The "Impossible Turn" and Three Mooney Crashes in Two Weeks

Posted on July 19, 2011 by Mike Danko

Three Mooneys have crashed in two weeks.  Each aircraft crashed on takeoff.  Sadly, seven people were killed.  Two of the accidents may have involved the "impossible turn."

First Crash: On July 5, a 1974 Mooney M20F (N7759M) crashed shortly after taking off from Watsonville, California.  All four aboard were killed. 

Second Crash: On July 17, a nearly identical Mooney M20F (N3524X) crashed taking off from Winslow-Lindbergh Airport in Arizona, killing two aboard.  

At first glance, the Watsonville crash and the Winslow crash seem eerily similar.  The same model aircraft was involved in each.  Each crashed just moments after takeoff. 

But the two accidents are entirely different. The Watsonville crash is consistent with the pilot climbing too steeply to avoid a fog bank. There doesn't appear to be any evidence of an engine problem, at least at this point. Rather, as the pilot pitched the nose up, his airspeed bled off, and the wings (not the engine) stalled.  According to one witness:

He was heading toward the coast and tried to climb . . .From the time he took off, he was going too steep, too slow. ... He spun to the left and you can see where the impact was.

In contrast, the pilot in the Winslow crash appears to have attempted to turn around and glide back to the runway after his Lycoming engine quit.  

A Mooney departed then called with engine problems [saying he was] returning to the airport [from the] opposite direction. My friend circled giving the Mooney the right of way. .  Later he asked the Mooney for a position, no response to a couple of calls. He circled for a while longer then landed. Rolling out he saw the Mooney off the departure end of the runway on its back. He said it looked like the typical return to the airport stall spin accident.

The attempt to return to the airport after an engine failure is often called "the impossible turn," because it so frequently ends in the aircraft stalling during the turn and spinning in, with fatal results.

Plots are trained never to turn back to the runway after an engine failure unless they have adequate altitude.  Instead, land straight ahead, or slightly to the right or to the left.  Better to land in the trees, but under control, then lose control of the aircraft and spin in.  While a crash landing in rough terrain may result in serious injury or even death, spinning into the ground is almost always fatal.  Losing control of the aircraft after engine failure must be avoided at all costs. Unfortunately, the temptation to try the "impossible turn" and make it to the runway can be irresistible.

This video shows a Mooney pilot attempting the impossible turn after engine failure near Sacramento, California in 2009.  Both he and his passenger were killed when the aircraft spun in.

 

 

Third Mooney Crash: Finally, on July 18, a 1979 Mooney 20K (N777CV) crashed at Augusta Regional Airport while taking off, killing the pilot and sole occupant, a Mooreville doctor. That aircraft also came to rest within the airport boundaries.  It appears this pilot also experienced engine failure, and also may have attempted to turn back to the airport, stalled, and spun in.  Too early to tell.

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Pilatus Crash at Butte: Reader Beats NTSB By Eight Months

Posted on July 14, 2011 by Mike Danko

Initially, the NTSB thought it might never determine the cause of the Pilatus crash at Butte, reporting to the press that it had no working theories. But this week, the NTSB concluded that the 2009 crash was caused by icing in the aircraft's fuel system.  According to the NTSB, the pilot failed to add an ice inhibitor to his fuel before takeoff.  Then, when his fuel started to solidify at altitude, he failed to immediately land.  Fuel in one wing tank began to freeze.  With fuel draining to the engine from other wing tank only, a fuel imbalance developed and grew worse and worse.  The fuel imbalance ultimately rendered the aircraft uncontrollable, and the pilot crashed.

Interesting analysis. But a blog reader provided us this analysis eight months ago, in a comment to this post.  Looks like "Pilatus Person" was spot on:

Pilot didn't take on Prist. Without Prist, the fuel the pilot had on board would freeze at -40F. It was colder than that at pilot's altitude. So fuel in one tank turned to jello. Despite the transfer pump's best efforts, it couldn't move fuel from that tank to the other side to balance the load. Pilot asked for a lower altitude because he wanted warmer air. But by then, the tanks were seriously out of balance. Pilot had to hold one wing up with aileron. As he approached the field, he was cross-controlled. Then he turned in the "wrong" direction. A cross-control stall flipped the aircraft on its back. . . .All of that fits with the information in the docket. Check it out.

 

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Prokop v. Cirrus Heads to Minnesota Supreme Court

Posted on July 1, 2011 by Mike Danko

A pilot crashed his new Cirrus, killing himself and his passenger. According to the families, Cirrus didn't train the pilot on the use of the plane's autopilot when he showed up at the factory to pick up his new aircraft, and that contributed to the crash. The details are here.

The jury agreed with the families, handing Cirrus Design one of the most controversial aviation verdicts in recent memory. Then, in April, a court of appeals vacated (erased) the verdict, and ordered that judgment be entered in favor of Cirrus. Now, in the most improbable turn of all, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has agreed to hear the case by granting a petition for review.

In vacating the verdict, the court of appeal ruled that, even assuming for argument's sake that Cirrus failed to train the pilot properly, it doesn't mean that the families had a right to sue.  That's because Minnesota law prohibits lawsuits for "educational malpractice."

. . . determination of whether the transition training was ineffective because the instructor failed to provide a flight lesson on [the use of the autopilot] would involve an inquiry into the nuances of the educational process, which is exactly the type of determination that the Dissenting Cirrus Judge Roger Klaphakeeducational-malpractice bar is meant to avoid.

But one judge on the three-judge panel, Roger Klaphake, dissented.  He reasoned that the "educational-malpractice bar" did not apply because the families did not claim that Cirrus' improperly instructed the pilot on the use of the autopilot. Rather, the families claimed that Cirrus failed to instruct the pilot at all.

The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to review the case is unusual.  Each year, the Supreme Court is asked to take up and review more than 600 appellate decisions. But it agrees to hear only about 60.  The rest are simply not important enough to take up the court's time.  

It is, of course, impossilbe to predict how the Supreme Court will decide the Cirrus case.  About  30% of the time, the Supreme Court affirms (completely agrees with) the court of appeal decision.  About 15% of the time, it reverses (completely disagrees with) the court of appeal.  The rest of the time, it's a mixed result.

The Supreme Court can reinstate the jury's verdict against Cirrus, erase it (as the court of appeal did), or issue new rules for the jury to follow and then order that the case be retried.  But the case's ramifications will not be limited to Cirrus, flight training, or even aviation law.  Rather, the court can be expected to clarify Minnesota's law banning "educational malpractice" suits generally. 

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