How quickly must I act and get a lawyer?

It is usually best to consult with an attorney within 90 days of an accident.  You need to ensure that the aircraft wreckage is properly preserved and that the applicable statutes of limitation do not run on your claim.

Read more here

What should I look for in an aviation lawyer?

Find an attorney with an excellent record of jury verdicts in aviation lawsuits.  Unless the lawyer has proven that he or she can successfully take an aviation accident case all the way through trial and to a verdict, it is unlikely the responsible insurance company will take the lawyer seriously when it comes time to discuss settlement

Should the lawyer I select be a pilot?

Experience as a helicopter or fixed-wing pilot is an invaluable asset for the aviation accident attorney.  But more important than piloting credentials is the attorney’s trial record in aviation accident cases. 

More here.

What does an aviation attorney cost?

An aviation lawyer will cost you nothing unless and until there is a monetary recovery.  The lawyer will work on a contingency fee contract, and will advance all costs and expenses of the lawsuit. 

Shouldn’t I wait for the NTSB to finish its work before deciding whether Ie should start a lawsuit? 

Sometimes that makes sense.  But usually it’s not in the client’s best interest to wait.  The offices of the NTSB are understaffed, underfunded and overwhelmed by workload.  It takes the NTSB from one to four years to complete its report.  The NTSB’s "party system" creates a conflict of interest that results in reports that favor the manufactures and other industry players.  Therefore, the NTSB report is seldom worth waiting for.  

More here.

Can I settle my case without retaining a lawyer?  

Yes, sometimes, especially if the injuries are not significant, or if the insurance is limited.  Before doing so, however, be sure to consult with an aviation lawyer.  Most will talk things over without charge and advise you whether it makes to settle on your own. 

How long will it take to resolve my aviation case? 

It varies but in our experience most cases resolve 1 1/2 and 3 years after we file them. (Yes, we frequently resolve aviation lawsuits before the NTSB even issues its probable cause report.)

How can we make sure that this accident doesn’t happen again to someone else? 

A decision to cut costs can be found in the chain of events leading to most aviation accidents.  By taking the profit out of unsafe business practices, a lawsuit can sometimes be the most effective way to bring about change in the industry. 

Many clients are surprised to learn that the NTSB has no power to punish sloppy operators or take away their licenses, regardless of what it concludes caused the crash.  For most operators, unless there’s a lawsuit, it’s "business as usual." 

How can I find out about your background and qualifications?

Look here and here

Cirrus aircraft are now available with "flight into known icing" (FIKI) capability.  That’s a great feature. I’ve written before, however, that Cirrus is asking for trouble with its marketing.  Cirrus sells the feature as one that both enhances safety and increases the aircraft’s utility.  But Cirrus can’t have it both ways.  If a pilot uses the FIKI capability by, for example, flying in conditions that would otherwise keep him on the ground, he necessarily undermines that feature’s safety benefits.  I discuss why Cirrus’ marketing is a problem here.

Steve Wilson, who is an air safety investigator (among other things), now slams Cirrus’ marketing even harder.  According to Wilson, some aspects of Cirrus’ marketing encourage pilots to use the FIKI capability to take risks that are simply foolish.

Some say that Wilson’s criticisms should be discounted because he sells Cessna aircraft and Cessna competes with Cirrus.  But Wilson isn’t criticizing Cirrus’ product, just its marketing.  It seems hard to argue with him. 

Updated February 12:

A Cirrus SR-20 single engine aircraft collided with a Pawnee tow plane that was pulling a glider. The Cirrus reportedly ran into the Pawnee’s tow line. The Pawnee crashed and the pilot was killed.  The occupants of the Cirrus were also killed.  The glider pilot, however, recognized the impending collision, released his aircraft from the tow line, and landed without injury to himself or his two

Continue Reading Cirrus – Pawnee Mid-Air Collison Near Boulder, Colorado

This week, aviation accident attorneys from across the country met on Maui to discuss current topics in aviation law. This was part of the American Association of Justice’s Winter Convention. I was honored to have been asked to speak. My talk was on Hawaii helicopter crash litigation — a topic with which we are — unfortunately — perhaps too familiar.

I covered the profits, accident statistics, the poor safety record, lack of insurance, the popular equipment (including the Eurocopter AStar); and the FAA’s unfortunate lack of heli-tour industry oversight. Powerpoint available here.

As it turns out, my presentation was a bit controversial. The tour industry was a sponsor of the convention. And I ripped into it. On the flight back to San Francisco, someone asked me whether that made me uncomfortable, given that AAJ actually promoted the tours. In fact, the blogosphere was chiming in about it before I even spoke. Carter Wood, blogging on PointofLaw.com, questions the appropriateness of my topic:


That’s the way you pay back Hawaii’s hospitality? ‘Fly like a tropical bird, and then sue!’

First, the risks are, for the most part, unknown. Unknown to people travelling to Hawaii, and unknown even to the AAJ, a group which is, generally speaking, keenly aware of industries that place profits over consumer safety. Thus, the title, "Under the Radar."


Second, I want to get the word out. It’s too important. Too many people’s lives have been torn apart by this industry. I really don’t care what “sponsors” I offend.

Icing or pilot error?

Last April, the NTSB released the data from Flight 3407’s FDR.  I blogged about that here.  Despite wide spread speculation that icing brought down the aircraft, it looked to me like pilot error — not weather —  was to blame.

Then, in May, the NTSB released an animation derived from the aircraft’s flight data recorder, its cockpit voice recorder, and ATC transcripts.  I blogged about that here.  The animation, like the raw data from the FDR, made a strong case for pilot error.  From the animation, it appeared to me that an inattentive pilot allowed the aircraft to get slower and slower, until it became dangerously close to the speed at which the aircraft would stop flying altogether and simply fall from the sky.  Then, when the critical moment came, the pilot pulled back on the control yoke instead of pushing it forward, thereby inducing an aerodynamic stall.

The NTSB made public its official probable cause finding at a hearing yesterday.  No surprises to anyone who has studied the data.  According to an article in today’s Buffalo News, the NTSB summed it up as follows:

The plane got so slow that the “stick shaker” — a device that helps to prevent stalls — activated. But Renslow [the pilot] mistakenly pulled back on the plane’s controls at that point, which is exactly the opposite of what he should have done.

In total, Renslow pulled back on the controls three times in response to the stick shaker and “stick pusher,” forcing the nose upward. That caused and then exacerbated the stall.

It’s almost unimaginable that a professional pilot would make the series of mistakes that the pilot did in this case.  Even a new student pilot would know better.  But that’s what he did.

The NTSB played its animation for those who attended the hearing.  The animation shows the pilot’s errors mount.  The activation of the “stick shaker” is depicted 2 minutes and 8 seconds into the animation. The shaking control yoke was a final warning to the pilot that he must immediately push the yoke forward.  But instead of pushing forward, the pilot pulled back. Three times.  After the third time, the aircraft stalled and crashed.

There were countless points at which this aircraft could have been saved but, inexplicably, the pilot failed to take appropriate action.

 

 

In 1994, the FAA — hoping to reduce the number of helicopter tour crashes in Hawaii — promulgated a controversial rule that set minimum altitudes for Hawaiian sight seeing flights.

According to an article appearing this spring in Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, after the rule went into effect the overall number of helicopter crashes in Hawaii decreased, but the number of crashes resulting from improper VFR flight into instrument conditions increased.  That means fewer overall crashes (especially ocean ditchings), but  more crashes into mountainsides hidden in the clouds. The number of fatal crashes remained the same.

Although its data and methodology may be questionable, the recent report concludes:

the FAA should reconsider the Rule’s clause that established a minimum flying altitude of 1,500 feet, as we know higher altitudes are associated with more cloud cover. 

This conclusion delighted the helicopter industry which opposed the new minimum altitude requirement.  And a possible increase in weather-related accidents was one of the FAA’s concerns from the outset.  Requiring helicopters to maintain more clearance from terrain features, and more altitude to deal with engine failure, makes it harder for them to remain clear of the clouds.  But the report fails to consider the "deviations" the FAA has issued to air tour operators that allow them to fly lower than the established minimums.  Depending on the number of deviations that the FAA issued, it may be unfair to blame the rule for the increased number of mountainside collisions.

It’s a modern day Scylla and Charybdis. (OK, you’ll have to indulge me, my favorite mythical allusion because it’s more accurate than saying "catch-22” or "caught between a rock and a hard place.") Is the danger posed by the close proximity to the terrain more daunting than the unpredictable cloud cover? When it spoke in 1994 the FAA said, “No — higher altitude is safer".
 

The easy answer: the applicant is the Pilot in Command and is fully responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft, not the FAA check pilot. But what about when the check pilot attempts to simulate an engine failure by chopping the throttle? At that point, hasn’t the check pilot assumed control of the aircraft?

Well, that’s what happened recently when another AS350 helicopter accident occurred during a check ride in Maui. The applicant, a commercially certificated air tour pilot working for Sunshine Helicopters, made a forced landing after the helicopter experienced a total loss of engine power. The helicopter was destroyed and both the pilot and the FAA check pilot suffered serious injuries.

The FAA defends the check pilot, explaining that it is routine to simulate the loss of engine power during a check ride. The air tour operator, Sunshine Helicopters, claims that while a simulated loss of engine power may be routine, the check pilot’s actions resulted in an actual engine failure over terrain unsuitable for an emergency landing.  Causing an actual engine failure is anything but routine.

The F.A.A. regulations require that, to pass a check ride, an applicant must demonstrate that he is the “obvious master of the aircraft.”  It follows that the applicant is presumed to be the pilot in command and responsible for the safe outcome of the flight. But if the applicant pilot can prove that the check pilot improperly interfered with his ability to control the aircraft, then he may successfully overcome that presumption and hold the FAA check pilot responsible. 

Who can be held responsible for compensating the Mountain Lifeflight families, and who is immune from suit?   

Maintenance.  If faulty maintenance is proven to be the cause of this helicopter crash, the families can recover against the maintenance company, provided that the families can prove that the maintenance company was negligent.  There is an important exception, however.  The families cannot sue the company that performed the maintenance if that company was Mountain Lifeflight itself.  That’s because the worker’s compensation laws immunize a crew member’s employer from suit brought by the crew member’s family.  More on that here.

Pilot error.  There is no reason to believe that the crash was caused by pilot error.  To the contrary, as discussed here, it looks as though the crash was likely caused by a mechanical failure.  However, assuming for argument’s sake that the crash was caused by pilot error, the workers’ compensation laws prohibit the families from suing either the pilot’s estate or the pilot’s employer.

Design defect.  Other A-Star accidents similar to this one raise the question of whether the crash was caused by the helicopter’s faulty design.  The families are entitled to sue the aircraft’s manufacturer, Eurocopter, and get to the bottom of the design defect issue.  If the families prove that the crash was in fact caused by a defect in the design of the helicopter, then they can hold Eurocopter responsible.

But there is one hurdle the families must overcome before winning a design defect suit.  The accident helicopter, N5793P, was manufactured in 1982.  The General Aviation Revitalization Act, or GARA, immunizes manufacturers from liability from lawsuits arising from aircraft that are older than 18 years.  At first blush, it would seem that the families have no recourse against the manufacturer at all.  But there is an important exception to GARA.   If the accident occurred as a result of a new part that was installed on the aircraft less than 18 years before the accident, the manufacturer can’t assert the defense, no matter how old the aircraft.  And it has been reported that N5793P had been completely rebuilt only a few years before the crash.  Therefore, even though the helicopter was manufactured more than 27 years ago, it’s likely that most critical parts on the aircraft were less than 18 years old, and that GARA won’t protect the manufacturer.

The Federal Tort Claims Act allows citizens who have been injured by the federal government to sue the United States.  But there’s an important exception.  No suit against the government is allowed when the victim is a service member injured by the negligence of the United States military. 

The rule protecting the military is called the Feres Doctrine.  In aviation accident cases, the doctrine bars service Marine Aboard Sea Knight Helicoptermembers from suing the government regardless of whether the crash was caused by the negligence of a military mechanic, air traffic controller, dispatcher or pilot.

Not surprisingly, the Feres Doctrine is controversial.  It allows the military to avoid responsibility for not just simple negligence, but for gross negligence as well.  Because of its unfairness, Congress has repeatedly been asked to abolish the rule, or at least limit it.  (Large pdf of Congressional Hearing here.)  But the Feres Doctrine remains the law.  As long as the victim was an "active" service member, and the injury or death was "incident to service," the military is immune from suit.  

That doesn’t mean that injured soldiers or their families cannot sue others who may have contributed to a military aircraft accident.  For example, if a defect in the design of the aircraft contributed to the crash or to the injuries the crew member received, the crew member can still sue the aircraft’s manufacturer. The aircraft manufacturer may be able to assert defenses of its own, such as the "government contractor defense," but not the Feres Doctrine.

The military prepares an investigative report after every accident involving one of its aircraft.  The report focuses on the military’s role in the accident.  It seldom addresses whether a manufacturer or other civilian contractor may have been at fault. In fact, as discussed in this article concerning a military helicopter crash off the California coast, sometimes the report provides no answers at all.  Families will often need to enlist an aviation accident attorney to conduct an investigation on their behalf.  The attorney may need to file suit against the manufacturers just to obtain access to the evidence bearing on who, other than the military, may be responsible for a service member’s injury or death.    

In the early stages of a lawsuit, it is often unclear which of two different defendants is responsible for an aviation accident.  But as the case progresses, evidence may point to one defendant over another.  When that happens, it may seem like a good idea for the victim to settle with (or dismiss from the lawsuit) the defendant whose liability appears tenuous, andEmpty Chair to proceed to trial against the defendant who appears blameworthy.  Experienced aviation lawyers think carefully, however, before following that course, for fear of creating an "empty chair" in the courtroom.

Let’s say that, at the outset of the case, it is unclear whether the aircraft crash was caused by the defective design of a part (for which the aircraft manufacturer would be responsible), or negligent maintenance (for which the aviation mechanic would be responsible).  But let’s say that, as the suit progresses, evidence is uncovered indicating that the responsibility should rightfully lie with the manufacturer.  It may seem like good sense to dismiss the mechanic from the lawsuit and proceed to trial against only the manufacturer.  Doing so, however, may allow the manufacturer to argue to the jury that the one truly responsible for the accident is someone who is not present in the courtroom — someone who should be seated in the "empty chair," but whom the victim decided not to bring into court. 

This strategy is called "blaming the empty chair."  Of course, the "empty chair" cannot defend itself.  Thus, if allowed to employ this tactic, the wrongdoer can sometimes escape liability altogether.