A poster on another forum notes that air traffic control kept Asiana 214 higher than the same flight from Seoul that landed the day before, requiring the aircraft to make a steeper descent to the runway. This is sometimes called a "slam dunk" approach.
The top illustration is the descent profile for the accident flight. The bottom is the profile from the Asiana flight that landed safely the day before.
In January 2008, a Boeing 777 crash landed just short of the runway at London Heathrow Airport. Ice crystals had formed in the fuel. The ice crystals restricted the fuel to the aircraft’s two Rolls-Royce engines, causing a power failure just before landing.
Could the same thing have happened to Asiana Airlines Flight 214?
No.
First, after the crash at Heathrow, the Rolls Royce engine components that had iced up were re-designed so that it could not happen again.
Second, Asiana 214’s engines were not Rolls Royce Engines. Rather, they were Pratt & Whitney engines. Pratt & Whitney engines heat the fuel before passing it through the components that would otherwise be susceptible to icing up.
Finally, witnesses on board the aircraft report that the pilot increased throttle to what seemed to be full takeoff thrust just before the crash. If ice crystals had somehow restricted the fuel flow, that would not have been possible.
The picture to the right makes it clear that Asiana Flight 214 hit the berm just short of the runway 28L threshold. But why?
Sometimes, an aircraft lands short because of a mechanical problem. For example, British Airways Boeing 777 landed short at Heathrow in 2008 when ice crystals in the fuel caused the engine to lose power during its approach to landing.
But more commonly landing short is the result of pilot error. And I’ve listened to the tower tapes and didn’t hear any indication of an emergency. (Admittedly, that doesn’t necessarily rule out a problem in the cockpit.)
Here’s an animation of Korean Airlines Flight 801 that landed short and crashed in 1997 in Guam. The cause was pilot error. The crew allowed the aircraft to get too low and then waited too long to add power and go around.
I really like the Avidyne PFD, MFD, and autopilot in my Cirrus.
In a nutshell, the Avidyne PFD and MFD tell the pilot flying in instrument conditions which way is up and how to steer a course that keeps you from hitting a mountain. The Avidyne autopilot is loaded with great safety features that can save your bacon if for some reason stuff hits the fan in the cockpit.
A few days ago, Avidyne offered me its new “AeroPlan” extended warranty for my equipment: pay $2000 per year and any repairs are free. If that sounds like a lot of money, keep in mind that without a warranty Avidyne charges a flat rate of $5900 to fix anything that might go on the fritz. (Ouch!)
Offer expires July 1.
All in all, it seemed like a deal that I couldn’t refuse.
Then I read the fine print.
Avidyne won’t sell owners the warranty unless they sign a “Waiver, Release and Indemnification.” At first blush, that document seemed like just another boilerplate form designed to protect Avidyne fromt frivolous suits. But when I read the form closely, I realized that by signing it, an owner puts his entire net worth on the line should Avidyne screw up and hurt someone that the owner may have never even met.
By signing, the owner agrees that he won’t sue Avidyne if he crashes, regardless of whether the crash was Avidyne’s fault. Hmmm. You’d think that if I could prove that I crashed solely because Avidyne’s product was defective, Avidyne would agree to at least pay my medical expenses
But it gets worse. By signing the agreement, the owner agrees that if one of his passengers is injured in a crash, and his passenger sues Avidyne, the owner will pay Avidyne’s attorneys fees in defending the case in court. Same goes for suits brought against Avidyne by anyone who is injured on the ground.
Furthermore, by signing the owner agrees to pay any court judgment that is awarded against Avidyne — even though the accident turns out to be entirely Avidyne’s fault and not the owner’s.
And there is no end date to the owner’s obligation. So even after I sell the aircraft, I’m still on the hook. If the new owner crashes, and then sues Avidyne, I agree to pay for Avidyne’s attorneys and for any judgment that the new owner (or his passengers) obtain against it.
In short, anyone who signs this agreement becomes Avidyne’s insurance company. Forever. All to save a few bucks on repair work.
Who would agree to that? My understanding is that owners are rushing to beat the July 1 deadline. But I don’t think those folks know what they are getting themselves into.
A flight attendant placed a cup of hot coffee on passenger Lourdes Cervantes’ tray table. Then the passenger in the row ahead of her reclined. That caused the coffee to spill on Cervantes lap. Cervantes suffered second degree burns. She sued Continental.
Does she have a case?
Domestic travelers can hold the airline liable only if their injuries are caused by the 
airline’s negligence. In other words, the airline is not responsible unless it was careless. So if Cervantes was on a domestic flight, it’s hard to see how she could win.
But Cervantes was flying on a flight from Madrid, Spain, to Newark, New Jersey. Because she was traveling internationally, the Montreal Convention applies. Under the Convention, whether the airline was negligent is for the most part irrelevant. All that matters is whether the passenger was injured by an "accident."
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined “accident” to mean “an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.” Does Cervantes’ situation meet the definition? Yes, according to a California federal court that ruled on a nearly identical case involving hot tea rather than hot coffee:
The slide of the tea off of the tray table was unusual and unexpected. Although it may be common for an airline seat to shake when its occupant moves around, it is not common for beverages placed on the tray table behind that seat to be so jolted by the movement that they fall onto another passenger. It is the failure of the tray table to hold beverages securely despite passenger movement in the seat in front that is unexpected.
Looks like Cervantes’ case is a winner.
A jury in Washington state handed down a $26 million verdict against Avco Lycoming as a result of a fatal Cessna 172 crash that killed three people in 2008. The jury’s award included $6 million in punitive damages, designed to punish Lycoming for consciously disregarding the safety of the flying public.
It’s the second time a jury has slammed Lycoming with punitive damages for its carb floats. In 2010, a jury awarded $89 million, including $64 million in punitive damages, as a result of 1999 Cherokee 6 crash that killed four and injured one.
This case, however, was a bit different. It was the judge who ruled that Lycoming was responsible for the crash 
before the case ever reached the jury. All that was left for the jury to decide was how much to include in its verdict. The judge ruled against Lycoming because it refused to turn over relevant documents in the case. Apparently, the documents were so incriminating that Lycoming felt it was better to suffer a certain jury verdict than to allow the documents to see the light of day.
[I]n December 2005, Lycoming participated in a series of emails discussing the leaking Delrin Float issue, none of which Lycoming produced during discovery. The series of emails informs Lycoming of the significance of the Delrin float leaking problem. In the emails, Lycoming employees state that it is clear that hollow plastic carb floats can leak, allowing fuel to enter the interior of the floats. The emails reflect that there was also a recent inflight [engine] stoppage. The email also recognized the danger of discussing the defects in writing: “It is too bad that we have to answer in writing on such a touchy issue.”
Plaintiffs asked Lycoming to turn over the rest of the emails on the subject, including those that went to upper managment. The emails would have been important evidence that Lycoming knew the floats leaked and could cause engine failure. But Lycoming refused. So the court ordered Lycoming to turn them over. Lycoming still refused.
Lycoming’s willful and deliberate refusal to follow the court’s order prevented plaintiffs from proving their case. So the court did the only thing that was fair and ruled that the floats were defective and caused the accident.
The Judge’s order is an interesting read.
This Robinson R44 crash was in Australia.
Witnesses said that nearby restaurant staff “grabbed every fire extinguisher in the building, but there were too many flames . . . There was nothing anyone could do.”
No occupant of a properly-designed helicopter should be burned in an otherwise survivable impact. Unfortunately, the fuel tanks installed in all Robinson R44 helicopters manufactured before 2010 are not properly designed.
On Friday, the ATSB (the Australian equivalent of the NTSB) confirmed that the accident helicopter was equipped with the all-aluminum fuel tanks, rather than the bladder-type tanks 
now available for retrofit. The ATSB urged all R44 owners to get their tanks retrofitted after the February 4, 2012 R44 crash that killed noted Australian filmmakers Andrew Wight and Mike deGruy. But less than half of the 4000 Robinson Helicopters with the defective tanks have been fixed.
Passengers killed in this latest crash included a couple who were checking out their wedding venue.
Other low-impact R44 helicopter crashes that have resulted in fires since the new tanks have been made available:
The FAA allows Boeing to certify its own design work. That means that, at least to some extent, Boeing now regulates itself. That never seemed like such a great idea to me. Afte
r all, isn’t it the FAA’s job to make an independent determination that an aircraft design is safe? Does it make sense for the FAA to allow Boeing — or any manufacturer — to grant FAA certification to itself?
Now, the NTSB seems to agree. In discussing whether the FAA’s "self-certification" policy played a role in Boeing’s 787 battery problems, NTSB Chair Deborah Hersman hinted that maybe the FAA isn’t doing its job:
This is an issue when you have a regulator with limited resources. . .You can delegate some of the action, but you can’t delegate responsibility.”
A regulator that allows a manufacturer to certify its own designs isn’t a regulator at all.
The Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation Center (“JACDEC”) is an airline safety think-tank in Germany. Last week, it rated the safety records of 60 air carriers worldwide. It considered the number of crashes and fatalities each airline has experienced – regardless of cause – since 1983. Its “time-weighted”
methodology placed the greatest emphasis on recent crashes.
The safest airline: Finnair. The least safe: China Airlines.
Over the past few years, most fatal crashes have been attributable to foreign airlines. Nonetheless, under JACDEC’s methodology, the US carriers didn’t fare all that well.
United Airlines was ranked 31st, American 42nd, US Airways 44th, Alaska 45th, and SkyWest was ranked one of the ten worst at 51st. Worse even than Aeroflot, the notoriously dangerous Russian airline.
The entire list is here. The translations for the German column headings is here.
An Fixed-Base Operator will sometimes tell the pilot to whom it rents an aircraft that, in the event of an accident, the pilot may be held responsible for the FBO’s deductible. From that, pilots sometimes conclude that their liability will be limited to the amount of the deductible, and that everything else is "covered."
Not so. Not only can the FBO pursue the pilot for the deductible, but the FBO’s insurance company can (and often does) pursue the pilot for the full amount it pays to the FBO for the damage to the aircraft. In other words, the renter pilot can be held responsible for the entire loss.
But more importantly, the FBO’s policy doesn’t necessarily cover the renter pilot for any injury or death he may cause to others. That was the recent holding in Knezovich v. Hallmark Insurance, an Illinois case arising from a fatal midair collision between a Cirrus and a Cessna in Wyoming. The families of those killed in the Cirrus sued the estate of Cessna pilot, claiming the Cessna pilot caused the crash. The court ruled that the FBO’s insurance policy didn’t protect the pilot at all (or, more accurately, his estate) and that the insurance company didn’t even have to hire the renter pilot’s estate a lawyer to defend against the wrongful death lawsuit brought against it. In short, the estate was on its own.
Aviation lawyer Greg Reigel sums it up:
Although this is an unfortunate situation for the deceased pilot’s estate, this case serves as a reminder to anyone who rents aircraft to confirm that insurance coverage is in place that will protect the renter. It isn’t enough to simply ask the FBO or aircraft owner whether they have insurance. You need to be sure that coverage is in place to protect you, the person renting the aircraft. If the aircraft owner’s or FBO’s insurance doesn’t provide coverage, you need to know that so you can understand your risk and either obtain coverage elsewhere or go without.
Of course, not only was the situation unfortunate for the estate of the Cessna pilot, but it was unfortunate for the families of the others killed in the accident. Even assuming that they prove the crash was caused entirely by the Cessna pilot, unlike the FBO, its unlikely they will ever be fully compensated.