A few days ago, most were saying it’s too early to tell what brought down the Russian Airbus that crashed on Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, killing all 224 aboard.  Now, there’s talk of the aircraft being downed by a bomb.  

Why a bomb?  The best explanation comes an article written by former NTSB investigator Doug Herlihy, appearing in the Goldendale Sentinel:

First, it’s likely that the aircraft came apart in flight.

The pieces of aircraft and persons on board are being found spread over 20KM (over 15 miles) in the mountainous region of the southern Sinai. The spread of wreckage is the most critical piece of the accident puzzle.    

When aircraft break up in flight, the parts are spread by two phenomena: the “ballistics” of the pieces and the wind.  “Ballistics” refers to the shape and weight of the object (like bullets or feathers) and how they will fly to earth.  The second factor is the wind at various altitudes as the parts fall to earth.  Like tearing a pillow in the wind, the parts are widely spread.

Second, aircraft seldom blow up because of a defect lurking within.  History shows that they almost always blow up because of an outside force.

Rarely, have any system or fuel supply or tank ever exploded a modern airplane.  Jet aircraft jet fuel, like kerosene and diesel fuel is not prone to explosion.  And, though it is not uncommon for an airliner to be hit by lightning, it’s almost unheard of that it has caused an explosion. Investigators know that either an on-board bomb or a hit by an explosive device is very high on the list of clues to search for.

Earlier this summer, the NTSB asked the FAA to require helicopter manufactures to equip all new aircraft with crashworthy fuel systems.  If history is any guide, we can expect the FAA to ignore that recommendation, despite that the FAA has known of the dangers posed by existing fuel system for decades.

But now Air Methods, one of the nation’s largest EMS helicopter operators, has committed toAir Methods EMS retrofit its entire fleet of more than 70 Airbus AS350 helicopters with fuel systems that don’t needlessly catch fire in a crash. 

Air Methods is committed to retrofitting 100% of our Airbus AS350/EC130 (H125/H130) fleet, and we are working directly with a thried party who is seeking certification for a crash resistant fuel system for the entire Airbus line.. . . For us, it’s about doing the right thing."

The program will be costly.  And Air Methods is taking the action entirely voluntarily.  The FAA does not now require retrofitting, and it’s unlikely it ever will.   

But, as Air Methods says, maybe it is about doing the right thing, rather than the most profitable thing. The question is, will other operators follow?

Experimental amateur-built aircraft crash more often than those assembled in a factory. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau found that, when compared to factory-built aircraft used in similar flight operations, amateur-built aircraft crash three times as often.  Our own National Transportation Safety Board studied the amateur-built accident rates and made similar findings.Victoria Vabre photo

One might expect that, because they are built by an amateur, an experimental aircraft’s wings would tend to fall off more often than those of a factory-built aircraft.  But that doesn’t seem to be the case. Most experimental aircraft are structurally sound.  Rather, according to NTSB data, the biggest issue is engine failure, often because of fuel flow problems.

And that’s exactly what brought down an experimental Van’s RV-10 aircraft in Toledo, Oregon, in June 2014.  The aircraft lost power on takeoff, killing the pilot and his 4 year-old passenger.  The NTSB concluded the engine failed because it wasn’t getting fuel.  Investigators found broken fragments of sealant in the aircraft’s fuel line where, of course, it wasn’t supposed to be.   

There are no statistics on how often the companies who sell kits get sued, but it’s hardly ever.  After all, who is responsible for the defect in the aircraft’s manufacture or design that caused the crash? The company who sold the kit?  Or the guy who spent several years putting the kit together in his garage?  While some builders follow the kit maker’s directions to the letter, many do not, taking it upon themselves to modify at least some portion of the aircraft. That’s allowed by regulations and seems to be part of the fun of building the aircraft.  For example, John Denver was killed years ago when the amateur-built aircraft he was piloting crashed off the California coast.  The amateur who put the kit together thought he had a better way of doing it and installed the aircraft fuel valve in a place other than as recommended by the kit’s seller.  The NTSB ultimately determined that it was that modification that led to the crash. 

But even if the victim’s lawyer proves it was the kit maker, and not the builder, who was responsible for the defect, few kit makers carry insurance.  That means a verdict against the aircraft company may be impossible to collect.

Despite the hurdles, the family of the girl killed in the Toledo crash has filed suit against Van’s Aircraft Inc., blaming it for exploiting FAA “loopholes” that allow it to sell aircraft  that have not been properly tested and are thus unproven and unsafe.  The suit goes on to allege that

Not only are Van’s aircraft designs untested and unsafe, but its assembly instructions are also inadequate and unsafe.

The suit goes on to allege that the fuel flow transducer that Van’s supplied with the kit was dangerous because it was not capable of dealing with a blockage, as would be required of on a fuel flow transducer mounted on a factory-built aircraft.

We can expect Van’s to argue that their experimental aircraft are just that – experimental.  They are not intended to have all the safety features included with factory-built aircraft.  That is why the word “experimental” is required by law to be prominently displayed inside each one.  

Nicholas Baer was body boarding in Carlsbad on the Fourth of July when a plane towing a banner crash-landed on the beach and injured him. The twelve-year-old is now suing the pilot and theCarlsbad Piper Crash company that owns the Piper that struck him.  The boy’s attorney argues that even though the Piper’s engine failed, the pilot shouldn’t have landed on the beach where someone could be injured. The pilot should have instead attempted to land in the water. Though the pilot might not have fared as well had he landed in the surf, there would certainly have been less chance of injuring beachgoers.

Seems that the boy’s attorney has a point. And this particular scenario – beachgoers being injured or even killed when a pilot attempts to put his plane down on the beach – is not entirely unheard of. It happened in Florida a year ago. The pilot in that case tried to land his Piper Cherokee, and in the process hit and killed a man and a daughter who were walking on the beach.  And it happened in Venice Florida Piper Crash2010 when a Lancair pilot landed on a beach in Hilton Head after his plane lost its propeller. In that case it was a lone jogger who was killed.Hilton Head Lancair Crash

In each of the cases, the victims were innocents. The risk of being injured by an airplane was certainly the furthest thing from their mind.

Air traffic controllers fall asleep on the job.  At least they do occasionally. That came as big news in 2011, when two airliners landed at Washington’s Reagan National Airport without ATC help because the lone controller was snoozing. No injuries there, but in 2006 a Comair regional jet crashed while taking off in Kentucky, killing 49 of the 50 people on board.   The air traffic controller who cleared the plane for takeoff didn’t notice the plane was taking off from the wrong runway.  He had slept only two hours in the previous 24.   

The question then was whether the problem of sleeping or sleep-deprived controllers was an isolated one or instead a significant, pervasive risk to aviation safety. 

The FAA paid NASA $1.2 million to find out. The NASA study’s findings:  the schedules controllers work lead to chronic fatigue and pressure to fall asleep.  In fact, a third of the controllers in the study reported that fatigue was a “high” or “extreme” safety risk.  More alarming was that 6 out of 10 controllers report that they had fallen asleep or experienced a lapse in attention while driving to or from a midnight shift.  If sleepiness is making controllers unsafe to drive, it’s certainly making them unsafe to work.

The study’s conclusion was clear: 

Chronic fatigue may be considered to pose a significant risk to controller alertness, and hence to the safety of the ATC (air traffic control) system.

Perhaps most interesting is that, according to an Associated Press report, the FAA has kept the FAA’s report secret for three years.   Though completed in 2012, the study was released just this week. No explanation from the FAA as to why it has kept the study from the public for all this time.

Robinson Helicopters began installing crash-resistant fuel tanks in 2010.  Robinson Helicopters with fuel tanks installed before then tend to catch fire during accidents that, but for the fire, would have been survivable.

The Australian authorities thought that the safer tanks were a good idea.  Enough Robinsons had caught fire after minor accidents that in 2013 the Australian government grounded all RobinsonAustralian R44 Post Crash Fire R44 helicopters operating in Australia until their owners installed the new-style fuel systems.

The NTSB asked the FAA to follow suit and issue a similar order grounding R44 helicopters in this country.  But the FAA refused.  Even assuming the old-style Robinson fuel tanks were needlessly dangerous, the FAA thought they really weren’t all that different from the fuel tanks installed in many other older helicopters.  If the FAA grounded Robinsons until they were fixed, they’d have to ground a lot of helicopters produced by other manufacturers as well.

But the FAA has known about the trouble with old-style fuel systems for a very long time. In fact, since 1991, FAA regulations have required manufacturers to install in their helicopters fuel systems that are proven "crash resistant."  Trouble is, those regulations apply only to helicopters designed after 1994.  They do not apply to helicopters that are manufactured today, but were designed (or certified) before 1994.  

Unfortunately, the majority of light helicopters manufactured in the US today were designed before 1994, and so in practice the regulations seldom apply.  The NTSB thinks its time for that to change.  The NTSB’s latest safety recommendation asks the FAA to:

Require, for all newly manufactured rotorcraft regardless of the design’s original certification date, that the fuel systems meet the crashworthiness requirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 27.952 or 29.952, “Fuel System Crash Resistance.”

What will the FAA do in response to the NTSB’s recommendation?  If history is a guide, unfortunately, the FAA will do nothing.

NTSB preliminary reports do not draw conclusions as the cause of a crash.  But the NTSB’s preliminary report of the Turbine Otter crash that killed 9 near Ketchikan on June 25 suggests a weather-related “CFIT” crash, exactly as described here.

First, the report indicates that the flight was conducted under Visual Flight Rules.  That means that that pilot was supposed to stay out of the clouds and avoid the terrain by looking out the window rather than by relying on instruments.Chelton disply

Second, the report indicates that the closest reported weather was “marginal” for flying under visual flight rules.    (“The closest weather reporting facility is Ketchikan Airport (KTN), Ketchikan, AK, about 24 miles southwest of the accident site. .  .  few clouds 800 feet, broken clouds 1,200 feet, overcast clouds 2,700 feet. . .”) 

Third, and most significantly, a helicopter pilot searching for the aircraft minutes after the crash was unable to get to the crash site because the terrain was obscured by clouds and fog.  

The NTSB noted that the Otter was equipped with a moving map display that is designed to depict the aircraft’s position with respect to hazardous terrain.  When first introduced, such displays were seen as a boon to safety, making it easier for pilots to avoid terrain that they might not otherwise be able to see.  But some argue that such technology doesn’t increase safety at all, because pilots use the technology to fly closer to the edge than they otherwise would.  The phenomenon coming into play is called “risk homeostasis.” And in fact, the NTSB has previously found that aircraft equipped with moving maps and the other technology comprising modern "glass cockpits" have a higher rate of fatal accidents than those that aren’t.

We don’t know much yet about the plane crash in Alaska that killed the pilot and 8 tourists from the MS Westerdam.  But the crash looks eerily similar to the Alaskan crash that killed Senator Ted Stevens and three others in 2010.

Like the plane that was involved in the Westerdam crash, the plane that crashed with Stevens Otter Senator Stevens Crashaboard was a de Havilland Otter retrofitted with floats and a turboprop engine. Both tour pilots encountered adverse weather that is common in Alaska:  Low Ceilings. Fog. Gusty winds.  

In the Steven’s crash, instead of turning around when he encountered the low clouds, the pilot pressed on.  Unable to see where he was going, he inadvertently flew into the side of the mountain. (The local papers were calling the pilot a "hero" because not everyone aboard was killed. I had to disagree.)

In last week’s crash at Ella Lake, the weather conditions were similar.  It looks as though the pilot,Promech Air Otter employed by tour operator Promech Air, inadvertently flew into the clouds and struck the side of a cliff.  

This sort of accident is not uncommon, particularly in Alaska and Hawaii.  The type of accident is called "controlled flight into terrain."  It is almost always due to pilot error. 

Blue Hawaiian helicopters was probably the last tour operator that flew a perfectly good aircraft into the side of a mountain due to low clouds.  Compare the photo of the weather conditions that contributed to the Blue Hawaiian crash (left) with the photo of the weather conditions that the Promech Air pilot tried to fly through.  Note how, in both photos, the clouds obscure the mountain tops.

Otter Crash near Ella Lake Alaska weather

 

 

 It looks as though the Germanwings first officer intentionally crashed the aircraft, killing all aboard.  Reporters are asking about the airline’s obligation to provide the passengers’ families monetary compensation.  Here are some answers:

The airline must compensate the families for any "accident."  Because Flight 9525 was angermanwings international flight, all the families’ claims are governed by a treaty called the Montreal Convention.  The treaty makes the airline automatically liable to the families for any "accident."  It doesn’t matter whether the airline was negligent or did anything wrong.

The crash was the result of an "accident."  Even if, as it appears, the first officer intentionally crashed the plane, it was still an "accident."  Most courts define "accident" for the purposes of the Montreal Convention to be any "unexpected or unusual event or happening that was external to the passenger."  The pilot’s decision to crash the plane would certainly qualify.

The Montreal Convention’s limits of liability will not apply.  An airline can avoid paying to the families of those lost in an accident any amount over 113,100 Special Drawing Rights (a sum equal to about US$160,000) if it can prove that it was in no way at fault for the crash.  Generally, it’s very difficult for an airline to make that showing.  It’s the problem of proving a negative.  In this case, of course, it will be impossible for the airline to prove it was completely free of fault.  So the Convention will impose no limit on the airline’s obligation to compensate the families for their loss.

The Airline is off the hook for punitive damages.  Though the airline will have to compensate the families for their losses, even if it turns out that the airline knew or should have known that the first officer presented a danger, the Montreal Convention prohibits a court from awarding punitive damages, or money designed to punish the airline rather than compensate the families.

The amounts that the families will receive depends upon where they sue.  The Montreal Convention leaves it to the courts of the country in which the passenger sues to decide how much money is appropriate compensation for the loss of a loved one.   Every country is different.  In the United States, certain families of those lost could expect payouts to exceed $10 million, depending on the circumstances.  In France and Germany, the payouts would be much, much lower.

Few passengers, if any, will be able to sue in the US.  The Montreal Convention allows families to sue in the United States only in certain limited circumstances.  For example, a family might be able to sue in the US if the passenger happened to purchase his tickets in the US, or if he was planning to continue on after landing to a destination in the United States, or perhaps if the passenger was US resident.