Sundance Tour Helicopter Crash at Las Vegas and the AStar Hydraulic System

Eurocopter's AStar is the most popular tour helicopter in the United States. But according to some tour operators, the helicopter is dangerous and defective. They use it anyway because it is the most profitable.

No, I’m not making this up.

Problems with the AStar 350?

One of Las Vegas' largest tour operators, Heli-USA, is run by Nigel Turner.  Turner is himself a pilot. He operates the largest AStar fleet in the Western United States. And he feels that the design of the AStar's hydraulic sytem causes it to crash. Turner complains that the manufacturer refuses to fix the problems. But, like other tour operators he sticks with the AStar for one simple reason: money. According to a 2008 article in the Star Bulletin:
 

Turner said that despite the problems with the AStar, it will remaiAStar's Hydraulic Actuatorsn the helicopter of choice for his company because it's the only chopper with forward-facing seats that can fit enough passengers to make a tour profitable.

So what exactly do hydraulics and actuators do?

The actuators move the helicopter's rotor blades, allowing the pilot to control the flight of the aircraft. The AS350's hydraulics -- similar to a power steering system in a car -- help move the helicopter's actuators. If the hydraulic system fails, the pilot may find it hard to move the actuators and thus the helicopter can be difficult to control.
 

While a problem with the hydraulic system can make the helicopter difficult to control, a disconnected or broken actuator will make the helicopter impossible to control. That's what happened in 2007, when an AS350 just like the one involved in this accident crashed in Hawaii, killing four tourists. Days after that accident, Eurocopter issued a Special Airworthiness Bulletin (see below) prompted by two previous fatal accidents, warning of the consequences of loose servo control rod end fittings. 

The Sundance Helicpter’s control system

NTSB board member Dr. Mark Rosekind says that the Sundance helicopter climbed and turned erratically just before impact.  That's consistent with an actuator problem. And, just hours before the crash, one of the Sundance helicopter's main rotor actuators was replaced.  Was the actuator defective? Was it installed incorrectly?

The NTSB has now recovered that actuator from the wreckage site. That's where the investigation will focus. 

But given what industry leaders have to say about problems with the AStar’s control system, one has to wonder whether by continuing to use the helicopter the tour industry is simply placing profits ahead of public safety. 

AS350BService Bulletin

Blue Hawaiian Helicopter Crash: Photo Tells the (Same Old) Story?

The NTSB blamed the pilot for the last Blue Hawaiian helicopter crash into the side of a mountain. The NTSB concluded that while flying near bad weather, the pilot inadvertently entered clouds, became disoriented, and lost control of the helicopter. According to the NTSB, the probable cause of the accident was:

The pilot's inadequate decision by which he continued visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions. Also causal was his failure to maintain terrain clearance resulting in a collision with mountainous terrain. A contributing factor was the low ceiling.

One need only look at the low clouds in the photo taken shortly after TBy Joey Salamon/Molokai Dispatchhursday's Blue Hawaiian crash on Molokai to wonder if weather and pilot decision-making played a similar role in this latest crash. 

Hawaii’s micro-weather makes helicopter tours dangerous. We've written about it before here, and hereSpoken about it too.  Yet, year after year, tour operators opt to collect the fares and fly when weather conditions dictate that they really should stay on the ground.

Did the pilot involved in Thursday's crash try to squeeze his Eurocopter between the weather and the terrain and lose control?  Time will tell whether this accident should be added to the list of crashes caused by "improper VFR."  But without significant changes in the industry, Hawaiian tourists will continue to lose their lives in completely avoidable weather-related helicopter accidents. 

FAA Declines To Close LSA Loophole

Operators have begun using LSAs -- particularly "trikes" -- to give air tours over the Hawaiian islands.  LSAs fly low and slow, just like helicopters, and are much cheaper to run.  But they have a terrible safety record.  And it's illegal to use LSAs for commercial tours.

If it is illegal to use LSAs for commercial tours, how do LSA operators get away with it?  As I wrote here, they simply say that they are taking the passenger for an introductory "flight lesson," rather than a tour. 

The FAA now recognizes that operators are taking advantage of the regulatory loophole. According to one FAA official, "It appears some operators are trying to get around the air tour provision by offering flights under the guise of introductory flying instructions."

The Honolulu Star-Advertiser reports that  the FAA's plan for dealing with the problem is to  step up surveillance:

the plan will call for more unannounced visits, interviews with pilots and record examinations of aircraft operators. Officials also held a meeting with weight-shift control operators to encourage more voluntary compliance.

The FAA says no new regulations are needed, since the existing rules are clear.  Yes, the rules are clear.  That's the problem.  It's clear that it's legal to take a paying passenger for an introductory flight lesson.  And so that's exactly what the tour companies operating LSAs will continue to do.

LSA Loophole Claims the Life of Another Hawaiian Tourist

The Hawaiian air tour industry has a horrible safety record. And now it has claimed yet another life – that of a 53 year-old Californian who had traveled with his wife to the islands to celebrate their 25th wedding anniversary.

I've written before about the dangers of Hawaiian helicopter tours. But this tourist’s death was not the result of a helicopter crash.  Rather, it was the result of the crash of a “Light-sport Aircraft” or LSA.  And, in fact, this was the third fatal LSA crash in Hawaii since last April.  Altogether, 6 people have died.Quik 912S

So what's an LSA? It’s an aircraft that, among other things, weighs less than 1320 pounds and flies no faster than 140 miles per hour. LSA's come in different shapes and sizes.  The model involved in the most recent crash, the Quik 912s, is pictured to the right.

LSA's are cheap to buy and to operate. They are much, much less expensive than helicopters.  And many think they are just as good as helicopters, if not better, for “low and slow” sightseeing. 

There’s one catch. It’s illegal to use an LSA for commercial air tours. LSAs are not engineered and tested to the same standards as conventional aircraft. If a hobbyist wants to fly an LSA, that’s one thing. But the FAA won’t allow a pilot to use an LSA to give a member of the public an aerial tour for hire. LSA's just aren’t safe enough.

Then how do the Hawaiian operators get away with doing just that?  The loophole: While a pilot can't use an LSA to give tours for hire, he can give flight lessons.  So the pilot need only call this ride the tourist’s first "flight lesson,” and he’s legal.

Aviation Attorneys Convene in Hawaii

This week, aviation accident attorneys from across the country met on Maui to discuss current topics in aviation law. This was part of the American Association of Justice's Winter Convention. I was honored to have been asked to speak. My talk was on Hawaii helicopter crash litigation -- a topic with which we are -- unfortunately -- perhaps too familiar.

I covered the profits, accident statistics, the poor safety record, lack of insurance, the popular equipment (including the Eurocopter AStar); and the FAA's unfortunate lack of heli-tour industry oversight. Powerpoint available here.

As it turns out, my presentation was a bit controversial. The tour industry was a sponsor of the convention. And I ripped into it. On the flight back to San Francisco, someone asked me whether that made me uncomfortable, given that AAJ actually promoted the tours. In fact, the blogosphere was chiming in about it before I even spoke. Carter Wood, blogging on PointofLaw.com, questions the appropriateness of my topic:


That's the way you pay back Hawaii's hospitality? 'Fly like a tropical bird, and then sue!'

First, the risks are, for the most part, unknown. Unknown to people travelling to Hawaii, and unknown even to the AAJ, a group which is, generally speaking, keenly aware of industries that place profits over consumer safety. Thus, the title, "Under the Radar."


Second, I want to get the word out. It's too important. Too many people's lives have been torn apart by this industry. I really don't care what “sponsors” I offend.

Hawaiian Helicopter Air Tour Crashes: On the Rise?

In 1994, the FAA -- hoping to reduce the number of helicopter tour crashes in Hawaii -- promulgated a controversial rule that set minimum altitudes for Hawaiian sight seeing flights.

According to an article appearing this spring in Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, after the rule went into effect the overall number of helicopter crashes in Hawaii decreased, but the number of crashes resulting from improper VFR flight into instrument conditions increased.  That means fewer overall crashes (especially ocean ditchings), but  more crashes into mountainsides hidden in the clouds. The number of fatal crashes remained the same.

Although its data and methodology may be questionable, the recent report concludes:

the FAA should reconsider the Rule's clause that established a minimum flying altitude of 1,500 feet, as we know higher altitudes are associated with more cloud cover. 

This conclusion delighted the helicopter industry which opposed the new minimum altitude requirement.  And a possible increase in weather-related accidents was one of the FAA's concerns from the outset.  Requiring helicopters to maintain more clearance from terrain features, and more altitude to deal with engine failure, makes it harder for them to remain clear of the clouds.  But the report fails to consider the "deviations" the FAA has issued to air tour operators that allow them to fly lower than the established minimums.  Depending on the number of deviations that the FAA issued, it may be unfair to blame the rule for the increased number of mountainside collisions.

It’s a modern day Scylla and Charybdis. (OK, you'll have to indulge me, my favorite mythical allusion because it's more accurate than saying "catch-22” or "caught between a rock and a hard place.") Is the danger posed by the close proximity to the terrain more daunting than the unpredictable cloud cover? When it spoke in 1994 the FAA said, “No -- higher altitude is safer".
 

Who is the Pilot in Command During an FAA Check Ride?

The easy answer: the applicant is the Pilot in Command and is fully responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft, not the FAA check pilot. But what about when the check pilot attempts to simulate an engine failure by chopping the throttle? At that point, hasn’t the check pilot assumed control of the aircraft?

Well, that’s what happened recently when another AS350 helicopter accident occurred during a check ride in Maui. The applicant, a commercially certificated air tour pilot working for Sunshine Helicopters, made a forced landing after the helicopter experienced a total loss of engine power. The helicopter was destroyed and both the pilot and the FAA check pilot suffered serious injuries.

The FAA defends the check pilot, explaining that it is routine to simulate the loss of engine power during a check ride. The air tour operator, Sunshine Helicopters, claims that while a simulated loss of engine power may be routine, the check pilot's actions resulted in an actual engine failure over terrain unsuitable for an emergency landing.  Causing an actual engine failure is anything but routine.

The F.A.A. regulations require that, to pass a check ride, an applicant must demonstrate that he is the “obvious master of the aircraft.”  It follows that the applicant is presumed to be the pilot in command and responsible for the safe outcome of the flight. But if the applicant pilot can prove that the check pilot improperly interfered with his ability to control the aircraft, then he may successfully overcome that presumption and hold the FAA check pilot responsible. 

New Rules To Keep Tour Helicopters Apart From Airplanes Transitioning Through Hudson River Corridor

The FAA has instituted new rules designed to keep sightseeing helicopters from colliding with airplanes that are transitioning the Hudson River Corridor near the Statue of Liberty.  The San Francisco Daily Journal, California's largest legal newspaper, published this column on how the new rules came to pass, and why they aren't enough.

FAA and NTSB Battle Over Aviation Safety

Hudson Mid-Air: NTSB's Comments Supported by Audio Recording?

NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman's recent testimony before congress concerning the mid-air collision over the Hudson raises more questions than it answers.  She stated that  the Teterboro controller instructed the Piper pilot to switch to frequency 127.85 to contact the Newark controller.  But before leaving the Teterboro frequency, according to Hersman, the pilot read back to the controller "127.87,"  which was wrong.  Thereafter, the pilot was in contact with neither Teterboro nor Newark, and so neither facility could warn him of the impending collision. Hersman's remarks are here.

Hersman's implication is that the Teterboro controller failed to correct the pilot, and so the controller contributed to the pilot's getting "lost in the hertz" (out of radio contact) at a crucial moment.  However, the animation that the NTSB released on the same day that Hersman testified does not appear to back Hersman up.  It just doesn't sound as though the pilot read back "127.87" as Hersman states.  You can listen to the audio yourself beginning at minute 2:25. 

 

Helicopter - Airplane Mid-Air Collision Over the Hudson: NTSB Boots It

We count on the NTSB to get the facts right. That confidence is, unfortunately, sometimes misplaced. The truth is that the NTSB gets it wrong. A lot. I’ve written about that herehere, and here.

The NTSB has now given us further reason to question whether it deserves the confidence weATC Radar place in it. On Friday, the NTSB came out with a block-buster press release condemning the Teterboro air traffic controller who had cleared the Piper airplane for takeoff. According to the NTSB's report, the Teterboro controller could see on his radar screen that the Piper pilot was on a possible collision course with the Liberty Tours helicopter. In fact, according to the NTSB, the controller could see the conflict before the Piper pilot switched off from the Teterboro controller’s frequency. Yet, according to the NTSB, the controller failed to warn the Piper pilot.

At 1152:20 the Teterboro controller instructed the pilot to contact Newark on a frequency of 127.85. . . At that time there were several aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of which were potential traffic conflicts for the airplane. The Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential traffic conflicts.

That was wrong. True, the controller was on the phone when he should not have been.  But the helicopter did not appear on the controller’s radar screen until after the Piper pilot was supposed to have switched to a new frequency. Of course, by then it was too late for the controller to advise the pilot of anything. In other words, it appears that there was nothing the controller could have done -- whether he was on the phone or not.

Over the weekend, the air traffic controllers’ union privately asked the NTSB to correct its error. The NTSB refused. So today the union issued its own press release setting the record straight.  The press release claims that the NTSB's account, which implies that the controller should have prevented the accident, is "outright false" and "misleading."  Worse, it charges that the NTSB knows it, but refuses to correct its error.

This afternoon, after the controllers' union went to the press, the NTSB finally conceded that it was, in fact, wrong. It thus issued a new press release, explaining that the controller could not have seen the helicopter after all.

The accident helicopter was not visible on the Teterboro controller's radar scope at 1152:20 [when the controller instructed the Piper to change frequencies]; it did appear on radar 7 seconds later - at approximately 400 feet.

The NTSB offered no apology for its error. Nor did it offer an explanation. Rather, despite that the union was right, and the NTSB was wrong, the NTSB’s only reaction was to kick the union off the investigation.

The NTSB’s blunder was a whopper. It laid blame for the accident where it does not appear to belong.  The NTSB's only interest is supposed to be in getting the facts right. If that’s so, why did it not correct its error when the union asked it to?  Why did it require the union to force the issue? 

Mid-Air Collision Over The Hudson: Airplanes and Helicopters Don't Mix Well

Compared to pilots in other countries, pilots in the US have extraordinary freedom. Of course, to keep commercial airliners safe from collisions, pilots of small aircraft are excluded from certain Author Over Statue of Libertyairspace near major airports unless they have first obtained a clearance from air traffic controllers.  If a pilot obtains the necessary clearance, controllers will dictate the pilot's path and use radar to monitor the pilot's every move. 

But that still leaves many places where pilots are permitted to fly without being supervised or controlled in any way.  One such area, appropriately enough, is near the Statue of Liberty.  As long as the pilot stays below 1100 feet -- outside the airspace used by airliners -- the pilot doesn't need a clearance, doesn't need to have filed a flight plan, and doesn't need to communicate with any tower or other air traffic control facility. The pilot is totally on his own.

Many non-pilots are surprised to learn that the method used to prevent collisions in such uncontrolled areas is called "see and avoid."  The pilot is supposed to look out his window, "see" the other aircraft, and "avoid" them.  Pilots talk about having to "keep their head on a swivel" when flying in uncontrolled airspace. Though this method of collision avoidance may sound primitive, over the years it has worked well.

There is one problem.  Helicopters and airplanes don't mix well in a "see and avoid" environment.  Helicopters fly slower than airplanes.  And because they have a small cross section, they are hard to spot -- especially when viewed from directly behind. That puts them at risk of being rear-ended.  It doesn't help matters that helicopters tend to manuever in a fashion that most airplane pilots find to be unpredictable. 

Because of all that, helicopter pilots are supposed to "avoid the flow" of airplane traffic.  In other words, as best they can, they are supposed to stay out of the way. Unfortunately, when both a helicopter and airplane are headed to the same spot, or are both looking at the same feature on the ground, that can be difficult to do.

We don't know what factors combined to result in the midair over the Hudson.  But the NTSB has long recognized that when it comes to uncontrolled airspace, helicopters -- especially tour helicopters -- don't mix well with airplanes.

Hawaiian Helicopter Tours: Profit Motive Still Trumps Safety

Hawaii Helicopter - Jurvetson photoThe Hawaiian Helicopter Tour Industry is Big Business.   Each year, more than 1 million people take an aerial tour of Hawaii.  That equates to one out of every 10 visitors to the islands.  Most of the tours are in helicopters.  The business generates more than $200 million annually, and supports countless jobs.

A helicopter is a great way to take in the islands' natural beauty.  And that is what the tour companies sell.  "Fly into the heart and heat of an active volcano" advertised one operator.  "Fly close enough to feel the waterfall's cooling mist" offered another.

But the Helicopter Safety Record is Terrible.  Flying too close to the terrain features, tangling with the islands' unpredictable "micro-weather," and substandard maintenance practices have resulted in a long list of fatal accidents. As a result, year after year, Hawaii's aviation safety record stacks up

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Weren't They Required to Have Insurance for This?

Accident victims or their families ask me this question a lot.  Sadly, the answer is usually: "no."

Pilots:  Most states require drivers on our highways to carry a minimum amount of liability insurance in case they injure someone. But pilots are regulated by the federal government, not the states. The federal government does not require pilots to have any insurance at all.

Though not required to have liability insurance, private pilots who own their own airplanes usually carry at least some. Many owner-pilots have policies with a $100,000 per passenger limit.  On the other hand, pilots who rent the aircraft they fly usually have no liability insurance at all.

Tour Operators:  Many tour operators aren't required to carry liability insurance either. So they frequently carry none -- or  just minimal policies with per passenger limits of $100,000 or less. To protect themselves from lawsuits, tour operators place title to their aircraft in shell corporations. By using shell corporations, victims' families cannot seize the operator's assets if it is determined that the operator was as fault for the accident. 

Aircraft Manufacturers:  Even aircraft manufacturers are free to "go bare", and many do. To protect themselves from liability for harm they may cause to others, some well-known manufacturers simply place their most valuable assets -- typically their type certificates -- in separate shell corporations so that they are out of reach of creditors.

The lack of insurance, combined with the industry's use of shell corporations, is a major obstacle facing victims of aviation accidents seeking fair compensation from those who have caused them harm.  It's a problem in need of a regulatory solution.