Aviation Law Monitor : Aviation Lawyer & Attorney : Michael Danko Law Firm : California Airplane & Helicopter Crashes : Aviation Law Monitor

The pilot says he warned Lauren Scruggs away from his propeller.   According to the NTSB's preliminary report:

After [the pilot] opened the door, [Scruggs] started to get out of the airplane. Upon noticing that she was exiting in front of the strut, the pilot leaned out of his seat and placed his right hand and arm in front of her to divert her away from the front of the airplane and the propeller. He continued to keep his arm extended and told [Scruggs] that she should walk behind the airplane. Once he saw that [Scruggs] was at least beyond where the strut was attached to the wing, and walking away, he dropped his right arm and returned to his normal seat position. The pilot then looked to the left side of the airplane and opened his window to ask who was next to go for a ride.

The pilot then heard someone yell, "STOP STOP," and he immediately shut down the engine and saw [Scruggs] lying in front of the airplane.

While the pilot apparently tried to keep Scruggs from the propeller, it wasn't enough.  Sadly, the accident likely would have been avoided had the pilot followed the the general safety guidelines set forth here.

• The aircraft engine should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers. This is the simplest method of avoiding accidents. Unfortunately, the pilot elected to keep his engine running.

• The pilot should instruct passengers, before they exit an aircraft with an engine(s) running, the path to follow to avoid the propeller or rotor blades. The pilot apparently failed to instruct Scruggs of the path to follow before she exited the plane.  Once she had exited the airplane, given the noise, he was left to rely on crude hand signals to get his message across.

• When it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger's route from the aircraft. Apparently, in this case, the propeller was in the path of the deplaning passenger's travel.

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“Investigators aren’t sure why Scruggs didn’t see the propeller” she walked into last night. 

Um, maybe because a spinning propeller is pretty much invisible? Especially at night?

News reports are that incidents such as Lauren Scruggs', who is a model and fashion blogger, are rare. Maybe, but it would depend on what one means by “rare.”  Seems that someone is killed or seriously injured by a spinning prop every year. Some reports of incidents from my local area alone are here and here.

During the day, spinning propellers have a mesmerizing effect. People have been known to see them, yet walk right into them. 

Of course, at night, propellers can be virtually invisible.

In almost all prop-strike cases, pilot error plays a role. A pilot needs to think carefully before allowing a passenger to deplane with the engine running. Here, apparently, the pilot allowed Scruggs to exit the aircraft with the engine running so that another passenger could take her seat. Certainly it would have been safer to shut down the engine of the Aviat Husky he was flying before allowing passengers to leave or approach the aircraft. “Hot loading” – allowing passengers to get into the aircraft with the engine running -- is safe only when the passengers have been carefully briefed on procedures.  Even then, it's best permitted only with the help of a trained spotter who walks one passenger away from the aircraft and then walks the next passenger in.

Here are some common guidelines for propeller safety:

• The aircraft engine should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers. This is the simplest method of avoiding accidents.

• Boarding or deplaning of passengers, with an engine running, should only be allowed under close supervision. The pilot in command should have knowledge that either the company or the airport operator has ground attendants fully trained in their specific duties to board or deplane passengers from an aircraft with an engine(s) running. The pilot should instruct passengers, before they exit an aircraft with an engine(s) running, the path to follow to avoid the propeller or rotor blades.

• When it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger's route from the aircraft.

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The NTSB blamed the pilot for the last Blue Hawaiian helicopter crash into the side of a mountain. The NTSB concluded that while flying near bad weather, the pilot inadvertently entered clouds, became disoriented, and lost control of the helicopter. According to the NTSB, the probable cause of the accident was:

The pilot's inadequate decision by which he continued visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions. Also causal was his failure to maintain terrain clearance resulting in a collision with mountainous terrain. A contributing factor was the low ceiling.

One need only look at the low clouds in the photo taken shortly after Thursday's Blue Hawaiian crash on Molokai to wonder if weather and pilot decision-making played a similar role in this latest crash. 

Hawaii’s micro-weather makes helicopter tours dangerous. We've written about it before here, and here.  Spoken about it too.  Yet, year after year, tour operators opt to collect the fares and fly when weather conditions dictate that they really should stay on the ground.

Did the pilot involved in Thursday's crash try to squeeze his Eurocopter between the weather and the terrain and lose control?  Time will tell whether this accident should be added to the list of crashes caused by "improper VFR."  But without significant changes in the industry, Hawaiian tourists will continue to lose their lives in completely avoidable weather-related helicopter accidents. 

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The NTSB is underfunded and understaffed. So it investigates accidents using the "party system."  That means the NTSB relies on those who may have caused the accident for help in investigating the accident's cause. Unfortunately, the "party participants" seldom point the NTSB towards evidence in their files that would tend to incriminate them. As a result, NTSB reports go easy on the industry players.

From time to time, I've offered examples of cases (like the ones here and here) where the real cause of the accident was found by plaintiffs lawyers -- sometimes well after the NTSB report is published.

Here’s yet another example, this time arising out of the crash of the Continental (Colgan) Flight 3407. According to a recent CBS News report, lawyers for the families uncovered emails showing that Colgan Air knew the captain was not qualified to fly the Q400, but put him in the left seat anyway.   

According to an ABC report, in one of the emails a Colgan Vice President states that the captain

had a problem upgrading” and, taking that into consideration, “anyone that does not meet the [minimums] and had problems in training before is not ready to tackle the Q.”

The “Q” is a reference to the Bombardier Q400. Despite Colgan's concerns about the captain's ability to fly the Q400, they promoted him anyway.  Just five months after that, the new Q pilot crashed his aircraft in Buffalo, killing 50.

This wasn't merely a case of "pilot error," it was the result of an airline that didn't take safety seriously enough. The newly released emails are critical to understanding why the accident happened, and how similar accidents can be avoided in the future. Yet, an NTSB spokesman confirmed that Continental did not provide these emails to the NTSB at any time during its year long investigation of the crash.

It looks like the company's emails tell the story of why Continental Flight 3407 crashed.  And it was the plaintiffs' lawyers, not the NTSB, who found them. 

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Hall of Fame aerobatic champion Patty Wagstaff says that it was just bad luck that Jimmy Leeward's accident involved spectators.

At the speeds Leeward was moving, had the malfunction occurred four seconds earlier or later, or almost anywhere else on the course, it would have terminated in the desert.  This was not an accident waiting to happen – this was a freak accident.

Patty, this was not the first time that flutter sent a highly modified warbird out of control during the Reno Air Races.  It happened in 1998, when flutter ripped a trim tab from a P-51 called "Voodoo."  Bob Hannah, the pilot, immediately found himself heading straight up, just as Jimmy Leeward did.  Hannah lost consciousness from the high g-loading, but regained his senses as the aircraft rolled over the top.  Unlike Leeward, Hannah landed safely.

So, though it's too early to say for certain, it looks like Leeward's precise airframe failure -- or something pretty darn close -- actually happened before.  And sure, Leeward's failure could have just as easily occurred somewhere else along the nine mile course, and not at show center. But that doesn't make it a "freak accident," any more than losing at Russian Roulette can be considered a freak accident. 

Nope. This was an accident waiting to happen.

The warbird pilots push their aircraft to their limits and beyond.  That's why it's called "Unlimited" racing.  No one would deny pilots, fully aware of the risks they are taking, the right to fly their aircraft to the point of destruction.  It is, after all, their own lives that they are risking over the Nevada desert.  But they should not be permitted to place spectators at risk.  Pilots might be willing to flirt with death.  But that's not what spectators bargain for.

Sorry, Patty.  Leeward's crash was no "freak accident."  And suggesting it was is not fair to the victims.

Related content on this blog:  

• Reno-Stead Airport Seeks to Influence NTSB Investigation
• Reno Air Race Lawsuits and the Assumption of Risk Defense
• Lawsuits Against the FAA Will Face Hurdles
• Leeward a Hero?
• Leeward's Aircraft Lost Trim Tab

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That's what some press reports are saying.  Had Jimmy Leeward not maneuvered the stricken plane as he did, things could have been much worse.

"The way I see it, if he did do something about this, he saved hundreds if not thousands of lives because he was able to veer that plane back toward the tarmac,” Johnny Norman, who was at the show, told the Associated Press.

That's a nice thought.  But it's probably not true.  Leeward likely was unconscious for most of the accident sequence, unable to veer the aircraft anywhere.

This isn't the first time a P-51 lost its trim tab at the Reno Air Races.  It happened once in 1998, when flutter ripped a trim tab from a P-51 called "Voodoo." Bob Hannah, the pilot, immediately found himself heading straight up, just as Jimmy Leeward did.  Hannah lost consciousness from the high g-loading, regained his senses as the aircraft rolled over the top, and saved the aircraft.  

As reported by AvWeb,

You OK Bob?" called Hinton. "Yea, this thing just popped big time," replied Hannah. What Hannah didn't mention is that the g-load from the quick pull-up had caused him to black out. He finally managed to reach the throttle and reduced Voodoo's power. At that point Hannah radioed that he "(wasn't) out of it yet," but he wasn't thinking clearly. Later, he declared a mayday and made a perfect landing. . . . On the ground one could see what cause Voodoo's problems during the race. The left elevator torque tube failed when the elevator trim fluttered and departed the plane.

It's quite possible that Leeward blacked out just like Hannah did in 1998 but, unlike Hannah, never regained consciousness. 

Take a look at the two pictures of Leeward's aircraft, the "Galloping Ghost."  The photo on the left is the cockpit before takeoff.  Leeward's helmet is clearly visible.  The frame on the right is the cockpit during the dive, a second before impact.  Leeward is nowhere to be seen.  Perhaps he is slumped over, unconscious.  Regardless, it's hard to imagine that Leeward was in any position to control the aircraft's flight path.

Related content on this blog:

• Reno-Stead Airport Seeks to Influence NTSB Investigation
• Reno Air Race Lawsuits and the Assumption of Risk Defense
• Lawsuits Against the FAA Will Face Hurdles
• Reno Disaster No Freak Accident
• Leeward's Aircraft Lost Trim Tab

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This photo, taken moments before the crash, shows that the P-51 had lost its left elevator trim tab. (I've circled the spot where the trim tab should be.) Without the trim tab, the aircraft may have been uncontrollable.

(Original Photo by Tim O'Brien, Grass Valley Union (AP).)

Why did the aircraft lose its trim tab?  One possibility is "flutter," an aerodynamic phenomenon that can, once it starts, damage a control surface quite suddenly.  Here's a NASA video of flutter in action.

An aircraft is at risk of flutter when its airspeed pushes up against or exceeds its design limits.

Related content on this blog: 

• Reno-Stead Airport Seeks to Influence NTSB Investigation
• Reno Air Race Lawsuits and the Assumption of Risk Defense
• Lawsuits Against the FAA Will Face Hurdles
• Leeward A Hero?
• Reno Disaster No Freak Accident

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Three Mooneys have crashed in two weeks.  Each aircraft crashed on takeoff.  Sadly, seven people were killed.  Two of the accidents may have involved the "impossible turn."

First Crash: On July 5, a 1974 Mooney M20F (N7759M) crashed shortly after taking off from Watsonville, California.  All four aboard were killed. 

Second Crash: On July 17, a nearly identical Mooney M20F (N3524X) crashed taking off from Winslow-Lindbergh Airport in Arizona, killing two aboard.  

At first glance, the Watsonville crash and the Winslow crash seem eerily similar.  The same model aircraft was involved in each.  Each crashed just moments after takeoff. 

But the two accidents are entirely different. The Watsonville crash is consistent with the pilot climbing too steeply to avoid a fog bank. There doesn't appear to be any evidence of an engine problem, at least at this point. Rather, as the pilot pitched the nose up, his airspeed bled off, and the wings (not the engine) stalled.  According to one witness:

He was heading toward the coast and tried to climb . . .From the time he took off, he was going too steep, too slow. ... He spun to the left and you can see where the impact was.

In contrast, the pilot in the Winslow crash appears to have attempted to turn around and glide back to the runway after his Lycoming engine quit.  

A Mooney departed then called with engine problems [saying he was] returning to the airport [from the] opposite direction. My friend circled giving the Mooney the right of way. .  Later he asked the Mooney for a position, no response to a couple of calls. He circled for a while longer then landed. Rolling out he saw the Mooney off the departure end of the runway on its back. He said it looked like the typical return to the airport stall spin accident.

The attempt to return to the airport after an engine failure is often called "the impossible turn," because it so frequently ends in the aircraft stalling during the turn and spinning in, with fatal results.

Plots are trained never to turn back to the runway after an engine failure unless they have adequate altitude.  Instead, land straight ahead, or slightly to the right or to the left.  Better to land in the trees, but under control, then lose control of the aircraft and spin in.  While a crash landing in rough terrain may result in serious injury or even death, spinning into the ground is almost always fatal.  Losing control of the aircraft after engine failure must be avoided at all costs. Unfortunately, the temptation to try the "impossible turn" and make it to the runway can be irresistible.

This video shows a Mooney pilot attempting the impossible turn after engine failure near Sacramento, California in 2009.  Both he and his passenger were killed when the aircraft spun in.

Third Mooney Crash: Finally, on July 18, a 1979 Mooney 20K (N777CV) crashed at Augusta Regional Airport while taking off, killing the pilot and sole occupant, a Mooreville doctor. That aircraft also came to rest within the airport boundaries.  It appears this pilot also experienced engine failure, and also may have attempted to turn back to the airport, stalled, and spun in.  Too early to tell.

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Initially, the NTSB thought it might never determine the cause of the Pilatus crash at Butte, reporting to the press that it had no working theories. But this week, the NTSB concluded that the 2009 crash was caused by icing in the aircraft's fuel system.  According to the NTSB, the pilot failed to add an ice inhibitor to his fuel before takeoff.  Then, when his fuel started to solidify at altitude, he failed to immediately land.  Fuel in one wing tank began to freeze.  With fuel draining to the engine from other wing tank only, a fuel imbalance developed and grew worse and worse.  The fuel imbalance ultimately rendered the aircraft uncontrollable, and the pilot crashed.

Interesting analysis. But a blog reader provided us this analysis eight months ago, in a comment to this post.  Looks like "Pilatus Person" was spot on:

Pilot didn't take on Prist. Without Prist, the fuel the pilot had on board would freeze at -40F. It was colder than that at pilot's altitude. So fuel in one tank turned to jello. Despite the transfer pump's best efforts, it couldn't move fuel from that tank to the other side to balance the load. Pilot asked for a lower altitude because he wanted warmer air. But by then, the tanks were seriously out of balance. Pilot had to hold one wing up with aileron. As he approached the field, he was cross-controlled. Then he turned in the "wrong" direction. A cross-control stall flipped the aircraft on its back. . . .All of that fits with the information in the docket. Check it out.

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Early news reports described the pilot in the Senator Stevens crash as a hero. According to the reports, the fact that there were any survivors at all is a testament to his flying skills.

I disagreed. (See Pilot in Senator Stevens Crash a Hero?)

As I saw it, the pilot took off in poor weather. When the weather deteriorated, instead of returning to the safety of the lodge, he pressed on, bobbing and weaving around low clouds, until he slammed into the side of a mountain. Nothing particularly skillful about that.  

Opting out of the instrument flight system, the pilot had to stay under the clouds. He couldn't go through them because once inside, he wouldn't be able to see and might bump into something hard and pointy. So he had to stay in the clear and visually pick his way around the terrain in his path. But as he maneuvered under the low clouds and around the fog, he suddenly came upon a mountain's steep up-slope. He shoved the throttle forward, pulled the nose up and began a climb. But the terrain rose faster than could his aircraft. He bellied onto the rising slope while in full control of a perfectly functioning aircraft.

Sadly, the new information that the NTSB just released suggests that my analysis was correct.

• The aircraft was equipped with a terrain awareness warning system (TAWS).  The pilot had turned the TAWS off.  He probably turned it off because, as he picked his way through the mountains, he found the frequent audible warnings annoying. 
• One survivor recalled seeing only "white-out conditions outside the airplane."  That probably means the pilot was in clouds or fog.   Of course, the pilot was supposed to stay out of the clouds, so that he can see the terrain ahead and avoid it.
• The fact that the ventral fin located beneath the aircraft had broken from the aircraft first, followed by impact by the left float, suggested to investigators that the aircraft impacted at a pitch attitude of 17° nose up and 30° roll to the left.  Most likely, as the pilot came out of a cloud or fog, he saw the mountainside ahead of him and pulled up and to the left in an attempt to avoid it.  But by then it was too late.

Unfortunately, there doesn't appear to be anything particularly heroic about the pilot's actions in this case.  Rather, it seems he flew a "perfectly good airplane" into a mountainside.  Looks like a classic case of controlled flight into terrain.

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I wrote here that the door on N146CK, the Cirrus SR22 that crashed August 4 at Deer Valley, opened in-flight.  Yesterday, Fox News in Phoenix aired video from a security camera that captured the impact.  Here are frame grabs from the video showing the open door. 

Usually, when a door pops open in flight, aerodynamic forces keep the door from opening more than an couple of inches, as depicted here.  The door on N146CK was open much more than just a couple of inches.  Of course, the aerodynamic forces operating on this aircraft were far from normal.

Full video here. (Note: the video is disturbing.)

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The EMS helicopter was returning to Shenandoah Valley Regional Airport in Virginia, having dropped off a patient in nearby Charlottesville.  Reports differ on whether the Cessna was departing the airport or returning to the airport for landing.  The Cessna and the helicopter collided.  Though the helicopter landed safely, both occupants in the Cessna were killed.

No Control Tower

There’s no control tower at Shenandoah Airport. The primary means of preventing collisions at airports like Shenandoah is called “see and avoid.” That means that pilots are supposed to look out their windows, see other aircraft, and avoid them. 

Helicopters and Airplanes Don’t Mix Well

Though the "see and avoid" method may sound primitive, over the years it has worked well, and mid air collisions are relatively rare.  But helicopters don’t mix well with airplanes in a "see and avoid" environment.  Helicopters tend to fly slower than airplanes and, because they have a small cross section, they are hard for airplanes to spot -- especially when viewed from directly behind. 

Because of that, when near an uncontrolled airport, helicopter pilots are supposed to "avoid the flow" of airplane traffic.  In other words, as best they can, helicopters are supposed to stay out of the way of airplanes.  Sometimes that’s easy enough. For example, if the airplane traffic flies on one side of the airport (see below), the helicopters generally should fly on the other side. Or, the helicopter can fly at an altitude that is lower than the altitude at which the airplanes are flying.

The above diagram depicts a left-hand traffic pattern for fixed-wing (airplane) traffic similar to the pattern used at Shenandoah Airport.  Airplanes typically fly the traffic pattern at 1000 feet.  To avoid the flow of that traffic, helicopters might fly a right-hand traffic pattern on the other side of the runway, and fly no higher than 500 feet.

One question will be whether the Cessna was operating within the "flow" of fixed wing traffic when the collision occurred and, if so, why the EMS helicopter did not avoid that flow. 

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Robinson Helicopter Company has long touted the crashworthiness of its helicopters. An excerpt from Robinson Safety Notice SN-10, which dates back to 1982:

The R22 and R44 have demonstrated excellent crashworthiness as long as the pilot flies the aircraft all the way to the ground . . .The ship may roll over and be severely damaged, but the occupants have an excellent chance of walking away from it without injury.

That’s turned out to be not quite true. Sure, occupants may survive the initial rollover without injury. But because of the way it is designed, the helicopter is prone to catching fire and burning the occupants before they have a chance to get out.  There has been a string of such accidents, the most recent being the September 16 Robinson crash at Mammoth, California.

The R44 helicopter involved in that accident, N2153S, experienced a problem on takeoff.  The pilot "flew the aircraft all the way to the ground," just as he was supposed to. When the helicopter touched down, it rolled over.  As advertised, the two occupants survived the rollover uninjured.  But almost immediately, fuel rushed into the cabin, a fire erupted, and both occupants were badly burned.

As I explained here, there is no reason for an occupant to be burned in that sort of mishap. Technology has existed since the 1970's that can almost completely eliminate post-crash fires in otherwise survivable helicopter accidents.  The technology is not particularly expensive, fancy, or heavy.

In the case of the Robinson helicopter, the biggest problem is the aircraft's transmission. In any type of rollover accident, the transmission can puncture the fuel tank. The fix is simple: replace the rigid fuel tank with a soft bladder tank that won't rupture. 

Robinson has known about the problem for years.  But instead of fixing it, Robinson tried to dodge liability by putting the problem back on the owners. While continuing to tout the aircraft's crashworthiness, in 2006 it posted on its website a "safety notice" advising that anyone flying in one of its aircraft should wear fire retardant clothing head-to-toe.

To reduce the risk of injury in a post-crash fire, it is strongly recommended that a fire-retardant Nomex flight suit, gloves, and hood or helmet be worn by all occupants.

Robinson didn't seriously expect any occupants to wear that kind of clothing.  It's hot, uncomfortable, and generally inconvenient.  The "strong recommendation" was strictly a "CYA" move.  If Robinson was serious about it, it wouldn't have posted on its website pictures of people flying Robinson helicopters in shorts and t-shirts. (One such picture right.)  Rather, it would show everyone wearing head-to-toe Nomex. But that sort of "advertising" would kill sales.

The unnecessary burn injuries continued. Finally, in December 2009, Robinson conceded that there was indeed a better way and announced that all new R-44’s will be equipped with bladder tanks.

In a continuing effort to improve the R44 fuel sytem’s resistance to a post-accident fuel leak, current production R44s now feature bladder-type fuel tanks, flexible fuel lines and other modifications.

Great news. But what about the thousands of Robinson helicopters produced before last December without bladder tanks?  They are, without a doubt, defective.  The defect has caused, and will continue to cause, needless burn injuries.  The defect and the resulting injuries are Robinson's responsibility.

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The NTSB hasn't yet released its probable cause finding concerning the Pilatus crash at Butte, Montana that killed the pilot and his 13 passengers.  But it has just made public its “docket.”  The docket sheds some light on what may have been happening in the cockpit in the minutes leading to the crash.

The flight was bound for Bozeman. Suddenly, the pilot diverted to Butte, which was only marginally closer.  Though the pilot never explained the reason for the diversion, the docket suggests that the

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An instrument rating entitles a pilot to legally navigate an aircraft when the weather is bad enough that he can't see outside.  A pilot who is not instrument-rated must always stay out of the clouds. If the weather is such that he can't do that, he must stay on the ground.  

The training required to obtain an instrument rating is extensive.  In most cases, it takes a pilot longer and costs him more to obtain the rating than it did for him to get his pilot's license in the first

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I was sitting in my aircraft at the approach end of the runway at San Carlos, waiting to be issued an instrument clearance. A Beech BE65 Queen Air taxied down to the runway and took off ahead of me. Sadly, it crashed 30 seconds later into a lagoon north of the airport, killing the three aboard. 

Some questions raised in the various news accounts:

Why was the aircraft headed north on the “Bay Meadows” departure, when its ultimate destination was to the south?

I heard the pilot – or whomever was handling the radios -- tell the ground controller that he was going to fly along the ridge line west of the airport and then to South County airport. The

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The pilot of the Otter that crashed in Alaska on Monday, killing Senator Stevens and three other passengers, encountered some very bad weather.  Low ceilings.  Fog and rain.  Gusty winds.

Rugged terrain only complicated things.  Fortunately, the pilot had tons of experience  -- tens of thousands of hours.  According to the Alaska Dispatch, had any less talented pilot been at the controls, the death toll surely would have been higher.

The fact there were four survivors is testament to [the pilot's] skills. [He] maneuvered that plane like no other mere pilot to save lives.

So is the pilot a hero?  No.  Not quite.

There's an old saying in aviation: "a superior pilot is one who exercises superior judgment so as to avoid having to exercise his superior skills."  In this case, a pilot exercising superior judgment might have turned around before tangling with the worst of the weather.  Or, better yet, never left the comfort and safety of the lake lodge in the first place.

The Weather was Bad 

When the pilot took off from the lake where the lodge was located, the weather was bad.  It was bad at nearby Dillingham airport.  It was bad at the river camp that was to be their destination.  And it was bad everywhere between.

A pilot who flew the same valley where the crash occurred confirmed to the LA Times that it was bad there too.  "It was just awful weather. . .I came through that valley at about 100 feet off the ground with about a mile of visibility."

Now, bad weather doesn't mean a good pilot must stay on the ground.  For example, the airport at Dillingham has various instrument approach procedures that will allow planes to land safely in some pretty crappy weather. No undue risk. No sweat.

But this pilot wasn't headed to Dillingham.  He was headed to a fishing camp on a nearby river.  No instrument approach procedure would guide him through the clouds.  If this pilot was going to get there, he’d have to do it without instruments. He’d have to do it by looking out the window.  Seat of the pants stuff.  All perfectly safe, as long as the weather is good enough for you to see where you are going.

Controlled Flight into Terrain

So what exactly happened?  What we know about the accident is consistent with "controlled flight into terrain."  Opting out of the instrument flight system, the pilot had to stay under the clouds.  He couldn't go through them because once inside, he wouldn't be able to see and might bump into something hard and pointy.  So he had to stay in the clear and visually pick his way around the terrain in his path.  But as he maneuvered under the low clouds and around the fog, he suddenly came upon a mountain's steep up-slope.  He shoved the throttle forward, pulled the nose up and began a climb.  But the terrain rose faster than could his aircraft.  He bellied onto the rising slope while in full control of a perfectly functioning aircraft.

At least that how it looks.

According to John Bouker, the pilot who found the wreck: 

The Otter had plowed into the hill. He bounced up the mountain. He looked like he was in a full-power climb. . the plane appeared mostly intact.

That’s a classic "controlled flight into terrain” scenario.

Poor Decision Making   

This morning a pilot who used to fly search and rescue out of Dillingham called me to talk about the crash.  He pointed out that the state of Alaska accounts for more than a third of all commuter and air taxi crashes in the entire country.  That's right: one state accounts for a third of all the nation's crashes.  And more than 80 percent of those crashes are due to poor decision-making.

Alaskans seem to accept aviation tragedies as part of life in the wilderness.  My caller suggested that poor decision making seems to be not just tolerated, but sewn into the very fabric of Alaskan aviation community. 

The question is not the whether the pilot had the skills to “maneuver” the aircraft around difficult terrain. Or whether he had the experience necessary to pick his way around the obstacles along the route. Or whether he brought the aircraft down with the least impact possible.  The question is whether, given the weather, he should have attempted the flight at all.

I can easily imagine that a nice fire was burning in the lodge fireplace when the pilot loaded up his passengers. If ever there was ever a flight that didn't need to be made, it was this one. 

Yet it was.  

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Cirrus N146CK crashed on August 4 at Deer Valley, Airzona.  The pilot was killed.  Just before the accident, the aircraft's door popped open.  We know that because the pilot reported to air traffic control that his door was open and that he needed to return to the airport to close it.  Plus, surveillance cameras confirmed that the pilot's door was indeed ajar. 

The plane's door popped open? What's with that? 

The Cirrus doors are poorly designed.  It's that simple. They just don't stay shut in flight.  

The plane flies okay after a door pops open.  But the distraction can be dangerous, and can lead to a loss of control, as demonstrated by this 2009 Cirrus crash.  Following the 2009 accident, John

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The NTSB has released its preliminary report of the off-airport landing of Lancair IV-P N9JE at Hilton Head.  The accident killed a jogger but left the plane’s two occupants uninjured. According to the preliminary report, 

Further examination of the airplane revealed that the propeller assembly separated from the crankshaft flange and was missing.

In other words, the crankshaft failed.

One wouldn’t expect a crankshaft to break absent some sort of defect. If that proves to be the case, could the manufacturer of the crankshaft be held liable to the jogger’s family?

The aircraft was built from a kit and was thus "experimental." The engine, however, was not. Rather, according to FAA records, it appears that the engine was an FAA-certified, turbocharged piston engine manufactured by Teledyne Continental Motors, a company that has had its share of lawsuits related to its engines coming apart in flight. 

The General Aviation Revitalization Act, or GARA, protects aircraft engine manufacturers from liability for defective engine parts older than 18 years.

We don’t know how old the engine was in this case.  However, the Lancair builder had reportedly taken the engine from a Piper Malibu.  Piper stopped using the Teledyne Continental TSIO-520 engine in its Malibus due to reliability problems. In 1988, it switched and began installing Avco Lycoming engines instead. Thus, if it turns out that the engine was an original equipment Malibu engine, then it had to be at least 20 years old -- 2 years beyond GARA's age limit.

So is Teledyne Continental Motors off the hook, regardless of whether the jogger's family can prove that the engine was defective? 

No.

There is one important but little-known exception to GARA.  Regardless of the defective part's age, GARA doesn’t protect its manufacturer from lawsuits brought by the families of those killed on the ground.  

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That's the number one question I've been asked about this accident.  Not "why did the accident happen," but "why didn't the pilot use the parachute?"

As I note here, most Cirrus pilots would say that the parachute should be deployed in the event of engine failure, unless there is a long, paved runway beneath the aircraft such that a safe on-airport landing is assured.  But that doesn't mean that, if there is no airport within range, a pilot who opts to glide to a field rather than pull the chute is negligent.

Pulling the parachute has serious risks.  The aircraft's rate of descent under the parachute is high.  Ground impact forces are severe. Cirrus warns that the decision to deploy the parachute should

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A Cirrus SR-22, N224GS, crashed yesterday in Washington state.  The pilot was killed.  The passenger was critically injured.  The aircraft departed Concord, California (CCR) in good weather, bound for home.  It crashed in Morton, 60 miles from its destination, which was presumably Renton (RNT).

The accident appears to have been the result of engine failure:

• Witnesses said it was flying "low and silent" just before impact.
• A pilot on frequency says he heard the Cirrus pilot report to Air Traffic Control "saying he was dead stick "no engine" and he didn't think they were going to make the airport."

Facts suggesting that the engine failed because it ran out of gas:

• Fuel exhaustion is the leading cause of engine failure.
• The pilot reported to his wife that he was battling a "stiff headwind." Unexpected headwinds are common to many fuel exhaustion accidents.

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The NTSB released its preliminary report on the Pine Mountain Lake crash.  As usual, the preliminary report contains no conclusions concerning the cause of the crash. For that, we'll have to wait up to 4 years.  The preliminary report does, however, hint that the NTSB's investigation will focus on whether the pilot pressed on into weather beyond what the regulations allowed.

The full text of the report is here.  Some excerpts:

Instrument night meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site, and no flight plan had been filed.

Instrument weather conditions are those that require a pilot to fly by reference to his instruments rather than by looking out the window. To fly in instrument conditions, a pilot must be instrument-rated, his plane must be properly equipped, and he must have a clearance from air traffic control.  He is not necessarily required to file a flight plan.  For example, instead of filing a flight plan, the

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The runway at Pine Mountain Lake is oriented east-west, and is surrounded by rugged terrain.  In poor weather, pilots are permitted to execute instrument approaches to the airport.  The approach procedures guide pilots as they descend through the clouds to the runway.  The procedures, flown properly, will place the pilot in a position to land straight ahead without having to maneuver.  When the pilot pops out of the clouds after flying the instrument approach to Pine Mountain Lake, his view out of the windshield should be something like this:  

The procedure the pilot must follow when approaching from the east is set forth below.  A pilot may descend in the clouds no lower than 770 feet above the runway.  To descend further, the pilot must

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The initial investigation was conducted by local law enforcement in conjunction with the FAA. Now the National Transportation Safety Board will take over.

The NTSB’s job will be to examine the wreckage and attempt to determine if the crash was caused by a defective aircraft part, negligent maintenance, or pilot error. The NTSB concedes, however, that it lacks the manpower, the technical expertise, and the funding to do that job properly on its own. Therefore, as a matter of long-standing policy, it will seek engineering assistance from the companies that manufactured the aircraft components in question. In this case, the NTSB will recruit the help of Cessna Aircraft, which manufactured the aircraft involved in the accident, Cessna N5225J, and Teledyne Continental Motors, which manufactured each of the aircraft’s two 260 horsepower engines. The NTSB will exclude members of the victims’ families and their technical representatives from the investigation, feeling that they have nothing to offer. (Sad but true.)

Of course, the NTSB’s practice of asking the manufacturers for help – a practice it calls “the party system” -- presents a conflict of interest.  After all, the manufacturers themselves might be the ones responsible for the accident. Some say that the NTSB’s party system is akin to asking the suspects for help in solving a crime. Nonetheless, the conflict – discussed further here – is ingrained in all NTSB investigations.

It’s no surprise that most NTSB final reports often favor the manufacturers who have “assisted” the NTSB investigators in their work. But perhaps it doesn't make any difference because, by federal regulation, the NTSB’s probable cause findings are not binding on anyone. The families are free to conduct their own investigation, and in the event of a lawsuit, the NTSB’s conclusions are given no deference whatever. In fact, in the event of litigation, the NTSB conclusions are not even admissible. Aviation attorneys who conduct their own independent investigations find that the NTSB’s conclusions are wrong about 50% of the time.

In one recent example, a Teledyne Continental engine similar to those installed on N5225J quit

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One might think that a twin-engine aircraft is safer than a single-engine aircraft.  After all, if one engine fails, you still have the other to bring you home safely.  That's the whole point of the second engine, right?

If one of the twin engines fails in cruise flight, maybe that's true.  But if it quits right after takeoff, the twin can be extremely difficult to handle.  When the aircraft's landing gear is down, its flaps set, and its airspeed just above the minimum flying speed, the asymetric thrust generated by the operating engine can flip the aircraft onto its back and out of control.  A "Vmc roll", as it is called, is

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Updated February 12:

A Cirrus SR-20 single engine aircraft collided with a Pawnee tow plane that was pulling a glider. The Cirrus reportedly ran into the Pawnee's tow line. The Pawnee crashed and the pilot was killed.  The occupants of the Cirrus were also killed.  The glider pilot, however, recognized the impending collision, released his aircraft from the tow line, and landed without injury to himself or his two

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Icing or pilot error?

Last April, the NTSB released the data from Flight 3407's FDR.  I blogged about that here.  Despite wide spread speculation that icing brought down the aircraft, it looked to me like pilot error -- not weather --  was to blame. 

Then, in May, the NTSB released an animation derived from the aircraft's flight data recorder, its cockpit voice recorder, and ATC transcripts.  I blogged about that here.  The animation, like the raw data from the FDR, made a strong case for pilot error.  From the animation, it appeared to me that an inattentive pilot allowed the aircraft to get slower and slower, until it became dangerously close to the speed at which the aircraft would stop flying altogether and simply fall from the sky.  Then, when the critical moment came, the pilot pulled back on the control yoke instead of pushing it forward, thereby inducing an aerodynamic stall.

The NTSB made public its official probable cause finding at a hearing yesterday.  No surprises to anyone who has studied the data.  According to an article in today's Buffalo News, the NTSB summed it up as follows: 

The plane got so slow that the "stick shaker" — a device that helps to prevent stalls — activated. But Renslow [the pilot] mistakenly pulled back on the plane's controls at that point, which is exactly the opposite of what he should have done.

In total, Renslow pulled back on the controls three times in response to the stick shaker and "stick pusher," forcing the nose upward. That caused and then exacerbated the stall.

It's almost unimaginable that a professional pilot would make the series of mistakes that the pilot did in this case.  Even a new student pilot would know better.  But that's what he did.

The NTSB played its animation for those who attended the hearing.  The animation shows the pilot's errors mount.  The activation of the "stick shaker" is depicted 2 minutes and 8 seconds into the animation. The shaking control yoke was a final warning to the pilot that he must immediately push the yoke forward.  But instead of pushing forward, the pilot pulled back. Three times.  After the third time, the aircraft stalled and crashed. 

There were countless points at which this aircraft could have been saved but, inexplicably, the pilot failed to take appropriate action.  

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The NTSB's preliminary report on the crash contains little more than what was in the news accounts. The report does, however, offer one bit of new information.  The helicopter impacted on a magnetic heading of 230 degrees.  That heading is not in line with the route from Reno to Susanville.  While that might ultimately prove to be important, little can be made of that information without a careful examination of the layout of the terrain near the accident site and the roadway that the pilot might have been using to aid in his navigation.     

Though the information in the NTSB's official report is sparse, an NTSB spokesman did offer his expanded comments to Mary Pat Flaherty, a reporter for the Washington Post who has been following the poor EMS safety record during the past months. The NTSB's Ted Lopatkiewicz told Flaherty that the Mountain Lifeflight helicopter didn't have certain important safety equipment.  Lopatkiewicz was referring to the helicopter's lack of an autopilot, a ground proximity warning system, night vision goggles (discussed in this post), and other equipment necessary to navigate in poor weather.

But in this case the pilot was flying in good weather.  He did not collide with the ground because he could not see it.  Rather, as discussed here, it appears that the pilot crashed because of some type of mechanical problem with the helicopter.  It's unlikely the helicopter's lack of advanced equipment played any role in the accident at all. 

Related Posts:

Compensating the Families of the Mountain Lifeflight EMS Crash

Mountain Lifeflight EMS Helicopter Crash at Doyle, California

EMS Helicopter Safety: NTSB Pushes the Envelope

OSC: FAA Ignoring EMS Helicopter Dangers For Fear of Negative Publicity 

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An A-Star AS350B air ambulance helicopter crashed November 14 at Doyle, California, killing the three crew members on board.  According to an article in the Reno Gazette Journal, the pilot made a distress call before the crash. That indicates that the pilot was likely experiencing a mechanical emergency. The photographs accompanying the article show that the wreckage was spread over a fairly large area.  That indicates that the pilot lost control of the helicopter well before he was able to attempt an emergency landing.

Under the circumstances, the NTSB will be looking at the helicopter's

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I blogged about Scene Systems' animation of Flight 1549's landing in the Hudson here back in March.  Great effort, but I noted that it would take hundreds more hours of work before it could be used in court.  That's because it did not appear that the animation accounted for and synchronized all the available data for the flight.  For example, the flight path depicted in the animation could not have been true to the information from the flight data recorder, because the flight data recorder had not yet been downloaded and made available by the NTSB.  As a result, Scene System's finished product involved too much guesswork to ever be shown to a jury.

Just for fun, Kas Osterbuhr of Exosphere3d in Denver has been working on perfecting an animation ever since.  He emailed me the link late last night.  Kas, whose firm creates animations for use in court, explained to me that his animation is pretty much technically perfect.

Among the datasets utilized are: audio transcripts and recordings, digital flight data recorder, raw radar data, NEXRAD weather, witness statements, satellite imagery, elevation maps and several of the NTSB reports published in the docket. . .All aspects of this animation are based on actual data, whether from the NTSB docket or otherwise. The entire 3D reconstruction is built into a single environment where every piece of information can be aligned in position and on a timeline.

Tons of work went into this animation and it shows.  Aviation accident animations don't get any better than this.

One question, Kas.  The animation depicts flames coming from the aircraft's engines at certain times.  On what data is this based and what would happen if the judge ultimately determined that that evidence for this aspect of the animation is insufficient to allow it to be shown to a jury?  

November 9 Update: Kas' response is in the comments.

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NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman's recent testimony before congress concerning the mid-air collision over the Hudson raises more questions than it answers.  She stated that  the Teterboro controller instructed the Piper pilot to switch to frequency 127.85 to contact the Newark controller.  But before leaving the Teterboro frequency, according to Hersman, the pilot read back to the controller "127.87,"  which was wrong.  Thereafter, the pilot was in contact with neither Teterboro nor Newark, and so neither facility could warn him of the impending collision. Hersman's remarks are here.

Hersman's implication is that the Teterboro controller failed to correct the pilot, and so the controller contributed to the pilot's getting "lost in the hertz" (out of radio contact) at a crucial moment.  However, the animation that the NTSB released on the same day that Hersman testified does not appear to back Hersman up.  It just doesn't sound as though the pilot read back "127.87" as Hersman states.  You can listen to the audio yourself beginning at minute 2:25. 

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We count on the NTSB to get the facts right. That confidence is, unfortunately, sometimes misplaced. The truth is that the NTSB gets it wrong. A lot. I’ve written about that here, here, and here.

The NTSB has now given us further reason to question whether it deserves the confidence we place in it. On Friday, the NTSB came out with a block-buster press release condemning the Teterboro air traffic controller who had cleared the Piper airplane for takeoff. According to the NTSB's report, the Teterboro controller could see on his radar screen that the Piper pilot was on a possible collision course with the Liberty Tours helicopter. In fact, according to the NTSB, the controller could see the conflict before the Piper pilot switched off from the Teterboro controller’s frequency. Yet, according to the NTSB, the controller failed to warn the Piper pilot.

At 1152:20 the Teterboro controller instructed the pilot to contact Newark on a frequency of 127.85. . . At that time there were several aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of which were potential traffic conflicts for the airplane. The Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential traffic conflicts.

That was wrong. True, the controller was on the phone when he should not have been.  But the helicopter did not appear on the controller’s radar screen until after the Piper pilot was supposed to have switched to a new frequency. Of course, by then it was too late for the controller to advise the pilot of anything. In other words, it appears that there was nothing the controller could have done -- whether he was on the phone or not.

Over the weekend, the air traffic controllers’ union privately asked the NTSB to correct its error. The NTSB refused. So today the union issued its own press release setting the record straight.  The press release claims that the NTSB's account, which implies that the controller should have prevented the accident, is "outright false" and "misleading."  Worse, it charges that the NTSB knows it, but refuses to correct its error.

This afternoon, after the controllers' union went to the press, the NTSB finally conceded that it was, in fact, wrong. It thus issued a new press release, explaining that the controller could not have seen the helicopter after all.

The accident helicopter was not visible on the Teterboro controller's radar scope at 1152:20 [when the controller instructed the Piper to change frequencies]; it did appear on radar 7 seconds later - at approximately 400 feet.

The NTSB offered no apology for its error. Nor did it offer an explanation. Rather, despite that the union was right, and the NTSB was wrong, the NTSB’s only reaction was to kick the union off the investigation.

The NTSB’s blunder was a whopper. It laid blame for the accident where it does not appear to belong.  The NTSB's only interest is supposed to be in getting the facts right. If that’s so, why did it not correct its error when the union asked it to?  Why did it require the union to force the issue? 

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Compared to pilots in other countries, pilots in the US have extraordinary freedom. Of course, to keep commercial airliners safe from collisions, pilots of small aircraft are excluded from certain airspace near major airports unless they have first obtained a clearance from air traffic controllers.  If a pilot obtains the necessary clearance, controllers will dictate the pilot's path and use radar to monitor the pilot's every move. 

But that still leaves many places where pilots are permitted to fly without being supervised or controlled in any way.  One such area, appropriately enough, is near the Statue of Liberty.  As long as the pilot stays below 1100 feet -- outside the airspace used by airliners -- the pilot doesn't need a clearance, doesn't need to have filed a flight plan, and doesn't need to communicate with any tower or other air traffic control facility. The pilot is totally on his own.

Many non-pilots are surprised to learn that the method used to prevent collisions in such uncontrolled areas is called "see and avoid."  The pilot is supposed to look out his window, "see" the other aircraft, and "avoid" them.  Pilots talk about having to "keep their head on a swivel" when flying in uncontrolled airspace. Though this method of collision avoidance may sound primitive, over the years it has worked well.

There is one problem.  Helicopters and airplanes don't mix well in a "see and avoid" environment.  Helicopters fly slower than airplanes.  And because they have a small cross section, they are hard to spot -- especially when viewed from directly behind. That puts them at risk of being rear-ended.  It doesn't help matters that helicopters tend to manuever in a fashion that most airplane pilots find to be unpredictable. 

Because of all that, helicopter pilots are supposed to "avoid the flow" of airplane traffic.  In other words, as best they can, they are supposed to stay out of the way. Unfortunately, when both a helicopter and airplane are headed to the same spot, or are both looking at the same feature on the ground, that can be difficult to do.

We don't know what factors combined to result in the midair over the Hudson.  But the NTSB has long recognized that when it comes to uncontrolled airspace, helicopters -- especially tour helicopters -- don't mix well with airplanes.

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The G36 Bonanza's closest competitor is probably the Cirrus SR22. Would the outcome of this accident have been different had the Beechcraft been equipped with a ballistic parachute system, like the system installed in the Cirrus, depicted here?  Probably not.  For the Cirrus' ballistic parachute to work, the plane needs at least 400 feet of altitude.  Although we don't know how high N618MW climbed before its engine quit, it's unlikely it reached 400 feet.  That's an altitude the aircraft probably wouldn't have achieved until well after crossing the end of the runway. As this illustration shows, the Bonanza never made it that far.

The NTSB has now released its Preliminary Report.  The report can be found here.  There's no new information in the report, and certainly nothing that causes us to rethink the analysis we wrote about here.  

As usual, the NTSB report contains no conclusion concerning the cause of the crash.  For that, we have to wait until the NTSB issues its Probable Cause report.  Some news sources, such as the one here, are reporting that the probable cause report will be issued in the next 6 to 9 months.  That's doubtful. Except in the simplest of cases, it takes the NTSB at least 18 months to issue its probable cause report.  Sometimes, it can take as long as four years.    

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Bonanza N618MW, a Beechcraft like the one pictured below, was doing "touch & goes" at Jack Northrop field in Hawthorne.  "Touch and goes" are practice landings where the pilot does not stop on the runway.  Instead, after the wheels touch down, the pilot advances the throttle, takes off again, and then circles around for another landing.  Everything appeared to be fine until, on one of

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Two months ago, Scene Systems -- a litigation support firm -- released its animation of Flight 1549's crash into the Hudson. I posted here that, in all likelihood, the animation would not be admissible in court. The legal objection would be that the animation "lacked foundation." For example, without information from the Airbus' black boxes, Scene Systems couldn't confirm the aircraft's flight path or guarantee that the Air Traffic Control audio was properly synchronized to the aircraft's path of travel.  Therefore, the animation involved too much guesswork to be shown to a jury.

The National Transportation Safety Board has now released its own animation. Having retrieved the black bloxes, the NTSB was able to plot accurately the Airbus' position, speed, and altitude at each point along the aircraft's short flight.  The NTSB then properly synchronized the Air Traffic Control audio to the aircraft's flight path.

The only audio on the NTSB's animation is the radio transmissions between the crew and Air Traffic Control. As is typical, the NTSB did not make public the audio of the cockpit conversation between the captain and the first officer. The NTSB did, however, prepare a written transcript of that conversation. The NTSB superimposed the transcript on the animation. (HOT-1 is the pilot, HOT-2 is the first officer.)

Would this animation be admissible in court?  While Scene System's animation would not pass legal muster, the NTSB's work probably would. 

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The pilot's original destination was Bozeman, Montana.  But the pilot amended his flight plan and diverted to Butte.  The pilot did not tell air traffic control why he was diverting.  About 25 minutes later, as the aircraft approached for landing at Butte, it went out of control and crashed. 

The NTSB is now investigating two things: (1) why the pilot diverted to Butte, especially when he was so close to Bozeman, and (2) why the pilot lost control and crashed so near the runway at Butte.

Some possible explanations for diverting include:

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Tim Vasquez is a meteorologist with Weather Graphics in Oklahomoa.  He has plotted Flight 447's flight path against GOES-10 satellite and other weather data. Vaquez' work suggests Flight 447 penetrated two thunderstorm cells.

The image below, according to Vasquez, is similar to what the Flight 447 crew would have seen on its weather radar screen, assuming its radar was working. The black line in the image represents the aircraft's flight path.  "ACARS Position" represents the aircraft's position when it sent it's last ACARS message.

This next diagram is a cross section of Flight 447's track through the thunderstorm cluster.  According to Vasquez, instead of fying around these two cells, Flight 447 flew through the top of the first cell and then continued on through the middle of the second.

Not surprisingly, Vasquez concludes the aircraft encountered severe turbulence that may have damaged the aircraft.  The question of why Flight 447 failed to avoid the storms (theories discussed in a previous post) remains unanswered.  Vasquez's full report can be found here.

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Did the Pilots Attempt to Fly Through a Thunderstorm Intentionally? That's very unlikely. Pilots avoid thunderstorms at all costs, because they know a thunderstorm can destroy any aircraft. Pilots use the aircraft’s on-board weather radar system to make sure they keep a safe distance. During the day, they can see the towering thunderstorms rising up to 50,000 feet and avoid them that way as well.

Did Lightning Destroy the Aircraft? Probably not. Lightning strikes are common. On average, each airplane is the US commercial fleet is stuck by lightning once per year. To protect against strikes, airliners are designed to route the electrical charge along the aircraft’s outer skin from one end of

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I blogged here on whether it was icing that caused the crash of Flight 3407, or whether the pilot simply pulled back on the yoke when he should have pushed forward.  The NTSB's animation, using data gathered from the aircraft's black boxes, makes a strong case for the latter. 

The video is 2 minutes 39 seconds long.  Watch the airspeed drop dangerously low by 2:04 and the stick shaker activate at 2:07.  The pilot should have immediately pushed the yoke forward, which would have pointed the nose down and allowed the aircraft to regain airspeed.  Instead, he pulls the yoke back.

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Cory Lidle's wife and Tyler Stanger's family are suing Cirrus Design, alleging that a problem with the plane's flight controls caused Lidle and Stanger's plane to crash into a Manhattan hi-rise.

Miles O'Brien, a former CNN correspondent, calls the lawsuit frivolous, because the NTSB concluded the cause was pilot error.  According to O'Brien, "in our litigious society, the facts don't matter for much."

O'Brien is missing the fact that the NTSB's conclusion is marred by a built-in conflict of interest.

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Right after the crash of Flight 3407 at Buffalo, investigators  focused on the aircraft's deicing system. The question, as explained by former CNN reporter and pilot Miles O'Brien, was whether ice had accumulated on the plane's wings faster than the de-icing system could remove it, leading to an aerodynamic “stall,” or loss of lift. 

But as the investigation progressed, it began to look as though, just before the pilot lost control of the aircraft, the nose of the plane pitched up  -- not down as usually happens when ice overwhelms an aircraft.  That raised an almost unthinkable possibility:  gross pilot error.  When an aircraft gets

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Scene System's animation of the crash of US Airways Flight 1549 is a viral hit.  The litigation support firm combined available ATC audio tapes, flight track information, and an on-scene photograph into a great recreation.  This is the exactly the type of animation used in court to help juries understand the details of an aviation accident.  

But would this particular animation be admissible in a lawsuit?  Probably not. It incorporates too much guesswork.  For example, Scene System overlays the animation with audio from Air Traffic Control tapes.  Are the movements and positions of the aircraft properly synchronized with the audio? To do that right, you'd most likely need information from the Flight Data Recorder , which isn't yet available. Without that data, the animation is objectionable as "lacking foundation."  It's safe to say that, before it could be shown in court, the animation would require hundreds more hours of work and refinement. 

Of course, Scene Systems wasn't out to produce a recreation that was admissible in court. It was just trying to show the type of product it is capable of. And it did that very nicely. 

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