nor its flight attendants to be “passengers.” Thus, crew members’ claims (or the