Aviation Law Monitor : Aviation Lawyer & Attorney : Michael Danko Law Firm : California Airplane & Helicopter Crashes : Aviation Law Monitor

The NTSB has released its preliminary report of the off-airport landing of Lancair IV-P N9JE at Hilton Head.  The accident killed a jogger but left the plane’s two occupants uninjured. According to the preliminary report, 

Further examination of the airplane revealed that the propeller assembly separated from the crankshaft flange and was missing.

In other words, the crankshaft failed.

One wouldn’t expect a crankshaft to break absent some sort of defect. If that proves to be the case, could the manufacturer of the crankshaft be held liable to the jogger’s family?

The aircraft was built from a kit and was thus "experimental." The engine, however, was not. Rather, according to FAA records, it appears that the engine was an FAA-certified, turbocharged piston engine manufactured by Teledyne Continental Motors, a company that has had its share of lawsuits related to its engines coming apart in flight. 

The General Aviation Revitalization Act, or GARA, protects aircraft engine manufacturers from liability for defective engine parts older than 18 years.

We don’t know how old the engine was in this case.  However, the Lancair builder had reportedly taken the engine from a Piper Malibu.  Piper stopped using the Teledyne Continental TSIO-520 engine in its Malibus due to reliability problems. In 1988, it switched and began installing Avco Lycoming engines instead. Thus, if it turns out that the engine was an original equipment Malibu engine, then it had to be at least 20 years old -- 2 years beyond GARA's age limit.

So is Teledyne Continental Motors off the hook, regardless of whether the jogger's family can prove that the engine was defective? 

No.

There is one important but little-known exception to GARA.  Regardless of the defective part's age, GARA doesn’t protect its manufacturer from lawsuits brought by the families of those killed on the ground.  

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That's the number one question I've been asked about this accident.  Not "why did the accident happen," but "why didn't the pilot use the parachute?"

As I note here, most Cirrus pilots would say that the parachute should be deployed in the event of engine failure, unless there is a long, paved runway beneath the aircraft such that a safe on-airport landing is assured.  But that doesn't mean that, if there is no airport within range, a pilot who opts to glide to a field rather than pull the chute is negligent.

Pulling the parachute has serious risks.  The aircraft's rate of descent under the parachute is high.  Ground impact forces are severe. Cirrus warns that the decision to deploy the parachute should not be made lightly because parachute deployment may result in "severe injury or death to the aircraft occupants."

The Cirrus, like every aircraft, comes with a Pilot Operating Handbook.  That's the "bible" that the pilot is supposed to follow.  The emergency checklist for an "engine out" scenario does not mention the parachute system:

Forced Landing (Engine Out):  If all attempts to restart the engine fail and a forced landing is imminent, select a suitable field and prepare for the landing.

A suitable field should be chosen as early as possible so that maximum time will be available to plan and execute the landing. . .

The checklist then sets forth the 12-step "forced landing" checklist.  No mention of the parachute, anywhere.

In the back of the Handbook, there is a separate section on the use of the parachute.  This section lays out various scenarios in which the pilot should consider deploying the parachute, such as after a mid-air collision, aircraft structural failure, or loss of aircraft control  One scenario deals with engine failures:

Landing Required in Terrain not Permitting a Safe Landing

If a forced landing is required because of engine failure, fuel exhaustion. . .or any other condition, [parachute] activation is only warranted if a landing cannot be made that ensures little or no risk to the aircraft occupants.  However, if the condition occurs over terrain thought not to permit such a landing, such as: over extremely rough or mountainous terrain, over water out of gliding distance to land, over widespread ground fog or at night, [parachute] deployment should be considered.

The pilot was not over "extremely rough or mountainous terrain." He had apparently picked out what he believed to be a suitable field for a forced landing.  The Cirrus Pilot Operating Handbook does not require pilots to deploy the parachute in the situation this pilot faced.  To the contrary, the Handbook leaves that decision to the pilot's discretion:

It is the responsibility of you, the pilot, to determine when and how the [parachute system] will be used.    

Related Post: Cirrus Crash at Morton, Washington

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Nothing scares helicopter pilots more than wires. Flying into a wire is often fatal. What worries the pilot is that wires are hard to spot. The trick is to look for the towers. Once you see the towers, you can spot the wires strung between them.

But not always.

In January, a California Fish and Game helicopter flew into wires near Auberry, California. Four died in the ensuing crash. Two families have now sued Southern California Edison, alleging that the power company should have marked its wires with orange balls to make them more visible.

The twist to the case is that the helicopter did not strike the 2” thick high tension wires that carry electricity.  Rather, it flew into thinner, harder-to-see “static lines” that were strung above the high tension wires.

From one of the lawsuits:

The transmission lines directly over Willow Creek span 3,000 feet from tower to tower. . . Static lines are normally within several feet of the power transmission lines however on the 3,000 foot span the static lines were constructed and maintained so as to be significantly elevated above the power lines. . . . helicopter pilots flying in and about transmission lines would form the belief that the static lines would be maintained at the approximate same distance above the power lines . . . Because of the size of the static lines, they are nearly invisible until they are within about 285' so that at a nominal speed of 60 knots the pilot has no more than 2.8 seconds to observe the lines and avoid them whereas with colored ball warnings on the lines they are easily seen from a safe distance to allow pilots to identify the lines and to easily avoid the hazard of them.

Here is a photo of marker balls installed on a nearly invisible static line, and the high tension wires that hang below.  (This is not the accident site.)  Note what a difference the balls make.

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A Cirrus SR-22, N224GS, crashed yesterday in Washington state.  The pilot was killed.  The passenger was critically injured.  The aircraft departed Concord, California (CCR) in good weather, bound for home.  It crashed in Morton, 60 miles from its destination, which was presumably Renton (RNT).

The accident appears to have been the result of engine failure:

• Witnesses said it was flying "low and silent" just before impact.
• A pilot on frequency says he heard the Cirrus pilot report to Air Traffic Control "saying he was dead stick "no engine" and he didn't think they were going to make the airport."

Facts suggesting that the engine failed because it ran out of gas:

• Fuel exhaustion is the leading cause of engine failure.
• The pilot reported to his wife that he was battling a "stiff headwind." Unexpected headwinds are common to many fuel exhaustion accidents.
• The aircraft was only about 20 minutes from landing, Most fuel exhaustion accidents happen close to the intended destination.
• There was no post-crash fire. No fire suggests that there was no fuel on board to burn.

Facts suggesting that the engine failed because of a mechanical problem:

• Assuming the Cirrus was fully fueled at Concord, the Cirrus should have been able to make Renton even with "stiff" head winds.
• The pilot's widow reports that the aircraft had engine problems that were recently repaired.

Why didn't the pilot deploy the Cirrus parachute? 

There is no consensus among Cirrus pilots as to exactly when the parachute should be deployed. 

• Some pilots say it should not be deployed in the event of engine failure.  Rather, it's safer for the pilot to glide the aircraft to a safe off-airport landing area. 
• Other pilots say the parachute should be deployed in all cases of engine failure unless the aircraft is directly over a long, paved airport runway.

The wreckage photos show that the parachute was, in fact, deployed.  An NTSB investigator has told the press that it cannot be determined at this point whether the parachute was deployed before impact or instead as a result of impact forces.  But the photos strongly suggest that it was deployed by impact forces and not by the pilot. 

March 26 Update:  The NTSB has released its preliminary report of the accident.  Investigators drained 7 gallons of fuel (about half-hour's worth) from the left tank.  That rules out fuel exhaustion -- there was definitely fuel on board the aircraft.  The right tank was ruptured in the crash.  That means it could not be determined if there was any fuel in it before impact.  As a result, while fuel exhaustion can be ruled out, fuel starvation is still a possibility.

In a "fuel exhaustion" accident, the engine stops because there is no fuel left on board the aircraft.  In a "fuel starvation" accident, there is fuel on board, but the engine stops because the pilot has not positioned the fuel valve or valves properly to allow the fuel to flow to the engine.  For example, fuel starvation results when the pilot tries to feed the engine from a tank that is empty.  Fuel starvation most commonly happens after the pilot runs one tank dry, and then fails to switch properly to another with fuel in it.

Fuel starvation is common in aircraft with complex fuel systems.  The Cirrus' fuel system, however, is a model of simplicity.  Point the valve to the left fuel gauge to feed from the left tank, point to the right gauge to feed from the right.  There's not much chance of confusion.

Unfortunately, the NTSB report doesn't say what position the fuel valve was found in: "left," right" or "off."  If the valve was found in the "right" position, fuel starvation remains a possibility.  If it was found in the "left" position (as shown in the photo), that would suggest the engine failed for reasons unrelated to fuel starvation.

Related Post: Should the Pilot Have Deployed the Parachute?

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Only modifications that carry a Supplemental Type Certificate may be legally installed on an aircraft. The Supplemental Type Certificate guarantees that the FAA has thoroughly tested and reviewed the modification. And it's the Supplemental Type Certificate that insures that the modification is safe and compatible with the particular model aircraft on which it’s being installed. Right?

Maybe not. Owners really shouldn't place too much stock in an STC. Or so says one former NTSB accident investigator. The investigator, now retired, explained to me that most owners might be surprised by how little work the FAA does before issuing an STC. Sure, the STC process is a huge paperwork shuffle for the modification's manufacturer. But it's little more than that. The process seldom entails any real independent engineering cross-check on the FAA's part.

"Give me an example", I asked. "OK,' he said. "Let's talk tip tanks."

A popular modification for many models of Cessna single-engine aircraft are wingtip extensions that

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Most general aviation aircraft manufactured today come with "glass cockpits."  Instead of being equipped with mechanical gauges and indicators, they are equipped with computer screens.  The screens integrate and display all sorts of useful flight information.  The information displayed may include satellite weather, synthetic vision, infrared vision, terrain awareness information, traffic information, and moving maps. Glass cockpits are supposed to help improve the pilot's "situational awareness." 

Not surprisingly, glass cockpits have been marketed as a safety advantage.  From the website of one manufacturer, Cirrus Aircraft:

We included new safety features to reduce your work load and anxiety by giving you more time to think and improving flight environment manageability. Ultimately, with [our glass cockpit] you get a smoother, more precise flying experience while all the time knowing you are flying smarter, flying safer.

The NTSB agrees that glass cockpits have the potential to improve safety.  But to the surprise of many, the NTSB has now found that, to date, they have not.  To the contrary, aircraft equipped with glass cockpits have a higher than fatal accident rate than comparable aircraft equipped with the old-fashioned, hard-to-decipher mechanical gauges.

Study analyses of aircraft accident and activity data showed a decrease in total accident rates but an increase in fatal accident rates for the selected group of glass cockpit aircraft when compared to similar conventionally equipped aircraft during the study period. Overall, study analyses did not show a significant improvement in safety for the glass cockpit study group.

How can this be?  More information, presented to the pilot in an easy-to-understand fashion, is supposed to be a good thing.  The NTSB's findings have left many scratching their heads.

I've written before that the poor safety record may simply be the result of "Risk Homeostasis" at work.  Risk Homeostasis theory suggests that, when given the opportunity, pilots will use a safety feature to enhance the aircraft's utility rather than enjoy the increased level of safety the feature could provide.  In other words, pilots use the the glass cockpits to fly into conditions that they would otherwise avoid.  And, instead of painstakingly preparing for the flight before they depart, they prepare "on the fly" (so to speak), relying on the glass cockpit to tell them what they need to know.

A feature - whether it is a glass cockpit or an airframe parachute - can serve as a safety feature or one that enhances an aircraft's utility.  It can't do both.

Related Content From the NTSB:

• NTSB Overview Report (pdf)
• Findings & Recommendations (pdf)
• Closing Comments (pdf)

Related Content From this Blog:

• Recent Crashes Stoke Debate on Cirrus Safety
• Cirrus FIKI Marketing Irresponsible?

Related Content from Max Trescott:

• Glass Cockpits: NTSB Concludes Pilots Need More Training

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Other countries severely limit compensation that may be awarded in wrongful death lawsuits arising from airline accidents.  For example, many other countries do not allow families to be compensated for loss of a loved one's "care, comfort, or society."  As a result, in almost all situations, the best venue for a family's lawsuit against an airline is the United States.

If the airline passenger's trip included an international stop, then the proper venue for the lawsuit is controlled entirely by international treaties known as the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions.  The Warsaw Convention permits the passenger (or the passenger's family) to sue in the United States, even though the accident happened on foreign soil, if and only if:

1. The passenger's ticket was issued in the United States;
2. The passenger's journey was a round trip that started in the United States or was a one-way trip that ended in the United States; 
3. The airline is incorporated in the United States; or
4. The airline's principal place of business is in the United States.

The Montreal Convention has replaced the Warsaw Convention in most situations. The Montreal Convention adds to the list what has been called a "fifth jurisdiction." Regardless of where the accident occurred, or where the passenger began or ended his trip, the international traveler or his family may sue the foreign airline in the United States if the United States was the passenger's "principal and permanent residence."  For this fifth option to be available, however, the airline must maintain some sort of presence in the United States.     

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